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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Many recently developed decision tools are being 
used in the petroleum refining industry. Specifically, the 
industry's major firms have competent staffs studying 
alternate applications of quantitative techniques. The 
entire refining operations of some of these firms have been 
simulated with computer models. The mathematical models 
thus developed predict the output of each of a large number 
of different types of refining processes with practical 
accuracy. The actual outputs of the refinery units can now 
be changed by reprocessing to produce the end products 
desired by management. This recycling creates a flexibility 
within the refinery unit. The refining operation has 
therefore become more of a manufacturing (as compared to a 
processing) activity than heretofore envisioned by the 
general public. A discussion of this new "manufacturing" 
characteristic of the refining industry was included in a 
dissertation entitled "Accounting and Management Control 
Practices in Petroleum Refining.”1
1William F. Schmeltz, "Accounting and Management 
Control Practices in Petroleum Refining" (unpublished 
Doctor's dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1966) 
Distributed by Standard Oil Co. of Ohio.
1
2
The study of refinery-related problems was made more 
complex, therefore, for at least two reasons. Improvements 
in refining technology have allowed an expansion of refinery 
products where an intricate joint production problem already 
existed. In addition, the magnitude of the production 
alternatives in modern refineries has made the application 
of computer simulations and quantitative techniques 
advantageous for total revenue total cost studies. These 
simulations have added their own complexities.
THE PROBLEM
Joint cost allocation has remained an "insolvable" 
problem with respect to an exacting, accurate, and 
defensible solution. Many solutions have been proposed and 
carefully studied; however, not one has proved invulnerable 
to all valid logic. The most practical and theoretically 
sound method advanced by accountants was the generally 
accepted allocation of joint cost based upon the relative 
market value of the products. Implicit in this theory was 
the assumption that prices of the various products are 
flexible and represent an interaction of supply and demand.
Some authors of accounting principles textbooks have 
suggested the price-relative solution to joint cost 
allocations as the best method available. These authors 
usually list refining, meat processing, and real-estate 
division as appropriate applications of this method. 
Simultaneously, authors of management accounting textbooks 
3
have emphatically stated that joint cost allocations were 
inappropriate for decision making purposes. The primary 
reason given was the arbitrary selection of relative prices 
as the cost allocator. The net result of the difference of 
opinion has been the use of the price-relative method for 
inventory purposes and the use of no allocation at all for 
managerial decision making purposes.
There is evidence that cost allocations have long 
been questioned by operating personnel as shown by the 
following quotation: "I also have generally concluded from 
reviewing the literature that refinery managers tend to view 
all calculated refinery cost with suspicion."2 This doubt 
coupled with the newer characteristics of modern refineries 
suggests the following questions:
1. Was the price-relative joint-cost-allocation method 
included in the decision models used to determine 
new internal refinery investment?
2. If the traditional joint-cost-allocation method was 
appropriate, how could accountants obtain more 
acceptance for this method in the decision model?
3. If traditional joint cost allocation was not 
appropriate, was a study then necessary to determine 
more appropriate input into the decision model?
The possibility of semirigid prices for petroleum 
products adds an additional complexity to the problem. If 
prices are found to be semirigid and costs are related to 
prices, then costs are also semirigid. This possibility
2Ibid,. p. 105. 
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suggests several additional questions such as:
1. Are supply and demand interactions the exclusive 
determinants of refined-product prices during 
the period under study?
2. Are artificial price rigidities in evidence?
3. Do accounting techniques or economic interpretations 
contribute to the price rigidities?
4. Are joint cost allocations based upon relative 
market values as undesirable as suggested in 
management accounting literature?
5. What effects do price rigidities have on the price­
relative joint-cost allocation?
6. What effects do price rigidities have on refinery 
investment decisions?
Statement
The multifaceted purpose of this study is to
investigate activities and policies which appeared to create 
artificial restraints on prices from 1963 to 1972, to 
determine the effect of rigidities in price on refinery 
investment decisions, and to consider the accounting and 
economic implications of price rigidities.
Another possibility is also explored in this study.
The implicit assumption of price flexibility necessary for 
the price-relative joint-cost allocator to have managerial 
significance may not have been possible in the petroleum­
refining industry during the period under observation due 
to artificial or external constraints on price.
Importance
Regardless of the method used to decide among 
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investment alternatives when allocating resources within any 
particular organization, both the expected revenue and the 
attendant costs from a potential investment must be 
estimated. The prominent methods deal with the difference 
between the total revenue flow and the cash costs of that 
flow. Some reasonably accurate approximation of this 
difference is required whether the method be discounted cash 
flow, years to pay out, or return on investment.
Refinery investment decisions are more complex than 
most other decisions but they are not basically different. 
The decision to build a completely new facility is usually 
determined by the total projected revenue less total 
projected cost; however, the product mix is a much more 
difficult forecast. Without a reliable indicator of 
individual product cost there is no accurate way to 
determine the excess of projected revenue over projected 
cost for each product.
A Lead Indicator of Change
In the past, technological progress was slower and 
the dollar investment in refineries was smaller. Under 
these conditions, the potential distortion of the investment 
decisions affecting the component parts of the refinery was 
not so critical because alternative processing techniques 
were not available. Mistakes were corrected by time 
without severe repercussions.
During the last century a major but gradual
6
transition in refinery output from kerosine to high-octane 
gasoline has occurred without extreme financial disaster.
If a major technological breakthrough or severe environ­
mental restriction were suddenly to occur, the industry 
would be dealt a severe financial blow. The potential loss 
would be millions of dollars of investment due to 
obsolescence. A reasonably gradual change in demand among 
the various products could be met with minimal loss if some 
indicator in the investment model were to change. This 
change would denote the need for a shift in investment 
within the refinery. If prices were semirigid and 
traditional accounting methods were followed, it is doubtful 
that any such indicator would be present in the investment 
model. New refinery investment would be continuously 
allocated on the old basis until an emergency was reached.
Shortage of Capacity
A national shortage of refinery capacity became 
apparent to informed observers in 1973. Many people only 
recognized a gasoline shortage and were unaware of the 
refinery-capacity problem. With most of the petroleum 
industry’s major firms possessing competent staffs, well 
trained in the latest quantitative techniques, this fact 
seems to require an explanation. The first conclusion one 
might reach is that the oligopoly structure has acted to 
artificially limit available products and raise the price 
structure.
7
Additional facts must be considered. Alleged 
shortages of fuel oil and alleged overproduction of higher- 
octane products have occurred within the same year. Prices 
of higher-octane products have long been depressed even 
while petroleum resources were dwindling as attested by a 
constant reduction of proven domestic reserves. This more 
complete picture of the situation in the petroleum refining 
industry may seem a strange paradox to even the casual 
observer. If petroleum resources were scarce in the long 
run, then the price of petroleum products should have 
demonstrated a long-term upward trend under normal 
circumstances.
There was no "absolute" shortage of fuel oil, but 
there was a domestic shortage of fuel oil at the existing 
low prices. Facts have been presented in Chapter 4 which 
lead to the conclusion that forces other than supply and 
demand for petroleum products in the United States were 
operating to establish prices. One should not necessarily 
infer from this statement that a conspiracy existed or that 
the price policies established by a few firms were the 
exclusive determinants of price within the industry. 
However, if only free-market forces were at work, one would 
have expected the fuel-oil price to rise and the gasoline 
price to lower until the increased fuel-oil price attracted 
some of the surplus refinery capacity devoted to higher- 




Given the existing circumstances, one might expect 
to see a waste of natural resources. The best investment 
indicators continue to induce an oversupply of higher-octane 
products because of analytical methods to be discussed 
later. This temporary oversupply was reflected in the 
depressed gasoline prices which may have induced marginal 
consumers to purchase additional products. One would expect 
most gasoline consumers to behave in a manner similar to 
that explained in Duesenberry's relative-income hypothesis.3 
There is, however, another facet to the problem. If 
price-relative joint cost allocations are inappropriate and 
this fact is recognized by operating personnel before it is 
recognized by the accounting profession, operating personnel 
may (in an attempt to improve input into their investment 
model) experiment with other cost allocators more 
detrimental to the investment model's output than the 
traditional price-relative joint cost allocation. In the 
intricacies of today's complex quantitative models some 
decisions could be reached and seemingly justified.
However, if these decisions were studied in a less-complex 
setting, or from a more-theoretical point of view, they 
might prove unacceptable.
3James S. Duesenberry, "Income-Consumption Relations 
and Their Implications," an essay in Income, Employment and 
Public Policy, ed. Lloyd A. Metzler (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Co. , Inc., 1948), pp. 54-81.
9
THE APPROACH OF THIS EVALUATION
Methodology
A careful review was made of the accounting 
literature to determine whether this problem had been 
previously investigated. After finding no such research, a 
pilot study was conducted at a medium-sized oil company to 
determine the best approach to the problem. This pilot 
project and an accounting-literature review suggested some 
of the problems associated with rigid prices.
The investigation necessarily encompassed some 
sensitive data in pricing and price expectations. The 
anticipated reluctance of company executives to provide this 
kind of information almost proved to be a serious barrier to 
the study. However, other data dependent upon, but not 
revealing price structure, were obtained. General state­
ments concerning price expectations when coupled with post­
completion audit evaluations provided sufficient verifiable 
evidence to proceed with the study without current detailed 
price figures.
Two primary research methods involving empirical 
data have been used. Because of the confidential nature of 
much of the information, personal interviews were sought 
with a significant portion of the firms responsible for 
United States refinery-investment decisions. In the larger 
oil companies those individuals contacted were usually 
located in a forward-planning division or in an economic
10
group responsible for forward planning. The interviews were 
unstructured to allow participants to speak more freely 
about potentially confidential material. An attempt was 
made to obtain information from a significant portion of the 
firms and to examine a few older investment decisions 
(either conducting a post completion audit evaluation or 
examining the results of one) on each of three decision 
size levels - small, medium and large.
Because of the confidential nature of much of the 
material, no firm has been identified although trends have 
been revealed. The firms, if referred to, were given 
fictitious names. In addition to the empirical evidence 
obtained from the firms contacted, considerable empirical 
data concerning the oil industry as a whole were available 
from several published sources and these data have been 
included in the study where appropriate.
Organization of the Evaluation
The evaluation of traditional joint cost accounting 
as it relates to internal investment decisions within the 
petroleum-refining industry has been described in detail 
under the following headings:
Chapter 2: Cost Accounting Within the Refinery
Segment of the Petroleum Industry. The historic 
development and theoretical justification of joint cost 
accounting methods are presented to provide a background for 
the analysis. Special emphasis is placed upon methodology
11
in joint costing and the implicit assumptions of different 
methods. In addition, the manufacturing, as opposed to 
processing, characteristics of the refining industry have 
been examined. Current practices in the industry have been 
reviewed, and available existing research on costing 
practices has been analyzed.
Chapter 3: Prices In the Petroleum Industry. 
Economic theory underlying the industry's pricing was 
briefly reviewed and compared to current practices. 
Observations on why oligopoly pricing might not have been 
possible in the petroleum industry during the period under 
study are presented.
Chapter 4: Factors Affecting Price Flexibility of 
Joint Products in the Refinery Segment of the Petroleum 
Industry. Regulatory agencies and congressional actions 
have a definite effect on price flexibility in certain 
portions of the joint product mix. Another influence has 
been the unusual competition monopolies exerted upon areas 
of the product mix. The United States crude oil import 
program and related defense considerations definitely 
affected pricing within the industry and have been 
considered. In addition, one of the most currently volatile 
subjects, the impact of ecological factors, has been 
considered together with some effects of policy fixation 
(the reluctance to change a proven policy despite changing 
conditions).
12
Chapter 5: Decision Processes Examined. The 
extent to which traditional joint cost accounting was used 
in the investment decision process has been briefly 
examined. The results of selected postcompletion audits of 
refinery investment decisions have been summarized. 
Interviews have been conducted with the management of a 
significant portion of total refinery capacity in existence 
on January 1, 1973.
Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions: The 
foundational materials and the empirical research developed 
and presented in prior chapters have been reviewed and 
analyzed. The conclusions and opinions reached as a result 
of this analysis have been presented together with 
recommendations either for action to be taken or further 
research to be considered.
Chapter 2
COST ACCOUNTING WITHIN THE REFINING SEGMENT
OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
Accounting literature contains few references in 
which the theoretical alternatives available for the 
allocation of joint-production costs are examined. 
According to John Dearden, "Joint production occurs 
whenever two or more products must result from the same 
production process."1 When the choice of products to be 
produced is assumed to be fixed in the short run, the 
traditional price-relative accounting approach to the 
problem of joint-cost allocation appears logical. Although 
this assumption of fixed short-run production options seems 
to permeate the accounting literature available, it is not 
often specifically stated.
General accounting aspects of joint cost allocations 
are reviewed in this chapter. In addition, specific problems 
associated with the petroleum-refining industry are 
considered. Since in-depth coverage of joint-production-
1John Dearden, Cost and Budget Analysis (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962). p. 46.
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cost allocation in accounting literature is so scarce, the 
following framework will be followed:
1. The early development of joint cost allocations
2. Cautions against and modifications to price-relative 
joint production cost allocations suggested in the 
literature
3. The manufacturing nature of refining
4. Current accounting practices in the industry
5. The quandary in the application of theory
6. Existing research on costing practices
7. A more precise statement of the current problem.
This review of the available accounting literature
on joint-production-cost allocation should provide needed 
background for the material to be presented in later 
chapters, while the attempts of authors to modify and 
caution against the generally accepted treatment should 
emphasize the difficulty of the subject.
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT
COST ALLOCATIONS
Early accountants were so occupied with recording 
and verifying data that little study was devoted to new 
areas of managerial assistance. Cost accounting procedures 
were first widely publicized around the turn of this 
century. The first published study of costs as a separate 
topic in the United States was by Henry Metcalf, an Army 
Ordnance captain. In 1885 he wrote "Cost of Manufactures,"
15
and thus broke a period of silence.2 Silence existed 
because cost accounting had long been considered 
confidential. Costs were used almost exclusively to 
establish price and any disclosure of cost disclosed price. 
Since the Army was not competing with other manufacturers, 
cost disclosures did not offer a competitive advantage that 
would cause concern.
Apparently few early writers even considered the 
subject of joint production cost allocation. As an example, 
Alexander Hamilton Church, a recognized cost authority who 
was particularly interested in overhead allocations, devoted 
only a small portion of his writing to by-product 
accounting.3 His observations on this phase of accounting 
were thorough, but did not embrace true joint-production­
cost allocation. Church recommended that by-products either 
be credited at the sales price, less cost of recovery in the 
manufacturing account, or that the original cost be divided 
on the basis of the relative weight of the by-products to 
the main products, if these figures were available.
A specific time for the introduction of the price­
relative approach to the solution of the joint-cost­
allocation problem was not readily apparent. The approach
2Captain Henry Metcalf, The Cost of Manufactures 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1885).
3 A. Hamilton Church, Manufacturing Costs and
Accounts (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1929), p. 106.
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was mentioned as early as 1903 by Stanley Garry.4 
Establishing this time does not appear essential to the 
discussion since more recent accounting principles authors 
have traditionally described the price-relative approach 
with little if any discussion of potential problems or 
alternate views. For example, Pyle and White state in their 
sixth edition of Fundamental Accounting Principles,
A joint cost may be, but is not commonly, 
allocated on some physical basis. ... The 
usual method of allocating a joint cost is in 
the ratio of the market values of the joint 
products at the point of separation.5
Niswonger and Fess in their eleventh edition of Accounting 
Principles mention only one allocation method, "the market 
(sales) value method."6
A study of the persons involved with cost concerns 
during the early period provides the basis for a logical 
observation. They were not accountants, but rather 
managers, consultants, and engineers. Their real concern 
was with efficiency, but efficiency was hard to measure 
objectively and report on successfully. As one engineer 
stated it:
4H. Stan ley Garry, "Factory Costs," The Accountant, 
(July 25, 1903), pp. 955-7.
5William W. Pyle and John Arch White, Fundamental 
Accounting Principles (6th ed.; Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1972), p. 606.
6C. Rollin Niswonger and Philip E. Fess, Accounting 
Principles (11th ed.: Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western 
Publishing Company, 1973), p. 521.
17
... one of the tasks of modern scientific
management, ... is to convert efficiency records 
into cost records since the language of cost is 
understood by all, the language of efficiency 
only by a few.7
The method advocated almost exclusively by current 
accounting principles textbook writers has not changed 
appreciably from that method introduced by earlier writers. 
This method (price-relative) allocates the cost of a joint 
product by multiplying the total cost by a different 
fraction for each of the component products produced. Each 
fraction is determined by placing the market value of the 
individual product to be costed in the numerator and the 
total market value of all products produced in the 
denominator. Although the selection of this method has been 
labeled arbitrary by most management accounting writers, it 
remains the most widely accepted accounting method.
CAUTIONS AGAINST AND SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS
TO PRICE-RELATIVE JOINT-PRODUCTION­
COST ALLOCATION
Harold G. Avery and numerous other authors in 
management-accounting textbooks have cautioned against the 
arbitrary nature of the price-relative approach.8 Their 
criticism is well phrased by John Dearden, ”... all cost
7Harrington Emerson, The Twelve Principles of
Elficiency (New York: The Engineering Magazine, 1913), P. 215.
8Harold G. Avery, "Accounting for Joint Costs." 
The Accounting Review, XXVI (April, 1951), 232.
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allocations among joint products are entirely arbitrary."9
Again he states:
If part of the joint production cost is 
assigned to one of the products, it is a 
meaningless allocation. This is the most 
important thing to remember about joint cost 
accounting because it is this characteristic 
that makes it necessary to modify traditional 
cost accounting techniques.10 ... Remember 
that the cardinal rule in joint cost accounting 
is: 'never show product-line profits.'11
Accountants have long considered accounting the 
language of business. Is the accountant going to be mute 
regarding communications needed by managers in their control 
of product mix? Accountants in this age seem to be 
forcing engineers and consultants to educate management in 
engineering efficiency by refusing to effectively convert 
the petroleum engineer's product improvements into the
g lanuage of cost accounting to the satisfaction of either
the engineers or management. Dearden makes a further
point:
Where some control can be exercised over the 
mix of products that result from a joint production 
process, the accountant has additional responsi­
bilities. He must give management information that 
will help in making decisions to maximize the 
profitability of the joint products. ... the 
products to produce are those with greatest 
contribution over unique costs.12
Dearden has rejected as arbitrary the price-relative 
method of cost allocation. His solution to the problem is
9John Dearden, Cost and Budget Analysis (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 47.
10Ibid. 11Ibid., p. 52. 12ibid.
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to deduct unique processing costs from the revenue realized 
on the sale of finished products. As pointed out by Lorig, 
this solution assumes
... that all the profits reflected in the latter 
sales values are earned prior to split-off. It 
assumes that the investment in the separate 
processing costs contributes nothing to the 
profits. Such an assumption is clearly illogical.13 
Another assumption that could be drawn is that the 
investment in the separate processing is equally profitable 
with the original processing. That is, the gross profit 
margin on all special processing and normal processing is 
the same. The implications of this latter assumption can be 
disproved.14
In his article Lorig attempted to provide an aid to 
management by analyzing joint-production costs. He 
postulated that in some circumstances management must make a 
decision regarding further processing of a joint-cost 
product beyond the "split-off" point. When this is true, he 
suggested that special processing costs should be compared 
to a cost calculated on the relative-market-value method. 
Wherever the special processing costs would exceed the 
allocated cost, a decision to process further would be 
unwise since more profit could be obtained in some other 
area.
13Arthur N. Lorig, "Joint Cost Analysis as an Aid 
to Management,” The Accounting Review, XXX (October, 1955), 
634-37.
14See Company M in Appendix E, p. 236.
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This article is one of the few available in 
accounting literature on Joint costs, and points up the 
controversial nature of the subject. In essence, Lorig 
theorized that whenever further processing costs exceed the 
gross profit margin at the existing level, a marketable 
semifinished product should be sold rather than processed 
further. Capital expenditures thus avoided should go into 
the more profitable processing areas.
Lorig immediately drew criticism from two sources.
T. M. Hill contested the ability to demonstrate any 
inequality of profitability on special processing of joint 
products.15 Further, he misunderstood Lorig's purpose in 
proposing a planning tool to determine whether or not to 
invest and raised the question of the transferability of 
committed capital from the old to the new projects. Gerald 
H. Lawson (an economic research student in England) also 
quickly entered the battle.16 Lawson raised the theoretical 
question of any allocation at all, thus challenging Lorig 
for using a price-relative allocator. He stated:
Implicit in this method is the assumption 
that every dollar invested in the production of 
the joint process is equally profitable. Whether 
or not one considers such assumption logical 
one cannot deny that it is highly arbitrary.
15T. M. Hill, "Criticism of 'Joint Cost Analysis as 
an Aid to Management,’" The Accounting Review, XXXI (April, 
1956), 204-5.
16Gerald II. Lawson, "Joint Cost Analysis as an Aid 
to Management ... Rejoinder,” The Accounting Review, XXXI 
(July, 1956), 439-43.
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How can one rely upon figures which are derived 
from such an arbitrary basis? The element of 
arbitrariness having entered a calculation at 
the outset, it follows that the final answer will 
be arbitrary to some degree.17
Lawson also attacked Lorig's method of backing into a 
particular negative value. He asked how total cost could be 
$400,000 less than the special processing cost. Lorig 
replied to both men explaining more clearly his position. 
Following this, Lawson had a rejoinder, which Lorig again 
answered.
This lively exchange occurred because one dared to 
suggest the beginning of a real problem. The value of 
Lorig's article was to point out the unequal processing that 
takes place beyond the "split-out” point which most authors 
had previously ignored. Lorig did, however, err with 
respect to joint process; he stated, "Furthermore, the 
chance to vary their relative quantities in the short run is 
practically nonexistent.”18 While this observation was 
correct at one time, relative quantities are now reasonably 
flexible, within constraints. This flexibility is provided 
by the decision to apply or not to apply techniques which 
have been developed to upgrade refined products by altering 
their atomic structure (see the next section, page 23).




significant contributions in the field of managerial
accounting. Early original contributions to the cost
accounting field were almost exclusively made by
nonaccountants.19 What are consultants saying today about
operating costs relating to joint cost accounting?
W. L. Nelson, Petroleum Consultant and Technical
Editor of the Oil and Gas Journal, had these comments on
operating costs.
Our committee ... has been able to unearth only 
the most meager published information. ... the 
problem of allocating refinery operating cost to 
the many petroleum products is so complicated that 
a completely satisfactory method will probably 
never be available. ... accordingly, little is 
available in the literature and the staff of the 
Oil and Gas Journal is unable to come up with a 
single truly useful reference.20
Dr. Nelson went on to suggest a "complexity factor” which 
produces a partial volume allocation, but takes into con­
sideration the operating-cost differences of the different 
refining processes.
If the refinery process could be simplified, and all 
processing beyond the original split-off point were done by 
different companies, the joint-cost-allocation problem would 
be simplified. This division of activity would clearly 
segregate the processing activity from the manufacturing
19Robert E. Feller, "Early Contributions to Cost 
Accounting.” Management Accounting, LV (December, 1973), 
27.
20W. L. Nelson, "How to Allocate Operating Costs to 
Each Product," Oil and Gas Journal, LXI (August 5, 1963), 
108 .
23
activity. Two distinct problems would be apparent instead 
of one if it were possible for the processing and the 
manufacturing activity to be segregated. This segregation 
.is impractical if not impossible, given existing facilities 
The first joint-cost-allocation problem would be concerned 
with the division of the costs associated with the 
acquisition and simple processing of a barrel of oil. The 
second joint-cost-allocation problem would be specifically 
concerned with manufacturing (further processing) costs and 
their division among the resultant products.
THE MANUFACTURING NATURE OF REFINING
From the birth of the petroleum industry in 1859
the refining of crude oil was a process. The only 
significant changes which occurred during most of this time 
were changes in vessel (still) size and changes in the 
methods of providing heat. Historically nothing could be 
done to significantly alter the yield from the process. 
Attempts at cost accounting under these circumstances 
produced considerable frustration because of the joint­
process-cost-allocation problem. When the early by-product 
period passed, and more than one desirable product was 
obtained, cost allocation with certainty was impossible. 
Astute accountants reached the conclusion, appropriate for 
that circumstance, that any allocation was arbitrary and 
cautioned against it.
More practical observers suggested price-relative
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allocations as a solution (although imperfect) to a pressing 
problem. How did this situation change; to what extent is 
the refining industry a manufacturing activity? William F. 
Schmeltz reviewed the historical developments in the 
refining industry which caused the change.21 A frenzy of 
activity has taken place since the discovery of the Burton 
Process in 1909 (patented in 1913) which has as its guiding 
thrust the extraction of greater quantities of high-revenue 
products from the barrel of crude oil. Various processes 
have been introduced and patented which give refiners 
greater and greater flexibility in product yield. Since the 
lighter fractions of the crude-oil barrel have traditionally 
produced the highest revenues, research and development have 
focused on the production of these lighter fractions.
Although research has been highly successful in enabling the 
refinery to upgrade products, it is not now possible to 
downgrade products heavier than the gasolines on an absolute 
basis. Flexibility does exist, however, since the manager 
can discontinue at will the upgrading process and return to 
the more natural yields. The percentage of upgrading is 
fairly small; however, the tremendous volumes put through 
the large refineries allow substantial quantities of 
alternate products to be considered for production. This
21William F. Schmeltz, "Accounting and Management 
Control Practices in Petroleum Refining" (unpublished 
Doctor's dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1966) 
Distributed by Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, pp. 3-5.
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flexibility creates the need for decisions. In turn the 
decision process generates a requirement for accounting 
information. Historically, (in other manufacturing areas) 
cost accounting with its managerial applications has 
provided the information needed to consider manufacturing 
alternatives.
The introduction of special processes to upgrade 
products led to differentials in processing costs. Dr. 
Nelson has clearly stated the fact that a price-relative 
cost allocator which completely ignores the processing-cost 
differences seems ill advised.22 Figure 4.4, page 87, 
indicates the complexity of the product-mix problem.
When crude oil and refining capacity existed in 
abundance, the normal decision was to continuously upgrade 
products Tor higher-revenue production. This decision 
appears to have been followed by the industry until 1973. 
An interruption on the supply side of the equation, however, 
produced a new result. When there was a shortage of supply 
at all levels of production, price should have become the 
adjustment mechanism in an uncontrolled economy. When 
supply was scarce, resources should have been shifted to the 
product with the increasing price (increased demand 
relative to other products). This solution was prevented by 
direct government control.
22W. L. Nelson, "Again - How to Allocate Operating 
Costs?" Oil and Gas Journal, LXIII (May 3, 1965), 123.
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The true flexibility of the refinery was not 
demonstrated to the public until 1973 when the government 
ordered a change in the product mix. An increase in 
intermediate-product prices was allowed by the government to 
avoid the penalty associated with not upgrading product to 
one which produced higher revenues. The problems related to 
limited domestic-refining capacity and the curtailment of 
United States imports of refined products by some foreign 
powers ushered in a dual pricing scheme for domestic crude 
and a separate set of prices for foreign crude. These 
multiple prices coupled with the retention of petroleum 
products under Phase IV Government controls have presented 
the industry with a most demanding need for timely, accurate 
cost data. One accounting and planning executive indicated 
when interviewed that his entire cost accounting and 
reporting system had to be changed to satisfy the reporting 
requirements of the government.23 The refinery is in 
reality a manufacturing plant with considerable flexibility 
in the short run and accounting systems have not always kept 
up with the rapidly changing external and internal reporting 
requirements. Any system which would meet today’s complex 
requirements must be flexible. Professor Schmeltz clearly 
points out the need for a segregation of fixed and variable 
costs and one might be tempted to embark on a discussion 
of direct costing versus absorption costing if one tended
23Name withheld by request.
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toward rigid accounting views.24 In this writer's opinion, 
the long-run solution to the extreme flexibility required of 
today's accounting system will demand modular construction 
in the accounting system.
The modular technique has been used to construct 
mobile homes, prefabricated houses, and other products 
where flexibility was a requirement. If used, the modular 
unit must be kept small and designed so that combinations 
are quickly possible. The accounting code used by most 
large firms would adapt to such a modular construction if, 
in addition to the regular code, a trailer code indicating 
the fixed or variable nature of a particular cost was added. 
In this way one could elect to sort either on the nature of 
the cost (i.e., fixed or variable) or on the nature of the 
account.
Regardless of the accounting methods used, there is 
flexibility in the output of today's refinery in the 
short run. Therefore, refining, once exclusively a 
processing operation, has now become a manufacturing 
activity with all the attendant cost-accounting and 
management-information requirements. While accountants in 
the past have generally adopted an "incapable-of-solution 
attitude” and consequently relied heavily on the price­
relative allocation, other members of the firms have been 
experimenting with different approaches. Some of these
24Schmeltz. op. cit. , p. 96.
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approaches will be briefly discussed in the following 
section.
CURRENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICES IN THE INDUSTRY
Two clearly separate areas require accounting 
information. Persons envisioning the financial reporting 
requirements have often pursued a fairly consistent approach 
to the valuation of inventory. This approach has generally 
taken the price-relative cost-allocation form. At the same 
time there is a need for internal information for decision­
making purposes and for planning. In this area some 
accountants have cooperated fully and tried to assist the 
decision makers. Others have resisted departure from their 
traditional approach and have become ineffective in providing 
management with timely information in areas management has 
chosen to pursue. Other specialists (without advanced 
accounting training) have attempted to provide management 
with meaningful information. Reliable techniques seem hard 
to find. Several methods have been adopted and abandoned 
within the last decade but one in particular seems to be 
gaining prominence.
William F. Schmeltz in an unpublished dissertation 
strongly suggested the development of a financial costing 
model to solve the complexities of this accounting problem .25
25 Ibid., pp. 242-3.
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He cautioned that it would be an expensive process but that 
existing technology was available and that such a computer 
model could be developed. This recommendation was sound, 
but the expense of such a model did not justify its creation 
merely for accounting purposes. Extremely sophisticated 
computer models had already been developed which would 
predict the output of each of many refinery operations with 
acceptable accuracy. There was a tendency for industry 
firms to use the existing model to the extent possible when 
developing the accounting model. These operational models 
used volume predictions and consequently most refineries, 
when forced by government agencies to report costs by 
product line, have adopted a heavy bias in favor of cost 
allocations based on volume. The theoretical problems 
associated with volume allocations are presented later in 
this chapter. While volumes appear to be a logical basis 
for allocating operating costs,they become quite illogical 
for allocating input costs.
The problem has been further compounded by Phase IV 
price controls. While a few companies suggested a price­
relative cost allocator, most companies favored a volume- 
oriented cost allocator and this view has prevailed. In 
essence the volume-oriented cost allocator will have a 
price-equalizing effect among the various products since the 
new prices will be based on allocated costs and the 
allocated costs are based on volumes rather than the 
relative values of the products. The higher-priced products
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will have a slight tendency to reduce in price and the 
lower-priced products to increase in price. Although the 
price tendency can be briefly explained, the methods applied 
for implementation are anything but simple. An indication 
of the complexities of the reporting requirements under 
Phase IV controls can be observed if one examines Appendix D 
beginning on page 204. These complexities and governmental 
requirements will undoubtedly affect future accounting for 
the cost of refined products and will also lend additional 
weight to the volume-oriented joint cost allocations.
A QUANDARY IN THE APPLICATION
OF THEORY
Direct questioning of personnel occupying management 
planning positions (economic planning departments or 
presidential, vice presidential levels) in the refining 
industry disclosed opposition to the use of a price-relative 
cost allocator for any management-decision purposes.26
Those contacted were unanimous in expressing opposition to 
this method even for the allocation of the input barrel of 
crude which (in the opinion of those interviewed) represents 
approximately 80 to 90 percent of the cost of the refined 
products included in this study. Most of the executives 
interviewed preferred a total revenue to total cost compari­
son for decision purposes. If they were forced to give
26A description of selection techniques and the 
number of firms contacted are presented on pp. 132-35.
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profit by product line, most indicated a preference for a 
cost allocation based either wholly or primarily on volume 
as opposed to price. The volume allocator was never 
suggested by the interviewer, but was either identified as a 
crucial part of a computer program's allocation technique or 
was directly stated by the industry executive. All persons 
interviewed indicated knowledge of many alternate costing 
techniques, and a few indicated that their firms had 
specifically experimented with several in planning 
department studies. Those interviewed included persons 
holding the Ph.D. in economics and authors of industry 
papers on the subject of cost allocation.
The implicit assumption in the price-relative cost­
allocation method that every dollar invested in the 
production of the joint process is equally profitable 
appears to be the most objectionable feature of the method. 
Processing costs are clearly not related to selling price 
since identical costs have been identified for products 
with different revenues.27 Rapid and severe price changes 
among the product mix defeats temporarily the logic of the 
price relative cost allocator.
Rapid Market Value Changes and the Price-Relative Allocator 
Recent increases in the price of foreign crude have 
removed some of the rigidity in the petroleum refining
27See Company "M", p. 236.
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industry. For years the refining industry in the United 
States has, with few exceptions, avoided domestic production 
of residual fuel oil.28 The reasons will be detailed in 
Chapter 4. Basically, residual-fuel-oil production was 
uneconomical at the time. However, increased demand for 
residual fuel oil , coupled with a critical shortage in the 
supply of the product, produced contract negotiations in 
which the 1973 residual-fuel-oi1 prices were almost double 
the previous price. The most expensive equipment and 
processes used in the industry have as their purpose the 
upgrading of refined products to lighter fractions which 
were previously more valuable. Suddenly, the product which 
does not require and cannot benefit from all this further 
special processing becomes more valuable. Should it then 
automatically acquire a "cost" approximately twice what it 
was originally? Until the price of crude oil rises, it 
cannot be argued that the purchaser of the barrel of oil 
envisioned the end result of the sale at the time of 
purchase. This timing difference between the purchase and 
use of the barrel of oil invalidates the primary logic of 
the price-relative approach.
This problem becomes even more complex if techno­
logical advance, rather than ecological or political 
constraint, causes the change. A detailed discussion of
28Texaco Inc. is the only major exception, having 
consistently produced residual fuel oil.
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such a change is presented in the section on page 39.
Other Allocation Methods
One of the simplest alternatives to the price­
relative allocator is an allocation based on volume (total 
cost divided by total units). This method seems to be 
gaining acceptance over more complex methods. Although 
well-suited to the allocation of processing costs, this 
method's use is questionable when one considers the cost of 
the barrel of input crude. Can it be logically argued that 
the purchaser of a barrel of oil is willing to pay the same 
price for the lowest revenue potential in the barrel as for 
the highest? If the components could be purchased 
separately, would any knowledgeable purchaser pay more for 
the residual-fuel-oil portion than it could be sold for 
after processing? This method creates conflicts greater 
than the ones presented in the previous section.
Management-accounting authors have cautioned against 
the arbitrary nature of the price-relative cost allocator. 
Emphatic statements have been made denying any managerial 
input quality to profit figures reported on a product mix 
basis. Accountants have presented an argument against the 
product of their own logic. With the acceptance of these 
comments there remains little value to the price-relative 
method of allocation. Inventory valuation is the one small 
exception. At this point most accountants have finished 
their search. Schmeltz has compared inventory
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valuation for a "model" refinery, under eight different 
methods, in a study which has been widely circulated within 
the industry.
Inventory valuations range from a high of 
$5,711,880.79 under the Barrel Gravity Method 
to a low of $4,957,182.10 under the Replacement 
Cost Method. Expressed as a percentage, the 
respective figures would be 87.48 percent and 
75.92 percent of the market value of the ending 
inventory. ... No matter what method is used, 
the dollar amount of the possible error is small 
in comparison.
This study included the joint-products method (with and
without blending), the by-products method, the replacement­
cost method, the product-analysis method, the barrel-gravity 
method, the crude/gravity and process/gallonage method, and 
the crude/BTU and process gallonage methods.
EXISTING RESEARCH ON COSTING PRACTICES
Most of the methods analyzed by Schmeltz were used
or had been suggested as possible solutions to the
allocation problem. However, most of these methods have now 
been discarded, are not used extensively, or are used with 
reluctance. New volume-oriented or differential cost 
techniques seem to be more acceptable to operating 
personnel. No one is entirely satisfied with the methods in 
use. Instead, the search continues for the least-objection- 
able method which bears some correlation to actual operating 
conditions. The study of the eight cost-allocation
29Schmeltz, op. cit., p. 96.
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techniques by Schmeltz appears to be dated to such an extent 
as to make the current usefulness of the study questionable. 
The age of this study leaves a void in the literature which 
will be difficult, if not impossible, to fill.
Phase IV price controls have made costs a direct 
determinant of price; consequently, any careful scrutiny 
of cost data at this time would arm competitors with 
pricing information and would undoubtedly be resisted by the 
oil companies. Some data could be obtained from the reports 
which are filed with the government but this information by 
itself would be of extremely limited value.
Methods other than those mentioned above have been 
considered by operating personnel and rejected (for example 
one company considered an allocation based upon atomic 
weight). The heavy use of computer models has introduced a 
trend toward the use of a volume or a modified volume 
method. How can one state the problem more precisely?
A MORE PRECISE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Is it possible to evaluate quantitatively the 
logical quandary in which we find ourselves? The 
traditional accounting justification for the price-relative 
allocation regards the barrel of oil as a bundle of 
products. (See Figure 2.1.) Accountants effectively argue 
that the knowledgeable purchaser of a barrel of oil 
envisions the use of the barrel at the time of acquisition; 
therefore, the maximum price one is willing to pay for the
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barrel is the sum of the values of the imagined component 
parts. Since the buyer thinks he knows the selling prices 
of the various potential products, and since he is quite 
familiar with his own operating costs, he would not choose 
to pay more for the barrel than the sum of the amounts each 
portion was worth, i.e., a sum which would allow a 
"reasonable" markup on each of the component products. The 
allocated cost of each component product would thus become 
price relative. The ratio of each component's revenue (Ri)
n
to total revenue ( E Rj) would be multiplied times total 
j=1
cost (C) to arrive at that component's cost. Expressed 
quantitatively (refer to Figure 2.1 and Formula 2.1), cost 
becomes:
(2.1)
Any change in the revenue barrel either in total or 
in product mix would cause a change in all costs under this 
accounting method. For example, assume that refinery 
engineers were successful in converting product C5 into a 
totally new product with much higher revenue, (referred to 
as revenue R5'). How is the cost barrel now envisioned? 
All cost allocated to the component parts have changed by 
recomputing formula 2.1.
In the illustration two important variables, technology and
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time lags, have thus far been ignored. The need for these 
variables becomes apparent if the problem is considered from 
the engineer's point of view. Petroleum engineers are 
assumed to be successful in the development of a new product 
by modifying an existing component. One old component is no 
longer produced, and the portion of the barrel of oil that 
used to go to that component is now used to produce the new 
component. No change has occurred in the cost of the 
barrel of oil. The engineer is successful in producing more 
revenue from the same crude-oil portion by incurring slight 
additional processing cost. Instead of reporting the 
additional revenue and cost associated with one component's 
conversion, the accounting method reallocates all costs and 
produces a new but equal profit margin on all products.
Engineers argue that a new formula (2.2) is needed 
for cost allocation. With such a view the revised cost 
should be
(2.2) Ci' = Ci + AC
where AC is the addition to cost due to product modification. 
This addition to cost would include both the additional 
processing cost and depreciation of the additional 
processing equipment required. Several different but actual 
refinery modifications which were approved by refinery 
management were described by industry representatives. 
Perhaps accounting reports should be capable of reflecting 
these potentially profitable events by reporting (internally) 
a profit from the engineering conversion.
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TIME AND TECHNICAL CHANGE
The illustration is clearer if reference is made to 
Figures 2.2, page 40, and 2.3, page 42. At least two 
possible situations exist. The newly produced product could 
be produced for an existing market or for a new market 
(i.e., although the product is new to our refinery, it may 
or may not be new to the consuming public).
A New Product
Figure 2.2 attempts a graphic illustration of a 
product which is new to the consuming public. Revenue R5 
and cost C5 exist at time to. These figures hold constant 
during time period a. A technological innovation is 
implemented in production by only one firm at time t1, 
creating a new use for input barrel component 5 with cost 
C5 (refer back to Figure 2.1). The decline in revenue from 
point t1 to t2 represents competition from other companies 
who have successfully copied the process before news of it 
is published. As discussed, the engineer attempts to 
account for the change by using only time period b on
Figure 2.2, while the accountant considers only time periods 
a and c.
New entrants into this new market area may be 
discouraged if the initial producer restricts revenue to 
R5'''. This pricing policy would eliminate a rapidly 
declining revenue in the early portion of time period b. 
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in trade journals at point t2. At this time it is assumed 
that the price of crude oil will increase to the maximum 
possible as a reflection of the increased value of the 
products. However, during time period b there is no change 
in crude-oil cost due to the technological advance because 
the firms posting the price are unaware of the technology. 
It is therefore theoretically impossible for the accounting 
cost reallocation to be valid in the short-short run, since 
that reallocation does not take period b facts into 
consideration.
An Existing Product
Assuming that the engineers have created a process 
to upgrade low-revenue products to existing higher-revenue 
products with existing prices rather than an entirely new 
product, Figure 2.3 attempts to portray the time sequence. 
When production of the upgraded product was started at point 
t1, the higher-revenue R5' (equal to the going rate) would 
be sought. The firm must be cautious with volumes if the 
existing favorable price is to be maintained. Unless the 
existing market is experiencing supply shortages, the 
introduction of large volumes of product would depress 
price. If a few other firms discovered the process and 
introduced greater volumes into the market, the lowering of 
price that would ensue would indicate to the developer of 
the process that other firms had knowledge of the process. 
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journals. After publication in the technical journals, the 
price of crude oil would rise to reflect the increased 
revenue potential, and the price-relative cost-allocation 
logic would again be valid in time period c.
Time Period b
In effect, then, two problems exist. How does one 
account for change in refinery production both in the short 
run and also in the short-short run? No similar problem 
apparently exists in any of the other well-known areas in 
which price-relative joint-cost allocation is used. There 
is no time period b in the cost allocation of a side of 
beef or a parcel of land since there is no manufacturing 
activity to allow an innovation. In these two illustrations 
the short run and the short-short run situations previously 
described do not exist simultaneously. There is no period 
of time (b) when the seller is not aware of the full range 
of products obtainable from the raw material.
The presence of time period b has caused difficulty 
in accounting for petroleum-refining operations. Most firms 
of any size are now using computer models to simulate 
refinery operations and to assist them in obtaining 
information for decision-making purposes. The outputs of 
the models are expressed in volumes of production. These 
two factors have combined to produce a strong bias in favor 
of a volume allocation of joint cost either directly or in 
some modified form. Once this accounting procedure is
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adopted, the short time period b is accounted for with 
meaning, but the longer time frames a and c are handled in a 
logically inconsistent manner.
In addition to this accounting framework it is also 
desirable to review economic theory relating to the refining 
industry before considering the factors causing price to 
have semirigidity. Such an economic review follows in 
Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
WHOLESALE PRICES IN THE PETROLEUM
REFINING INDUSTRY
The petroleum refining industry has all the outward 
appearance of the classical oligopoly structure (refer to 
Appendix A which lists refiners by their 1973 capacity). 
The top eight companies each controlled more than 750,000 
barrels per day of refining capacity. The next seven 
companies each controlled more than 200,000 barrels per day 
of refining capacity and together these two groups (fifteen 
companies) represented 75 percent of the total industry 
capacity at the beginning of 1973. Only seventeen more 
companies have the capacity to produce over 50,000 barrels 
per day. The production activities of the many small 
companies which remain should have little effect on price 
under most theories of oligopoly. Bain has labeled the 
control of 50 to 80 percent of total refinery volume a 
concentrated oligopoly. What is the current nature of 
oligopolistic competition in petroleum refining?
A brief review of economic theory related to 
oligopoly structures is essential before an answer to this
1Joe S. Bain, The Economics of the Pacific Coast 
Petroleum Industry Part I: Market Structure (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1944), p. 211.
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question can be attempted. Several theories have been 
advanced which attempt to explain the oligopoly market. 
These theories fall into two basic categories, the kinked- 
demand-curve approach, and multiple-cause approaches.
Criteria for the acceptance of economic models are 
often disputed. Some persons insist that to be valid a 
model must be merely a reasonable representation of historic 
activity so that this activity is "explained" by the model. 
(The multiple cause approaches often fall in this category). 
Others would insist that to be practical an economic model 
must be primarily capable of predicting the logical 
anticipated actions of the firm if the inputs to the model 
are available (for example,the kinked-demand-curve 
approach). Although the current study is historical, 
covering the activities in the refining industry which have 
produced alarming "energy crisis" headlines, both approaches 
will be considered. Do industry activities leading up to 
this emergency closely follow the suggested patterns for 
oligopolies? If not, do any components of the economic 
theories advanced explain the activities of the industry 
over this time period? The single-model approach will be 
considered first.
A SINGLE-MODEL APPROACH
The "kinked" demand curve attempts to explain in a 
single model the actions of all oligopoly markets. 
Proponents of this approach have generally used the
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Hall-Hitch or the Sweezy2 solution which introduced the 
kinked demand curve with its accompanying "imaginary” 
demand curves. The price elasticity of demand, formula 3.1, 
is used to evaluate competitor response.
3.1
The kink in the curve is produced because competitors in the 
oligopoly market view demand as elastic when they consider 
price increases (the price elasticity of demand (n)>l, i.e., 
a percentage increase in price will cause a greater 
percentage loss in quantity), but when they consider price 
decreases, demand is viewed as inelastic (the price 
elasticity of demand (n)<1, i.e., a percentage decrease in 
price will cause a smaller percentage increase in quantity 
demanded). This dual view of demand leads to the 
conclusion that competitors would not "follow” price 
increases and the relative elasticity of the demand would 
significantly decrease sales volume. Competitors would, 
however, meet price decreases, thus reducing total industry 
revenue with little or no gain in market share to the firm 
initiating the price change.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the demand curve for 
price increases is dd' and the demand curve for price 
decreases is DD'. This difference of attitude between price 
increases and decreases causes the demand curve to be dWD'
2Paul Sweezy, "Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly," 

















and introduces a vertical section in the marginal revenue 
curve, represented by line segments dXYZ. This model does 
not explain why a price is set where it is, but merely 
demonstrates the tendency for a common price throughout the 
vertical portion of the marginal revenue curve. In 
Ferguson's words, "The Sweezy thesis, accordingly, must be 
regarded as an ex-post rationalization rather than as an 
ex-ante explanation of market equilibrium”.3 The 
fluctuations in price which can be observed by examination 
of Figure 4.1, page 79, appeared contrary to the price 
stability suggested by the Sweezy model. Figures 4.1, 3.1, 
and 3.3 were therefore presented to refinery-industry repre­
sentatives to obtain their explanations or responses. The 
responses of the executives interviewed suggested that 
either a modification must be made in the kinked curve model 
or the model is not appropriate to the oligopoly structure 
existing in the refining industry during the period under 
observation. Their responses also support the observation 
that the behavior of the firms for the decade 1962-1972 
indicates a growing conviction on the part of cut-rate 
distributors of refined products that price competition is 
in their best interest and is effective in wresting a larger 
market share from major oil companies. Those companies 
interviewed which utilized cut-rate pricing policies were
3C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), p. 315.
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quite certain of a positive effect of price reduction on 
market share, and consequently it was neccessary to modify or 
discard the sharp difference in the two imaginary demand 
curves. (See Figure 3.1.) The following material 
demonstrates this change in attitude utilizing the Sweezy 
model.
Assuming that the demand curves are only modified, 
they might appear as represented in Figure 3.2. In this 
figure the inelastic portion of the model is considerably 
more elastic than in Figure 3.1. The effect is to narrow 
the vertical portion of the marginal-revenue curve. If, as 
Sweezy has proposed, the pricing of the oligopoly structure 
is related to short-run marginal-cost curves which lie 
within this vertical portion of the marginal revenue curve, 
and if one further assumes that an attempt is made to 
prohibit entry in a manner consistent with Bain's suggested 
entry restricting pricing scheme, one could logically expec 
to find the short-run marginal-cost curve relatively low in 
the short segment between X and Y.4 Under these circum­
stances, if the independent refiners miscalculate their 
short-run marginal cost, or if the demand schedule is not 
well estimated, they may erroneously believe this cost to 
fall somewhere on the line segment YZ. This error would 
definitely lead them to the conclusion that price
4Joe S. Bain, "A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and 



















competition would be effective.
The possibility exists that even a properly 
calculated marginal cost could fall in this region. If the 
long-run average cost curve of refineries is U-shaped, the 
economies of scale for the large refiners might not be as 
great as anticipated by the United States Government. The 
possibility of marginal cost falling on line segment YZ is 
more plausible if one also considers the possibility that 
independent refiners frequently do not have exactly the 
same product mix as major refiners.
The smaller independent refinery, although 
inefficient in terms of "Best-Practices Production 
Techniques" as suggested by Salter,5 may be reasonably 
efficient in terms of the product mix for which the refinery 
was originally designed. Many of the technical improvements 
in refinery configuration have as their primary thrust the 
ability to produce a higher percentage of higher revenue 
products. Salter's study was primarily directed toward 
improved productivity, i.e., the efficient substitution of 
improved capital equipment for labor so that more product 
could be produced with fewer man-hours and less capital.
Since the conversion of low-revenue products to high-revenue 
products could reduce the volume of low-revenue products 
for a given geographical area, an existing refinery with the
5W. E. G. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 13.
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ability to produce this product may find its relative 
position on this range of products strengthened by the new 
refinery. Concurrently the smaller refinery will probably 
find the higher-revenue products in greater competition 
with the output from the new refinery. Several areas where 
small refineries may have compensating advantages were 
reported by an informed representative of Company "U" and are 
presented on page 222. Salter acknowledged that trade-union 
restrictions or severe shortages of natural resources may 
both be valid reasons for refuting his contention that 
curves representing alternate best-practice techniques never 
cross. If these observations are valid and the United 
States Government attempts to equate the economies of the 
large and small refineries, any miscalculation on the part 
of the United States Government may temporarily give the 
small refiners an actual marginal cost advantage. In either 
event (whether real or imagined) an independent refiner who 
considered himself to be operating in the portion of the 
marginal revenue curve between Y and Z of Figure 3.2 would 
definitely adopt policies of price competition. In fact a 
refiner in this circumstance could conceivably envision 
himself a price leader in a rather limited, geographically 
segmented, market.
THE MULTIPLE-CAUSE APPROACH
Other writers have suggested that there may not be
one model which can accurately describe the complex
54 
interworkings of today's oligopoly markets. Lanzillotti, 
after extensive interviews with corporate executives, has 
suggested four major pricing objectives as an alternative to 
a single model with one profit maximizing objective. 
Lanzillotti's four objectives are 6
1. to achieve a target return on investment
2. to stabilize prices and margins
3. to meet competition
4. to achieve a target market share.
Constraints
The Lanzillotti pricing objectives were integrated 
with several others in a paper entitled, "Pricing in Big 
Business," by White, Market, and Taylor.7 In essence, 
these writers present a feasible area for the solution of 
oligopoly pricing problems (refer to Figure 3.3). The 
feasible area is constrained by management-determined 
minimum (QL) and maximum (QI) market share, a demand curve 
(d), and the lowest acceptable profit level (πL). The 
authors suggest that the pricing policy adopted by the firm 
be the one that will maximize profits within the feasible 
region. The point of tangency between the highest possible 
isoprofit curve ( π1) and the feasible area determines the
6Robert F. Lanzillotti, "Pricing Objectives in Large 
Corporations," American Economic Review, XLVII (December, 
1958), 921-40.
7Leonard White, Donald Market, and Phillip Taylor, 
"Pricing in Big Business," (paper presented at the 






normal mathematical solution to price and quantity. In 
Figure 3.3, point A is the mathematical solution to this 
problem. This model is useful, even though caution in use 
may be in order, since it allows the introduction of 
additional constraints. Discussions with representatives in 
the industry disclosed an apparent bias on the part of 
industry personnel in favor of operating at what they 
considered to be an optimum level of capacity despite the 
effect on price. (See the marginal cost discussion on page 
63.) This policy represents an additional constraint and 
would cause the mathematical solution to move to point B so 
that the refinery could maintain optimum levels of capacity 
whenever physically possible. If Qi is that optimum level, 
then additional output Qe would be pursued even if the 
product had to be sold at a lower price (P1).
A combination of activities which tended to suppress 
price and establish artificially low prices over a period of 
time are presented in the next chapter, but these actions 
have an impact on this economic model. Among other price 
depressors, a major change in consumer attitude toward off- 
brand and cut-rate operations appears to have shifted demand 
for major refiners' branded products as illustrated in Figure 
3.4. Original demand represented by line segment d is 
replaced by demand curve d' which produces an economic 
solution for the firm at point Y. The loss in output at 
point Y is not acceptable since refiners prefer to operate 
at more efficient levels. (See the marginal cost section of
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Figure 3.4
Feasible Area Solution With 
Government Constraint
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this chapter on page 63.) Product dumping follows and 
causes price to further decline toward point Z. This 
economically unstable situation is described in greater 
detail later in this chapter. To reach point Z might 
require several cycles of demand loss.
General inflationary pressures and increased 
specific costs combined to prevent prices from going below 
P2; however, it should be noted that at this level isoprofit 
curve  π0 does not appear to be attainable. This curve 
represents the lowest profit which will provide for the 
generation of the future capital requirement for totally new 
refinery facilities.
When prices reached point Z the United States 
Government used the news media to force price rollbacks by 
threatening the removal of oil-import controls. This 
action effectively prevented the industry from raising 
prices. Thus a new external constraint was introduced 
which held return on completely new refinery investment to 
an effective minimum. This investment-retarding effect can 
be seen if the actual United States refinery capacity is 
examined in Figure 4.5 on page 124.
This model has introduced company policies or 
objectives as constraints and is a useful tool because 
empirical evidence supports the position that external 




Bain lists three necessary conditions for easy entry 
into an oligopoly structure.8 One, established firms should 
have no absolute cost advantage over new firms. Two, 
economies of scale should be negligible. And three, no 
product differentiation advantage should be held by 
established firms. The absolute cost advantages which 
exist in the refining industry appear to be partially offset 
by United States Government activity.
Although an "absolute cost advantage" usually refers 
to input prices (or costs) that are appreciably lower for 
the established firm, an extreme example would be a complete 
lack of availability of input to new entrants at any price. 
When raw materials were in short supply, major oil companies 
attempted to control production and reserve their crude-oil 
production for their own refinery operations. These efforts 
were partially overcome when the United States Government 
insisted on taking its royalty in kind and delivering it to 
the small companies. For a short time during the 1973 
crisis, regulations required that all refineries operate at 
the same percentage of capacity. Those with the foresight to 
provide for their own crude needs were thus penalized for 
that management skill by being forced to sell crude oil to 
independents at fixed prices while their own refineries
8 Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 12.
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could have been operated at more efficient (normal) levels 
had they been permitted to retain their own crude oil.
Knowledgeable persons in the industry (those 
capable of operating a refinery) stated that production 
techniques are well known and do not deter entry.9 
Product differentiation, however, was a significant factor 
until economic advantages given to small refineries allowed 
them to supply independent marketers with low-cost product. 
The upset of the delicate balance started an unstable chain 
reaction, which will be described under the marginal-cost 
section of this chapter (on page 63). Once the balance was 
upset, a fairly continuous supply of cut-rate products was 
available at a price difference that substantially negated 
the accumulated preference of many buyers for established 
brand names.
The third major obstacle to entry (economies of 
scale) was rather extensively offset for sustained periods 
by import advantages given to small refiners. These took 
the form of low-cost crude oil. The crude-oil input has 
constituted 80 to 90 percent of the total finished-product 
cost. Although large-scale economies have necessitated 
consistent increases in plant size over the years, crude-oil 
cost has remained the most significant cost, factor in the 
refining operation.
9For an example see comments of a representative 
from Company "U” page 222.
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PRICE LEADERSHIP
Price leadership in petroleum refining seems to have 
undergone rather drastic changes during the decade 1962- 
1972. Little effective leadership was manifested by the 
major oil companies although attempts were made. Price 
increases were announced and then rolled back due to direct 
United States Government pressure. Unofficial price wars 
seemed to be the order of the day.
A review of the important market features required 
for price leadership in an oligopoly sheds light on the 
confusion of this era. As suggested by Markham, the 
requirements for price leadership are:10
1. There must be relatively few firms in the industry.
2. Entry into the industry must be restricted.
3. The industry product must be fairly homogeneous.
4. The elasticity of demand for the product should 
either be close to or less than unity.
In addition, Dean states that to qualify as a price leader 
the following circumstances are required:11
1. a substantial share of the market
2. a strong reputation for sound pricing decisions
3. a demonstration of initiative in pricing policies.
There are relatively few firms in the refining 
industry. Its products are fairly homogeneous. Government 
regulatory agencies have attempted to remove restrictions on
10Jesse W. Markham, "The Nature and Significance of 
Price Leadership," American Economic Review, XLI (December, 
1951), 901-2.
11Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 433.
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entry. With the exception of market share, which has been 
carefully controlled by antitrust policy so that no one firm 
has succeeded in obtaining even 10 percent of the market, 
the other prerequisites listed by Dean for price leadership 
seem to exist in the industry.
Historically, one of several dominant firms (those 
with over one million barrels of productive capacity in 
1973) has set prices until the period covered by this study 
was reached. During the last decade there is evidence that 
effective price leadership by the dominant firms was 
attempted but failed. The primary reason for this appears 
to be the usurping or controlling of price leadership in the 
industry by the United States Government. Several companies 
rolled back price increases because of thinly veiled threats 
by members of the United States Senate to eliminate the 
protected price of crude oil in the United States by 
removing the oil-import program. This activity, coupled 
with the direct savings by smaller refineries made possible 
under the import allocation program, reduced costs enough 
for some independent marketers to adopt pricing policies 
contrary to those policies adopted by major oil companies. 
Significantly, these independent marketers survived the 
ensuing price wars. Paolo Sylos-Labini, an Italian 
economist, suggested that
Although there is not a unique equilibrium 
situation, we can indicate the general price 
tendency; the price tends to settle at a level 
immediately above the entry-preventing price of 
the least-efficient firms which it is to the
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advantage of the largest and most efficient firm 
to let live.12
Clearly, government intervention has rendered this 
observation invalid in the petroleum industry for the 
period under examination. Firms existed which were in 
effect an irritant to the sensitive pricing structure but 
which could not be removed by the major refining firms.
MARGINAL COSTS
The history of economic thought provides us with an 
early indication of the nature of marginal cost. One 
classic explanation of rent explained rent as a premium paid 
for productive land when the expansion of the economy 
required marginal land to be put into production. For an 
adequate return to exist on the marginal land a rather 
generous return existed on the more productive land. Land­
owners, keenly aware of this difference, charged high rents 
to absorb the difference and to make production equally 
profitable for the laborers on all lands involved. The 
classical quotation by Ricardo, "Corn is not high because 
rent is paid, rent is paid because corn is high," was the 
embodiment of this marginal-cost principle. Economics has 
come a long way from the subsistence wage of that era; 
however, a grain of truth exists that does not seem to be
12Paolo Sylos-Labini, Oligopoly and Technical 
Progress, Elizabeth Henderson (trans), (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 50.
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fully emphasized when discussing marginal costs. If a 
decision is made to allow inefficient refiners to exist (the 
marginal land), then without arbitrary discrimination, 
higher returns (rents) should be expected from major 
refiners since they are more efficient.
General Considerations
Most economic literature suggests that if product 
discrimination can be maintained, price policy should 
provide for reduced prices until marginal costs are equal to 
marginal revenue. At this point no further discrimination 
is required and no lower price will be effective in 
maximizing profits. Usually foreign markets and new 
distribution channels using little-known names as opposed to 
the recognized or branded products are suggested as 
effective means for price discrimination.
For a number of years major refineries have promoted 
product differentiation quite successfully and have built up 
in the minds of customers the image of heterogeneous products 
in a homogeneous market. As long as price differentials 
remained relatively small in the mind of the purchaser he 
preferred the imagined superior product even at a higher 
price. Off-brand marketers, however, fortified with low-cost 
products, succeeded in passing the point of mental equality 
in this pricing scheme. Their prices were low enough to 
induce a significant portion of the branded market to try 
their products because of the price advantage. All of the
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firms questioned agreed that the illusion of the superior 
product was broken in the minds of a significant portion of 
the consuming public. Thereafter, customers switched to new 
suppliers any time price was low enough to offset incon­
veniences caused by new marketing forms. Operating economies 
were available to cut-rate marketers because their facilities 
were designed for minimal service and self-service operation, 
which eliminated substantial overhead and operating cost. 
The only other problem to be surmounted in order to 
consistently better major oil companies' price structures was 
the need to ensure an adequate supply of low-cost product. 
In this area the majors assisted their competitors.
What is the marginal cost of operating a modern 
refinery of average size at 97 percent of capacity as 
opposed to 87 percent? In essence the refining operation 
(although flexible in its output potential and therefore 
similar to manufacturing) is the processing of fluids under 
pressure. Refinery configuration usually requires fairly 
extensive use of fixed plant and operating personnel 
throughout normal production ranges. Therefore it follows 
that once the basic crew is available and the refinery is on 
stream, relatively minor cost increases accompany increases 
in output. For this reason as capacity is approached, the 
marginal cost of additional output is extremely low when 
measured by the absolute additional cash outlay required. 
This fact has prompted major oil companies to "dump" 
significant quantities of refined product at low prices
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whenever their individual supply-demand situation produced a 
reduction of their "normal" sales. The action was justified 
on the grounds of marginal cost (incremental-barrel) 
pricing.
Discontinuities
Careful inspection of the situation discloses a 
misunderstanding of marginal-cost principles. Marginal cost 
is the cost generated by adding one additional unit in the 
production process. The misunderstanding takes place in the 
definition of the unit. James R. Nelson has edited a 
collection of essays pertaining to economic analysis for 
practical application of marginal-cost prices.13
Gabriel Dessus, in his essay, "The General Principles 
of Rate-fixing in Public Utilities," presents a classic 
example that bears directly on the refinery problem.14 His 
example involves a French train. However, destinations 
within the United States are easier to visualize. Assume 
that a passenger train runs from Tulsa to Chicago. With the 
present energy shortages, more and more people may decide to 
use the means of travel that appears more certain, and 
therefore move from automotive travel to the passenger train. 
The director of Amtrak requests a marginal cost study to
13J. R. Nelson, Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964).
14Ibid., p. 42.
67
determine the additional cost involved in carrying these 
added passengers. Assuming a coach on the Amtrak system 
will accommodate ninety persons and the last available coach 
is half full, compute the marginal cost for the next fifty 
passengers.
The approach that is most tempting to the 
uninitiated is to determine the cost of the additional 
diesel fuel to be consumed by the engine when required to 
pull the weight of an average person down the track at the 
required speed.
This approach appears to work well until the 
forty-sixth additional passenger is reached at which time 
there is a discontinuity and a whole new coach must be 
added. Obviously, one would never add an entire coach to 
provide service for one person (although the rail industry 
has repeatedly contended that the government has not been 
adequately concerned with the diseconomies involved in 
carrying only a few passengers). However, rational 
individuals outside government control have added new 
coaches when relatively few passengers were guaranteed at 
the inception of the service. Clearly, in these circum­
stances, ultimate utilization of the new facilities at 
optimum levels was envisioned from the outset. What is the 
marginal cost of the forty-sixth through the fiftieth 
passenger, and what was the marginal cost of the ninetieth 
passenger on the previous coach? The problem is immediately 
simplified if one remembers that one is adding and computing
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marginal costs on units of added capacity, not on individual 
passengers. The marginal cost of adding another coach may, 
therefore, be easily calculated. To obtain the marginal 
cost for an individual passenger, Dessus carefully explains 
that one has to use the average marginal cost for a new 
coach plus the operating costs of transporting the 
passenger.
Dessus is not alone in his observation. Marcel 
Boiteux presents three general conclusions which relate to 
similar situations in an essay entitled "Marginal Cost 
Pricing":
1. Sale at marginal cost involves deficits when 
the firm is overequipped relative to demand 
but it is profitable when the enterprise is 
very underequipped.15
2. When capacity is optimum, sale at marginal 
cost of the service rendered by the marginal 
plant exactly covers the costs of this 
marginal equipment.16
3. Sales tariffs based on marginal costs should 
be established with reference to continuously 
optimum plant sizes, regardless of the actual 
successive phases of over- and under-capacity 
through which the enterprise passes.17
It is quite clear that these writers believe that whenever 
discontinuities in productive capacity exist, the marginal 
cost associated with the last unit of existing capacity 
produced is the average marginal cost for the existing plant 





from a new facility. Had refinery managers been willing to 
accept this theory, product dumping might have been avoided 
or reduced during periods when a major oil company's 
refining volume and normal refinery sales were out of 
balance even though domestic demand exceeded domestic 
refinery output.
Financial Implications
What are the financial consequences of not under­
standing this concept? The approach to marginal costing 
based on a fraction of an additional productive unit when 
discontinuities exist will erode capital (through a series 
of losses). If one concludes by his analysis that the cost 
for the forty-sixth additional passenger from Tulsa to 
Chicago is. for example, 0.1 cent per mile and prices his 
tickets accordingly, he might soon fill the coach; however, 
he would have extreme difficulty showing a long run profit. 
Financiers, observing his actions, would be reluctant to 
lend him additional capital for his next coach. Why should 
the refining industry be different? Some financial people 
feel it is not.
Why then do so many cling to the belief that somehow 
they can have their essential needs satisfied 
without paying all the associated costs? There is 
also the companion belief that at least part of the 
burden of costs can be avoided by shifting it to 
others. ... To a major degree, beliefs such as 
these have contributed to the critical shortage of 
energy now existing in the United States. They 
have effectively restricted both the generation and 
the investment of capital funds needed to provide 
an adequate supply of energy. ... It ought to be
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obvious that the energy industries can't invest 
enough if the money isn't available and the money 
won't be available if profits aren't adequate. 
Profits, of course, can't possibly be adequate if 
the price paid for energy by consumers is too low.18 
The oil companies' economic lesson was not accepted.
Independent marketers made substantial inroads in the major 
oil companies' markets using available low-cost product from 
independent refineries. The accompanying reduction of 
"branded sales" caused the refineries to have momentary 
surpluses despite the fact that there were no great 
surpluses for the economy as a whole. Normal distribution 
channels being full, the refiners proceeded to dispose of 
this temporary surplus in the only areas where excess demand 
existed (the cut-rate market). These sales were at low 
prices and provided cut-rate marketers with additional "fuel 
for the fire" to again invade the major marketing area and 
capture even more branded sales. This shift again created a 
temporary surplus situation, and the process which created 
the economic instability for any one individual major oil 
company continued. Had the major oil companies realized the 
true marginal cost of the products dumped, they undoubtedly 
would have considered reducing production whenever they lost 
branded sales volume.
18John G. Winger, "Something For Nothing" The 
Petroleum Situation, November 30, 1973, p. 2.
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SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
The refining industry, although structured as an 
oligopoly, does not appear (during the period studied) to 
conform in detail to any of the theoretical models advanced 
for oligopolies. This lack of conformity seems to be due 
to United States Government interference in the market 
picture, and a lack of acceptance by refinery executives 
of marginal cost principles as they relate to firms with 
discontinuities in productive capacity. The United States 
Government's concerted effort to ensure survival of 
marginal refineries has taken several forms as further 
detailed in Chapter 4. These forms include an outright 
gift which reduced input costs (import allowables), 
noncompetitive bidding practices (back in options available 
to small refiners on jet-fuel contracts), and a semi­
guaranteed crude supply (government takes royalty oil in 
kind and delivers to small refineries). The government- 
protected position of small refiners has enabled some of 
them to supply cut-rate marketers with the initial potential 
for invading major marketing territory. After the first 
inroads were successful, supply was maintained by the majors 
themselves due to a misapplication of marginal cost pricing.
Modified views of the economic structure of the 
industry were presented. The first followed the Sweezy 
model but severely reduced the slope of the inelastic demand 
curve to reflect an attitude change as discussed on page 49.
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This attitude change, coupled with government reduction of 
small refinery costs, could have induced some refiners to 
believe that their marginal costs were below the vertical 
portion of the marginal revenue curve and thus induced them 
to continue price-cutting activity. The second modification 
was an attempt to explain industry activity in general, 
rather than industry activity from the view of the cut-rate 
refiner. For a time the government succeeded in controlling 
price leadership. The government effectively used the 
import program to hold existing prices and to foster price 
competition by independents, thus imposing upward rigidities 
on price and at the same time removing "natural” downward 
rigidities of the oligopoly structure in the industry.
In reaction to this government involvement, prices 
appeared to have a fluctuating downward movement during the 
early 1960's as indicated on page 79, Figure 4.1. Costs, 
however, have continued to rise and seem to have imposed a 
floor under prices in the mid to latter portion of the 
1960's. A modification of a model presented by White, 
Market, and Taylor, which itself is a modification of a 
Lanzillotti model, seems to explain in an ex post fashion 
the activity of the industry during this period of intense 
government intervention in the marketing process. The new 
model (modified by the author, but agreed with by economists 
in the companies contacted), demonstrates the suppressive 
price associated with the major oil companies' loss of 
product discrimination, the government's assistance of
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independent refiners, and artificial competitive prices in 
certain areas. Price suppression was intensified by the 
refiners' desire to operate at fairly constant volumes. 
This desire was fortified by erroneous marginal cost 
studies. Low price then became a constraint in the model 
due to the activity of congressional investigating 
committees and government pronouncements concerning 
potential elimination of the crude-oil import program.
Recent large increases in the cost of crude oil 
associated with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries' cartel has effectively removed most of the 
government market-interfering mechanisms previously 
mentioned and thus provides the terminal date for this 
research. It is interesting to note that the regulatory 
policies since that time have accomplished similar purposes. 
The price-control program established different prices for 
"new" and "old" oil. Realizing that different firms have 
different combinations of new and old oil, cost differences 
again reflect themselves in price differences at the pump. 
The author does not attempt a current analysis in this 
paper but rather limits his work to a historical review of 
cause and effect.
The basic refining operation and the economic 
structure of the industry are both complex. The accounting 
and economic frameworks which explain cost allocation and 
firm behavior are also reasonably complex. Determining the 
best sequence for the presentation of material was made
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difficult by these complexities since all areas really 
should be considered together to obtain the best view of 
refinery operations. For this reason the last two chapters 
which contain the accounting and economic frameworks should 
be referred to when considering the competitive forces in 
the petroleum-refining industry and the price restraints 
presented in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
FACTORS AFFECTING PRICE FLEXIBILITY
IN THE REFINING INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
The complex structure of competitive forces in the 
petroleum-refining industry is examined in this chapter. 
Prices of petroleum products are analyzed to determine 
whether the price trends suggest the presence of excessive 
restraints on price structure. A brief review of the 
"competitive products" which vie with components of the 
product mix is also presented.
Several indirect competitive forces are examined 
separately to explore the extent of apparent artificial 
restraints affecting price. Preliminary study by the author 
appeared to support the hypothesis that prices of standard 
refined products were semirigid (lacking upward flexibility) 
for a period. Observable direct restrictions of price are 
also studied.
The following research questions are being probed in 
this chapter.
1. Do empirical data indicate the presence of price­
suppressive activity in the price structure of the 
petroleum-refining industry?




3. What role has the rigidity of policy played in price 
structure?
4. Has the government's involvement in the refined- 
products marketing process produced upward rigidity 
in the price structure?
5. What effect has monopoly pricing practice had on 
refined-product prices?
6. Did the petroleum-refining policies or practices 
add to the upward rigidity of product pricing?
7. What was the short-run effect of ecological 
considerations?
8. Have the price rigidities demonstrated in this 
chapter retarded financial investment?
These questions present a framework for logical 
inquiry into the complex question of price rigidities. Each 
question was designed to explore a potential price­
suppressive activity or influence.
REFINERY PRICE TRENDS
Oklahoma refinery prices are examined in this study 
for two reasons. First, oil-producing areas historically 
had more flexible price structures than nonproducing areas 
due to the ease of entry afforded independent refiners by 
the close proximity of raw materials. In addition, smaller 
firms were available within the Oklahoma area. Although 
prices from a limited geographical area (the Oklahoma 
pricing area) were used, the remainder of the study included 
representation from all domestic areas and the conclusions 
are not restricted to the Oklahoma pricing area.
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Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 present the average 
Oklahoma refinery prices of regular-grade gasoline from 
January 1953 to December 1972. A brief glance at the raw 
price data allows several observations. Prices of regular 
gasoline exhibited a gradual upward trend from 1954 to early 
1959. Seasonal fluctuations occurred from early 1959 to 
late 1964. A period of stable but lower prices ensued. No 
evidence of the seasonal cycle can be observed from October 
1965 to October 1967. Prices were lowered even further 
during 1968 and 1969. A 92-octane product stabilized at the 
approximate price of the 89-octane product when this latter 
product was first introduced; then, the higher-octane product 
was further lowered in price. A detailed analysis of the 
data should shed further light on these prices.
The inflationary trend of the period under obser­
vation is common knowledge, but the wholesale refined- 
products prices do not seem to follow this trend. A 
statistical test (t) was applied to the price data to obtain 
an indication of the significance of this observation.
The average Oklahoma refinery prices of regular­
grade gasoline and the wholesale price index (all 
commodities) are presented in Table 4.1 and 4.2 
respectively. The null hypothesis states that the 
difference in slope between the least-squares regression 
lines computed from "common size” or comparable percentage 
data for both gasoline prices and the wholesale price index 
is equal to zero. This hypothesis is tested in Appendix B
Table 4.1
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices 
of Regular Grade Gasoline 
1953 - 1972
Source:

























































































































































































































































































Minerals Yearbook, United States Department of Interior, 1953 to 1972.
Platt's Oil Price Handbook, 1953 to 1972.
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Figure 4.1






Wholesale Prices United States 
Department of Labor Indexes 
All Commodities 
1953 - 1972






































































































































































































































































*1947 - 1949 = 100%
+1957 - 1959 = 100%
Δ1967 = 100%
Source:
Survey of Current Business-monthly issues from 1953 to 1972.
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using a t test (see page 171).
A graphic portrayal of the comparable data is given 
in Figure 4.2. This graph depicts average Oklahoma whole­
sale prices for regular-grade gasoline as a percentage of 
the first month's reported prices, as well as the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics wholesale price index (all commodities) as 
a percentage of the first month's reported index value.
A period of fairly stable wholesale price levels was 
indicated from early 1958 to the end of 1964 when the 
current inflationary trend appears to have begun. For this 
reason the data were divided into two groups, pre-1965 and 
post-1964. This division also closely approximates the 
point in time when the average gasoline prices no longer 
exceeded the wholesale price index, when each is considered 
as a percentage of its respective base month value.
In Figure 4.3, least-squares regression lines were 
superimposed on the data originally represented in Figure 
4.2. Two separate t tests of regression-line slopes were 
calculated and presented in Appendix B to determine whether 
price-level adjustments were appropriate. The results of 
the first test indicated that price-level adjustments may 
have been appropriate for the pre-1965 period (the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected). However, the second 
test indicated that the null hypothesis should be rejected 
at the 99 percent confidence level for the post-1965 period. 
Therefore, price-level adjustments were made for neither 
period since a partial use of price-level adjustments would
82
Percent of Base 
Month Value
Figure 4.2
A Common Size Comparison of Regular Oklahoma Gasoline Prices 
with the Wholesale Price Index (Each Expressed as a 
Percentage of its Relative Base Month Value)
Source:
Data taken from Tables 4.1, 4.2, B.2, B.3, B.8, B.9.
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Percent of Base 
Month Value
Figure 4.3
A Comparison of Least-Squares Regression—Line Slopes 
Fitted to Common-Size Gasoline Prices 
and Wholesale Price Index Values
Source:
Data taken from Tables 4.1, 4.2, B.2, B.3, B.8, B.9.
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be inconsistent. Hesitancy in using price level adjustments 
in the pre-1965 time period also seemed appropriate because 
the wide fluctuations in gasoline prices produced an 
extremely low coefficient of correlation for that regression 
line (.110752). A search for the cause for the change which 
occurred in the relationship between wholesale gasoline 
prices and the wholesale price-level index seemed desirable 
to the author.
An observation of the original wholesale gasoline 
prices suggested the introduction of a seasonal price 
depressor in 1959. Significantly the oil-import program was 
adjusted by Presidential Proclamation 3279 on March 10, 
1959, and subsequently contained price-depressive factors 
which are detailed on page 100. Another t test of 
regression line slopes was applied to the price trend for 
regular grade gasoline prices before and after this change 
in import policy. Allowing for a delay in reaction to the 
announcement of March 10, 1959, to reflect its seasonal 
trend, the one-year period eliminated runs from September, 
1959 to August, 1960 inclusively. Although this period was 
eliminated for the reasons given, an examination of Figure 
4.1 will reveal the fact that the first severe seasonal 
depression of price occurred in this period. This one-year 
period was omitted for two reasons; first, to eliminate the 
uncertain period of transition associated with the policy 
change, and in addition, to avoid any seasonal difference 
by ensuring that the two time periods cover the same months
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of the year.
The t test of regression-line slopes clearly 
indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 99 
percent confidence level (see Appendix B beginning on page 
171). This fact would strongly imply that the two sets of 
data were not taken from the same population; yet the 
participants in the Oklahoma market for wholesale gasoline 
prices did not change materially over the nine-year period 
encompassed by the test. The conclusion must be reached 
that there has been a significant change in market 
conditions. Since total demand was increasing over this 
time frame and the reduced prices were not in the best 
interest of the oligopoly structure within the industry, the 
primary cause appears to be external to the petroleum 
refining industry. The oil-import program initiated in 
March, 1959, provides a logical explanation of the price 
trend change. Prior to this change, prices were increasing, 
but after the program was initiated an abrupt reversal took 
place and prices decreased. The fact that octane increased 
during this period makes the price-trend reversal even more 
significant. The effects of the import program on wholesale 
gasoline prices are discussed in detail on page 100.
COMPETITIVE FORCES IN THE 
PETROLEUM-REFINING 
INDUSTRY
Many forces help to shape the price structure for 
the refining industry. Before it is possible to appreciate
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these competitive forces, a brief look at the products 
produced by a refinery is required.
A relatively complete technical breakdown of 
refinery products is presented in Figure 4.4; however, the 
analysis of competitive forces in this study is confined to 
the standard products normally produced in volume. Only 
completed products normally sold outside the industry will 
be considered. The inclusion of gas oils and petrochemicals 
could add to the complexity of the analysis without 
contributing significantly to the conclusions.
The basic refinery process in its simplest form is 
the heating of crude oil in a still, and the recovery of the 
gases and oils that result at different temperatures. The 
lighter fractions evaporate at lower temperatures, the 
heavier fractions at higher temperatures. There are three 
natural groupings of these products; the residues, the 
distillates, and the gasolines.
The Residues
The residues are, in essence, the portion of the 
barrel that remains in the "bottom" when the distillation 
process is completed. Traditionally three major products 
have been made from the bottom of the barrel. Residual fuel 
oil is the most natural of the three; however, with 
additional processing, asphalt or coke can be made from the 
same residue material. The ability to make the two latter 














































































Domestic and industrial fuels
Crude oil production stimulus
Raw materials for synthetic hydrocarbon chemicals 
Production of carbon black
Component of automotive and aviation fuels 
Liquefied gases, domestic and industrial fuels, 
ana illuminants
Raw material for synthetic hydrocarbon chemicals 
Metal cutting and glass manufacture
Welding, refinery fuel, and regrigerant
Rubber tires, inks and paints
Cooking and heating Synthetic motor fuels
Synthetic rubbers
Lubricating-oil additives
Aviation gasoline blending agents
Antifreeze, fat, lacquer, ana drug solvents 
Gas-machine gasoline




Raw material for synthetic hydrocarbon chemicals 
Varnishmaker's and painter's naptha
Dyer's and cleaner's naphtha
Turpentine substitutes
Cattle and insect sprays
Jet, stove, lamp, and tractor fuels
Railroad signals, lighthouse oil, and ship illuminants 
Lubricating-oil additives Carburetor oils
Soaps
Naphthenic acids
Metallurgical, domestic heating, Diesel-engine 
and light industrial fuels
Gasoline recovery oil and benzol recovery oil 
Insecticides and tree sprays
Bakers, fruit packers, candy makers, egg packer's 
and slab oils
Recoil oils and hydraulic oils
Salves, ointments, and creams Cosmetics
Internal lubricants
Wood, leather, and twine oils
Cutting, paper, leather, and textile oils 
Switch, transformer, and metal-recovery oils 
Candy and chewing gum wax
Candle, laundry, sealing, and etcher's wax 
Paper, match, and cardboard wax 
Medicinal wax Canning wax
Synthetic lubricants and their derivatives 
Grease and soap Lubricants
Rubber compounding
Household detergents and wetting agents
Spindle, turbine, transformer, and compressor oils 
Household lubricating oils
Ice-machine, meter, dust-laying, and tempering oils 
Journal, motor, Diesel-engine, aircraft, and 
railroad oils
Steam-cylinder, valve, transmission, and printing 
ink oils
Black oils Tempering oils
Cup, switch, automotive, industrial, and cable grease 
Cosmetics
Salves, creams, ointments, and petroleum jelly 
Rust preventatives, rubber softeners, lubricants, 
and cable coating compounds
Wood preservation and gas manufacturing oils 
Metallurgical oils
Marine boiler fuel Railroad boiler fuel
Roofing and shoe material 
Shingle and paper saturants 
Road oils Emulsion bases
Briquetting and paving asphalts 
Paint bases Flooring saturants 
Roof coatings and waterproofings 
Rubber substitutes Insulating asphalts




Saponification agents Fat splitting agents





Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 18, 1972, p. 632.
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The economics of residual production must therefore be 
considered before the refinery is built.
For many years residual fuel oil was placed in 
competition with a very inexpensive coal in the European 
market. Since Europeans used substantial quantities of 
residual fuel, the low price of coal acted as a natural 
competitive ceiling for the price of residual fuel in world 
markets. The production of residual fuel in the United 
States was comparatively uneconomical at this low price, and 
few companies produced it. Most United States companies, 
when faced with the original-investment problem, designed 
their refineries to produce asphalt or coke.1 Since their 
introduction, the revenue from the latter two products has 
traditionally exceeded the revenue from the production of 
residual fuel oil. One of the primary reasons for this was 
the government's policy regarding fuel-oil importation.
Whenever surges in residual fuel-oil consumption 
tended to increase price, the government traditionally 
intervened. Import barriers were lifted and enough 
additional fuel oil was imported to maintain the previous 
low price. Large and repeated demands for additional fuel 
oil have occurred within recent years. Standards imposed to 
control sulfur emissions had, temporarily, directed public
1One major oil company did not follow this trend 
because of a heavy utilization of thermal crackers rather 
than catalytic crackers.
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utilities away from the use of most domestic coal and 
toward either residual fuel oil or gas during the latter 
part of the period under observation.
If the supply of input factors is held constant for 
any reason, then, under normal circumstances (regular market 
forces at work) large increases in consumption would be 
reflected in gradually increasing prices. These price 
increases would generate economic profit and would normally 
attract additional investment to produce products in short 
supply. Existing refineries, designed to produce coke or 
asphalt, would undoubtedly continue to follow their design 
configuration and produce those products. The increased 
demand would create a more difficult choice among the 
residue products that could be produced by new refineries. 
If demand persisted, and prices continued to rise, more and 
more new refineries would decide to produce residual fuel 
oil. This sustained increase in demand and production would 
cause the price of the other two competing products to go up 
only slightly while the fuel-oil price would stabilize at a 
considerably higher level. The government's activity 
prevented such a solution to the problem, as indicated by 
the prices presented in Table 4.3. The price of residual 
fuel from 1953 through 1972 has remained a relatively low 
percentage of the price of a barrel of crude. This low 
price is particularly significant when viewed from the 
engineer's volume-oriented viewpoint. Operating personnel 
frequently speak of selling a barrel of residual fuel oil
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Table 4.3
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices 
of Residual No. 6 Fuel Oil 
1953 - 1972
Sources:
Year Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average
1953 1.03 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.26 1.37 1.49 1.15
1954 1.54 1.51 1.39 1.27 1.21 1.12 1.08 1.15 1.20 1.34 1.42 1.47 1.31
1955 1.57 1.58 1.59 1.65 1.79 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.96 1.74
1956 2.14 2.15 2.12 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.14 2.39 2.14
1957 2.60 2.64 2.52 2.48 2.48 2.41 2.26 2.10 2.03 1.90 1.80 1.80 2.25
1958 2.03 1.88 1.68 1.71 1.73 1.73 1.64 1.59 1.60 1.13 1.73 1.83 1.73
1959 2.02 2.18 2.15 1.94 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.93 1.97
1960 1.93 1.99 1.83 1.75 1.75 1.87 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.89
1961 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.89 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.88
1962 1.86 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90
1963 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90
1964 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 2.03 1.96
1965 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.06 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.08
1966 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15
1967 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15
1968 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.68 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.67
1969 1.74 1.78 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.71 '
1970 1.83 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.26 2.55 2.71 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.73 2.35
1971 2.68 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.61
1972 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60
Minerals Yearbook, U.S. Department of Interior, 1953 to 1972.
Platt's Oil Price Handbook, 1953 to 1972.
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for less than what was paid for it (i.e., for less than the 
cost of the barrel of crude), although this concept is 
inaccurate from an economic or an accounting view.
A sudden shift in consumption would require sudden 
and drastic changes in refinery output even if "free" market 
forces were at work. With government intervention (an 
attempt to maintain a low-cost energy policy) the 
adjustment becomes even more severe. The adjustment from 
almost total dependence upon foreign sources (95 percent of 
eastern requirements) to self-sufficiency would be a 
violent one. The author indicated in Chapter 1 that if the 
basic hypothesis were true and there were rigidities in the 
price structure, sudden violent adjustments would be 
expected since normal market forces, which have a tendency 
to smooth adjustments by giving lead indicators in the form 
of price changes, would be absent. Without this lead 
indicator the industry must perforce read minds. No 
difficulty exists in the observation of increases in demand; 
but, since prices under controlled conditions do not reflect 
increased demand, it is necessary to anticipate or predict 
policy changes. Whether these changes in policy are made 
by our own government or by foreign powers, they may cause 
severe, abrupt changes in the refinery-product mix 
requirements or refinery-operating levels, or both.
Lack of capcity, coupled with a lack of input 
crude, caused the government to announce an abrupt policy 
change. The clear-air regulations were relaxed so that
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electric utilities converting from coal to residual fuel oil 
and gas were to stop the conversion, or possibly reverse it, 
and to operate with coal. Again, the serious difficulty 
observable in sudden policy change was the lack of a lead 
indicator. Coal companies had been closing down their 
operations over a period of years due to the restrictive 
high sulfur content of their product and the relatively low 
price of natural gas and residual fuel oil. They were not 
prepared to handle this sudden large increase in volume. 
Both industries will probably exert great efforts to meet 
the emergency, but an easy, long-run solution is not 
expected.
Newspaper headlines in the winter of 1970-1971 
concerning shortages of residual oil first aroused the 
writer's interest in this topic. A careful discussion with 
refiners at that time disclosed no real shortage. There was 
only a shortage at the existing price. Refiners could have 
supplied additional fuel oil then, had there been an 
economic incentive. The government, however, following its 
regular policy, met this first public indication of a 
serious problem by increasing fuel-oil-import quotas.
The United States oil industry is producing 
substantial quantities of fuel oil. However, the majority 
of the companies are producing fuel oil at their foreign 
refineries. These refineries, although often owned and 
operated by domestic oil companies, are under the control of 
the governments of the countries in which the physical
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facilities exist. This foreign control of residual fuel oil 
became critical when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries exerted extreme pressure on Canada, Japan, and 
most of the countries in Europe and Asia (by threatening to 
withhold all crude oil deliveries to prevent petroleum 
products refined in their countries from entering the United 
States).
The low price previously prevailing in the residual­
fuel-market also controlled the selection of refinery 
location for residual-fuel-oil production. Relatively low 
labor costs had to be obtained in order for production of 
residual fuel to be economically attractive. The ability to 
import foreign crude also entered into the decisions, as 
will be discussed more fully in conjunction with the 
gasoline section of this chapter (beginning on page 99). In 
simplest terms, the crude-oil import policies basically 
allowed the importation of crude oil as a percentage of 
existing refinery capacity, and consequently, discouraged 
any attempt to increase refinery size where the total 
refinery input depended upon imported crude.
Discussions with industry personnel revealed that 
tentative contract proposals were made during 1973 which 
were more than double the government's normalized residual 
fuel-oil prices of prior years. As indicated in Chapter 2, 
such a move causes violent cost adjustments under the price­
relative accounting allocation method. In addition, it 
should induce new construction to prepare for fuel-oil
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production. However, for reasons to be discussed under the 
financial-incentives section of this chapter (beginning on 
page 120), refineries were not built to meet this fuel oil 
requirement.
The Distillates
The middle-range group of products (called 
distillates) include kerosine, jet fuel, furnace distillate 
(number 2 fuel oil), and diesel fuel. Due to the flexi­
bility of the manufacturing operation within this range of 
products, an overriding consideration at each level is the 
cost of recycling to upgrade the product. This recycling 
and upgrading potential is particularly prevalent in the 
inferior distillates (number 2 and number 3 fuel oil). 
Kerosine is in competition with jet fuel because of their 
similar composition. Furnace distillate competes with 
natural gas and electricity because of their similarity of 
use. These inferior distillates also compete with jet fuel, 
but to a lesser degree.
Jet fuel. A little-known policy adopted by the 
government affects the allocation of military jet-fuel 
contracts. The "small-business set-aside program" enables 
small refiners to compete in the production of jet fuel.2
2Armed Services Procurement Regulation, Paragraph 
1-706.1 issued to conform to Title 10, Chapter 1137 - 
Armed Forces Procurement Generally, Section 2301 - 
Declaration of Policy.
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Under this program a small refinery submits a bid along with 
the majors for a given volume of fuel at the small refiner's 
best price. When the bids are opened, if any major company 
has submitted a lower price, the small refiner is offered 
an opportunity to deliver the gallonage submitted in his 
bid at the major refiner's price. The major refiner is 
then allowed to supply only the remaining requirement. This 
set-aside program potentially involves up to 40 percent of 
the jet fuel delivered under any contract. This program 
is additional evidence that the government is keenly 
interested in providing artificial economies to the small 
refiners in an attempt to negate the effect of economies of 
scale and to promote price competition in the industry.
Furnace Distillate. The price of the furnace 
distillate has been held to an artificial low for two 
reasons. First and most important is that the price of 
natural gas has been held to an artificial low by the 
Federal Power Commission since 1954. Petroleum industry 
observers compare natural-gas inventory replacement cost to 
selling price and conclude that regulated prices are too 
low. This severe restriction of natural-gas price has been 
decried by the industry almost from its inception. Despite 
logical argument, the regulatory agency has persisted with 
the low-cost energy policy to the point that imported, 
liquefied products commanded a significantly higher price 
over a long period of time than the natural gas produced
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domestically.
This low price has discouraged search for additional 
gas reserves and has indirectly increased further the demand 
placed on refined products. The lack of available natural 
gas has caused utilities to increase their utilization of 
residual fuel. The lower price of the distillates has also 
caused refiners to search both for new methods to upgrade 
products and also new products to produce. This search for 
new products (which do not fall under the price restrictions 
covered in this section) has created a small crisis of its 
own. The raw material for the production of plastics was 
developed and rapidly grew in volume. With the recent 
shortage of total crude supply and refinery capacity, the 
plastics industry experienced critical shortages. The price 
of its raw material input had increased appreciably due to 
the scarcity of crude oil.
Further elaboration on this phase of the distillate­
rigidity problem is probably unnecessary since the price of 
natural gas has received such widespread publicity. This 
portion of the problem, however, is grave and brevity of 
coverage should not diminish its significance. Most 
government officials will admit the impact of the low 
natural gas price upon available energy, and therefore, have 
agreed indirectly with the premise that this low price also 
has strong impact on furnace distillate prices.
Furnace distillates also compete with electrical 
energy in a lesser but significant way. Electrical
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utilities have successfully discriminated in their pricing 
scheme to produce at least four different price structures. 
Three of these are rather natural divisions of their sales. 
Reported statistics break down the sales to ultimate 





For the purpose of this discussion, the "other users" 
category is disregarded since it is a catch-all and repre­
sents no clearly distinguishable segment of the electric 
utilities' marketing activity. Residential sales must be 
analyzed further and broken down into two clearly differ­
entiated segments in order to obtain the four price 
structures referred to above. Residential users with 
permanent electrical heating (total electric homes) and 
residential users without permanent electrical heating 
compose the two segments. Once this breakdown is complete 
we have three areas of discriminatory prices over the normal 
residential rates.
Justification for price discrimination is twofold. 
First, large industrial users are given a favored price 
structure because of the basic economies achieved by 
delivering large quantities of electrical energy to a single 
location, and also as an inducement to provide jobs and 
attract residential and commercial users into an area to 
achieve economies of scale and enlarge the rate base.
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Expressed in another way the distribution system is quite 
simple and direct and requires much smaller capital 
investment in the form of poles, lines, and the like. This 
logic is difficult to fault. Court cases have upheld the 
justification of a price differential based upon reduced 
cost of distribution. There is no attempt in this 
discussion to debate that point. The second justification 
for price discrimination is more subtle and may contain an 
error in logic when considered with the first. This 
justification states in essence that there is a marginal 
efficiency associated with the utilization of off-season 
productive capacity. If a facility is being used 
extensively during a particular season of the year and is 
partially idle at another season of the year, the cost of 
delivering electrical energy during the slack period is a 
marginal cost. Therefore, a marginal price which is lower 
than other prices during the same period may be justified.
The production reducing effect of this attempt by 
the electric utilities to equalize the peak between summer 
and winter and to expand the rate base has been an 
artificial low winter heating rate which has effectively 
competed with the furnace-distillate rate. This low winter 
rate has helped to hold the price of this segment of the 
refined products to an artificial low. Empirical evidence 
to support this view is presented in Appendix C, 
beginning on page 191.
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Gasolines
Since gasoline is the only product which does not 
have a "competitive" substitute, all external pressure 
exerted against the price of gasoline must be created by 
providing an arbitrary artificial cost advantage to some 
firms. The pressure mounted against the oligopoly price 
structure in the gasoline market was both direct and 
indirect. The primary tool was the government import 
program. Prior to the late 1950's the United States had 
surplus crude production compared to domestic consumption. 
This situation allowed many small refineries to operate with 
a relatively low input crude cost. The major refiners, 
being integrated oil companies and having excess crude 
available, allowed independents to fulfill part of their 
refining requirements. During the 1950's, exploration and 
development of foreign crude sources created a worldwide 
surplus of crude. At the time the domestic crude surplus 
was fading into history, the relatively inexpensive oil 
had been found and produced.
At a time when leasing and drilling operations were 
becoming more expensive, forces were set in motion which 
tended to reduce the incentive for exploratory drilling. 
The low cost of natural gas allowed it to be a ready 
substitute for some petroleum products. Under the guise of 
conservation provisions, the producing states adopted strict 
regulations relating to the production of crude oil. These 
regulations would have been a conservation tool had they
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conformed more closely to engineering requirements for 
optimum output. Unfortunately, they also were used to 
assist in maintaining a high domestic crude-oil price by 
frequent adjustment in the production rates. These 
adjustments often had more to do with price than with the 
maintenance of reservoir pressures.
In March, 1959, the government adopted a mandatory 
import quota system which prevented the domestic price from 
falling to the world price and established a dual pricing 
structure for the industry. Immediately, benefit accrued to 
any organization that could obtain the cheaper imported 
crude (refer to Table 4.4). If all refineries had been 
treated equally, this problem would not have been too 
formidable; however, such was not the case. The bill 
establishing the import quota system provided for exceptions 
and immediately exceptions came into being. A number of 
companies were successful in establishing refineries in the 
Carribean area which depended almost totally on imported 
crude and which were exempt from the import quotas. When 
this activity was attempted in the New England States (with 
great promise of local political reward from a trust fund to 
be established out of the crude cost difference), the 
procedure was finally defeated and no further exceptions 
were granted. A differential treatment among the oil 
companies was established as an integral part of the import 
program. Several classifications of refinery size were 
identified and the smaller refiners were allowed a greater
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Table 4.4
Value of the Crude Oil Import Quota
(The difference between the 
domestic and foreign price 
of crude oil per barrel)
Source:














percentage of import relative to their total crude demand 
than the larger refiners based upon a step-scale reducing-
percentage of import allocations (see Table 4.5).
With the implementation of this program, two 
artificial noncompetitive levers came into existence and 
affected the gasoline-pricing system. The more direct of 
the two was the use of implication and threat by political 
groups and administrations. These groups suggested complete 
elimination of the artificially created domestic price by 
removal of all import restrictions. This threat was used to 
force industry leaders or potential leaders to roll back 
price advances which had already been announced. In 
addition, Senate investigative committees were busy probing 
the possibility of returning to a true world price by 
eliminating both the import program and the state regulation 
of allowables. This lever, when applied, was quite 
effective and several price advances were rolled back during 
the last decade. The procedure received very little 
publicity as a tool to control price, but received 
substantial publicity in the form of political attacks on 
the industry.
The second lever was even more effective. There is 
strong indication that the petroleum industry can become 
inherently unstable with respect to its refinery pricing 
operations, as was discussed previously in Chapter 3. Any 
force which tends to upset the delicate balance between 
refining and major-brand marketing causes major companies to
Table 4.5
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*This data is not available from local sources.
Source:
Code of Federal Regulations, 32A, Chapter X, sections 10-11.
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dump quantities of refined product on the discount market in 
an attempt to preserve the operating efficiency of the 
refinery. This situation is a distinct characteristic of 
refining and is not associated with other joint production 
operations.
The second lever moved to create the initial upset 
of otherwise carefully planned refining and marketing 
operations. In a true oligopoly rather stable prices 
usually exist among alternate suppliers. Many economic 
reasons are suggested for the stable price and one common 
economic analysis is that there is a kink in the demand 
curve. Under this theory, potential price discounters are 
dissuaded. They reason that any price reduction would be 
met by the competition, rendered virtually ineffective, and 
all parties would suffer from the lower prices. The 
economies of scale associated with the large refiners' 
operations would enable them to prevail in the long run and 
to virtually eliminate any price rebel they felt was not 
good for the industry. The inequality of imports relative 
to total operations between the small refiners and the 
majors under the import program is a carefully calculated 
plan which attempts to equate in part the economies of scale 
between the small firm and the large firm. In effect, this 
allows a marginal refiner to continue his otherwise 
unprofitable operation. Some small refineries have 
virtually existed on the import allocation margin. To be 
more specific, their total reported income during periods of
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intense price competition was from that source.3
The practical effect is to permit the independent 
refinery to initiate pricing practices which can be 
detrimental to the entire industry. Distribution of cut- 
rate gasoline to cut-rate dealers can be perpetuated far 
beyond the productive capacity of the independent refinery 
in a very competitive market. One should remember that it 
does not take much to upset any major oil company's 
refining-marketing balance. In addition, the diversification 
within the industry is so great that no single firm truly 
leads in industry pricing; collusion is extremely difficult 
because of the ever-watchful eye of government antitrust 
activity, and mistakes in judgment do exist from time to 
time both in potential demand and optimum refinery size for 
a short-run situation. All these factors tend to suppress 
price. Apparently, government economists, well aware of the 
oligopoly's barriers to competition, have taken a significant 
step to eliminate some of the barriers within the refining 
industry. The effect can be observed by examining the 
average price data during the early 1960's and toward the 
end of that decade as presented in Table 4.1, page 78.
A study entitled "Oil Supply and Tax Incentives," 
published by the Brookings Institution, provides additional 
support for these observations from a different viewpoint.
3More than one direct source. Names withheld by 
request.
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The authors reach the following conclusions about two 
hypotheses advanced by the Federal Trade Commission:
Over the period 1951-1972 the real price 
of gasoline (excluding tax) fell by 25 percent 
and the ratio of the real price per gallon of 
gasoline to the real price per barrel of crude 
oil fell from 9.4 percent to 6.8 percent, a 
drop of 27.7 percent. ... If the real price of 
gasoline fell because the majors were 
aggressively expanding refining capacity and 
competing for incremental shares of the 
gasoline market, the cooperative-behavior 
hypothesis falls. If the majors were 
cooperatively restraining expansions of refining 
capacity and the real price of gasoline fell 
because of expansions of refining capacity by 
nonmajors, the hypothesis of barriers to entry 
falls. In our view of the evidence, the real 
price of gasoline, refinery margins, and long- 
run profit rates declined both the FTC hypotheses 
- about barriers to entry and about cooperative 
behavior - are wide of the mark.
Government activity seems indeed strange when this 
activity set up in the same mechanism the ability to 
artificially raise crude-oil price by adhering to domestic 
supplies of crude and at the same time to lower refined- 
product price in a rather deliberate attempt to eliminate 
the price advantages of the oligopoly structure.
RIGID POLICIES
Target fixation is an expression used by United
States Air Force personnel to refer to the tendency of some
4Edward W. Erickson, Stephen W. Millsapps, and 
Robert M. Spann, "Oil Supply and Tax Incentives,” ed. Arthur 
M. Okum and George L. Perry, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activities 2 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974). 
pp. 449-78.
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pilots to get so absorbed in the pursuit of their target and 
so oblivious to their surroundings that they kill themselves 
and destroy their aircraft just before, during, or just 
after they attack their target. Success in destroying the 
target is of questionable value if the concentration 
required causes one's aircraft to strike the side of a cliff. 
This phenomenons of target fixation is important to the pilot 
because of the speeds at which he is moving and the changes 
in environment that are taking place around him as he 
pursues his target. Similar things seem to be happening in 
the business world. Today's business is conducted at a 
frenzied pace amid rapidly changing circumstances and 
environment. Are those charged with the responsibility for 
the determination and maintenance of policy equipped with 
enough peripheral vision to avoid becoming locked in on a 
target to the exclusion of rather obvious danger signals?
A look at some persisting policies should shed further 
light on the problem.
Each policy presented is included in quotation marks 
since it has been paraphrased by the author.
"Low-cost energy is in the best interest of the 
United States consuming public." This policy or one 
similarly worded appears to have long been the guiding force 
of many government regulatory agencies. At this policy's 
inception the policy was probably sound, and the public in 
both the industrial and private sectors greatly benefited 
from it. There is ample current evidence to indicate that
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the policy is either in need of a change or requires less 
rigid interpretation. Perhaps the policy should read 
"relatively low-cost energy is in the best interest of the 
United States public."
"Big business is inherently evil, and must be 
continuously and carefully watched to prevent growth, 
excessive profits, and collusion." There are existing 
antitrust laws to enforce a portion of this policy. 
Politicians and reporters assume that it is their civic 
responsibility to watch other areas. The net result has 
been to successfully retard profit in the very capital­
intense petroleum industry. These actions have reduced 
return on investment to a figure below the national average 
despite favored tax treatment for the industry. Improved 
profits are compared to these abnormally low figures and the 
general cry is raised that additional safeguards are 
necessary to prevent profiteering.,
"The American consumer desires a large luxury 
automobile and is not really interested in an economy car." 
Some automobile-industry executives in the United States 
could not be convinced that they did not have the proper 
production policy. These executives followed their 
previously conceived policy concerning the size and the 
economy desired by the United States motorist until foreign- 
car manufacturers captured a significant portion of their 
sales. Even then they turned their attention more to sporty 
models rather than economy-oriented small cars. The
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immediate result of this policy fixation was to produce 
automobiles which consumed large quantities of gasoline. 
The eventual result was a major shutdown of large automobile 
plants and their conversion to the manufacture of smaller 
cars only after better than thirty million automobiles with 
high fuel consumption were already on the road. This high 
fuel consumption added significantly to the total energy 
problem.
"The type of service station which is most desirable 
is a large multibay full-service station of modern decor." 
After several years of this type of construction, it was 
discovered that the overhead costs would not allow 
competitive pricing when the cut-rate dealers began to 
construct minimal service and self-service operations.
"Profit may be maximized by producing additional 
units whenever marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost." 
This economic truth may prove dangerous if adopted as a 
policy without a very clear definition of marginal cost. As 
suggested in Chapter 3 there is the danger of misconception 
concerning what constitutes marginal cost in any industry 
where product ion is discontinuous (economies of scale 
require a large plant size and additional units can not be 
processed when capacity is approached without the 
construction of a very large plant). An attempt to adopt 
marginal pricing as it is generally understood under these 
circumstances can cause a real loss in both capital 
invested and the ability to attract additional capital.
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Policies which appear innocent when considered by 
one company may develop into mutually exclusive policies 
when the industry is considered as a whole. For example, if 
a major oil company decides as a policy not to be undersold 
by more than one cent while discount competitors adopt a 
policy of always being two cents under the major ptice, such 
a mutually exclusive set of policies exists. There will be, 
then, no end to the price reductions until one of the firms 
changes its policy.
The problems existing within the industry which 
have tended to make prices depressive have been those 
involving a persistent use of obsolete, poorly defined, or 
mutually exclusive policies. Most of the pressure exerted 
against price increases by agencies outside the industry 
have also been generated due to a rigid adherence to 
potentially or partially antiquated policies.
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
The government's involvement in the market place is 
clearly referenced and quite carefully stated in a policy 
background paper prepared for a Senate committee. Excerpts 
from that paper are enlightening:
OPEC'S [*] success in raising landed prices of
imports to the U.S. level would mean an end to 
the 'cheap imported oil' yardstick against which 
domestic energy prices have been measured, and 
the government would be deprived of the
*The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
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leverage of increased imports that is now used 
to stabilize the prices of domestic oil and 
other fuels.5
The policy background paper quotes a cabinet task force on 
oil-import control
The present system has spawned a host of 
special arrangements and exceptions for purposes 
essentially unrelated to the national security 
... and had led to undue Government intervention 
in the market and consequently competitive 
distort ions.6
The policy paper further states "The import control program 
is now principally a price stabilization device and a means 
of allocating the benefits of import among refiners."7
This allocation is done in a biased manner as indicated in
the policy paper "... the 'sliding scale' favoring small
refineries.”8 The sliding scale referred to is presented 
in Table 4.5, page 103, and the benefit of the import quota 
is presented in Table 4.4 on page 101.
The absence of clear legislative authority and 
guidelines for oil import policy, the general 
practice of deciding import matters on an ad hoc 
basis, and the drift in administration of the 
existing program, constitute uncertainties that 
deter investment in several sectors of the energy 
economy. Among these sectors are ... refinery 
location and construction.9
Many of the areas of government involvement have
5U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Insular 
Affairs, Toward a Rational Policy for Oil and Gas Import - 
A Policy background paper, 1973 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office), pp. 9-10.
6Ibid., p. 14. 7Ibid., p. 15. 8Ibid.
9Ibid., p. 16.
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been mentioned in previous sections of this chapter. In 
addition to those mentioned, President Truman requested and 
received from the industry cooperation toward a million­
barrel reserve capacity which suppressed prices in the early 
fifties (prior to the adoption of the oil-import program).
PROBLEMS WITHIN THE INDUSTRY
The balance between refining and marketing for major 
oil companies is a precarious one with extremely unstable 
characteristics. This lack of stability is caused by the 
application of marginal pricing in a questionable manner.
Thorstein Veblen has a rather clear exposition of 
the price system in a free-market economy in his book, The 
Engineers and the Price System.10 He illustrates the effect 
of overproduction on prices by referring to the capacity of 
the United States during times of war to mobilize production 
facilities and turn out tremendous volumes of any selected 
product (tanks, trucks, aircraft and the like). He 
suggests that this extensive production volume could also be 
accomplished during times of peace; however, it would 
suppress prices by creating hugh surpluses of any given 
product. These lower prices would be self-defeating from a 
profit oriented viewpoint. Veblen therefore concludes that 
it is essential under our economy to control production.
10Thorstein Veblen, The Engineers and the Price 
System (New York: Viking Press, 1954).
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This premise is accepted in almost every major manufacturing 
area. Business personnel produce and utilize carefully 
calculated inventory control programs. A manager in today's 
business world would be remiss and subject to open criticism 
if he allowed inventories to run rampant, to absorb 
excessive quantities of working capital, and eventually to 
become obsolete. Despite this fact there is general 
presumption that any attempt to control production in the 
refining industry has to be blatant conspiracy.
There were several causes for the lack of stability 
within the industry. The government's intervention in the 
market place was of major importance since this external 
disruption of the market economy appeared to be an internal 
disruption of the market economy. The independent refiner, 
given a protective blanket under the import program, had on 
occasion used that protection to engage in practices he 
would have hesitated to attempt if such windfall profits 
were not rather uniquely available. Despite the fact that 
there was encouragement, the extent of price competition in 
the industry appears excessive. Outside influences, 
although responsible for the initial thrust, were not fully 
responsible for the magnitude of price-suppressive activity.
A combination of misapplied marginal cost principles 
and self-serving purchase timing has greatly amplified the 
problem. To illustrate the effect of the combination of 
these two forces, consider a situation in which a major oil 
company has carefully calculated its total requirement for
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heating fuels for the winter season. Although there is 
considerable manufacturing flexibility within the refinery, 
a hypothetical company has concluded that it cannot produce 
all the requirements during the peak season without getting 
an early start. The company commences the production of 
normal requirements considerably ahead of the season and 
stores the output pending sale to independent jobbers. The 
jobbers, well aware of the total storage capacity at a given 
refinery location, purposefully delay the acquisition of 
heating fuel. During this interim period they almost 
totally deplete their inventory of product. At the point 
where the major refinery has exhausted its storage capacity 
and is considering negotiations for extensive transportation 
costs, not normally incurred, the jobber begins to bargain 
with the major refinery. Due to the pressures of sheer 
volume and absence of storage capacity, the major refiner is 
caught in a weak bargaining position and sells at low 
prices. One available recourse which would avoid such 
disastrous results, when the bargaining position of the 
independent is strong, is to purposefully delay the changing 
of the product mix so as to produce less than the 
anticipated demand for the product and to thus avoid 
exhausting storage capacity. The major companies have 
repeatedly been unwilling to do this.
Another alternative which could be effectively used 
to avoid depressed prices would be to purposefully curtail 
production volume whenever a significant segment of the
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product mix is in oversupply. In this area the lack of 
acceptance of marginal cost in its application to the unique 
aspects of the refinery industry has caused the major oil 
companies to adopt policies promoting heavy utilization of 
plant capacity at the expense of price. Independent 
marketers of gasoline, well aware of the policies adopted 
by the major oil companies, utilize products obtained from 
independent refiners to gain a foothold in the market place. 
Drastic discounting policies are adopted and can be main­
tained because the independent refiner's price is below the 
major's price. In addition, the marketing costs of these 
service stations which provide almost no service other than 
the delivery of gasoline are considerably below the costs 
involved in a full-service station because of the great 
difference in fixed costs. After obtaining a small foothold 
the marketing policies of the independent attract a portion 
of the major refiner's sales. This sales-volume loss 
creates a chain reaction since a loss of sales volume places 
the major refiner in an excess-capacity situation. This 
temporary oversupply of product has been "created" by brand 
name and does not exist when total supply and demand are 
considered. The policy to maintain production volume causes 
the major refiner to sell his excess product at attractive 
rates to the independent marketer. An attractive rate is 
one which is lower than the rate supplied by the independent 
refiner. This low rate enables the independent marketer 
to again reduce his price and the cycle repeats itself.
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In addition to the reasons previously mentioned, 
there have also been some instances where poorly worded 
contracts have created a price-suppressing effect. These 
contracts take the form of a guaranteed profit margin or 
express the price in relative rather than absolute terms, 
such as some relative price below the normal tank-wagon 
price. In these instances there is no sharing of 
responsibility in the pricing scheme. Regardless of how low 
the price goes, one party to the contract is still assured 
his normal markup. On occasion one party to such a contract 
has been known to initiate the price-suppressive activity 
thereby automatically lowering his cost and attempting to 
stockpile product at a low cost. Inequities of this sort 
are usually of short duration because the injured party is 
not again interested in entering into such an arrangement.
ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Any attempt to segment the various facets of the 
problem associated with refining is subject to criticism. 
Most of the effects of any one portion of the industry are 
interwoven with the circumstances in other segments. This 
interlocking relationship is especially true of the effect 
of concern for the environment upon the industry.
There can be little dispute with the fact that 
environmental concerns are a real and timely problem and 
that the refining industry should make reasonable efforts to 
minimize atmospheric pollutants. The primary problem in the
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interaction of ecological and refining needs has been one of 
timing. Environmentalists were interested in halting known 
pollutants and preventing further abuses to the environment. 
Strength for the cause was received from the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Although it is reasonable to assume that 
individuals would react emotionally to challenges to the 
environment, it seems also reasonable to assume that the 
Environmental Protection Agency should react more calmly and 
on known facts rather than emotions. In some instances this 
does not appear to have been the case. There are three 
major areas where environmental concerns have seriously 
affected the normal operation of petroleum refining, and a 
fourth area which has resulted in tremendously increased 
demand for petroleum products.
Removal of Lead
The first area of concern was caused by the 
legislation requiring elimination of certain emissions from 
car exhaust. Because of the approach that the United States 
automotive industry followed to meet its emission require­
ments (namely, the use of catalysts), the refining industry 
was forced to prepare for low-lead and eventually no-lead 
gasoline. This preparation was essential to prevent a 
fouling of the catalyst by the lead which would render the 
catalyst useless. In addition to the no-lead requirement, 
United States auto makers had to severely reduce the 
performance of their engines by reducing compression ratios.
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These lower compression ratios increased the demand for low- 
octane gasoline rather than premium gasolines. At the same 
time the technology associated with producing reasonably 
high-octane gasoline containing no lead required additional 
processing using equipment whose function was to increase 
the octane. Refiners thus had the capability of delivering 
a leaded gasoline with high octane ratings when the short 
short-run demand was for gasoline with relatively low 
octane. In this instance, the political body which 
established the mandatory policy provided lead time. 
However, in view of the technical requirements, the lead 
time was quite short. Following their usual policy, the 
government regulations provided favored treatment to small 
refiners. The major refiners have only until 1975 to 
accomplish the conversion; however, the small refiners have 
until 1977. The short time period for the implementation of 
the emissions standards, which was cut even shorter by some 
of the states, has created a doubt in the minds of some 
industry leaders as to the need for the strict measures 
required. There is some evidence to support the claim that 
eliminating the lead was an unnecessary requirement. Given 
the same crude stocks, refineries will be unable to produce 
the same volume of gasolines containing no lead that was 
previously produced utilizing the lead. The automobiles 
will of course consume more product since the compression 
ratios have been reduced.
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Refinery Emissions
A second impact of environmental concerns on the 
refining industry was the requirement that the refinery 
clean up their own emissions. Substantial earnings of the 
companies have been diverted from other sound investment 
proposals to accomplish this objective. Despite these 
efforts and disregarding the fact that entirely new 
refinery facilities were being constructed to meet emission 
standards, politicians on the eastern seaboard (primarily 
in the Northeastern United States) were successful in 
defeating proposed refinery construction sites in that 
sector. They have also vigorously and successfully opposed 
the construction of superports to handle large tankers 
transporting foreign crudes. One result of this action 
(which created large deficits in refinery capacity for the 
PAD11 district) has been a hostile attitude on the part of 
some state and local officials toward the exportation from 
their producing areas of refined products to areas that had 
deliberately blocked refinery expansion.
Alaskan Crude
The third impact of major significance directed 
against the petroleum industry by environmentalists was the 
blocking of the efforts to construct the Alaskan pipeline 
which would transport Alaskan crude from the North Slope to
11Petroleum Administration for Defense.
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an open seaport. The ability to transport this volume of 
crude does not begin to reach the magnitude of the current 
domestic crude deficit, although Alaskan crude provides a 
potential for a significant temporary relief from extreme 
hardship when transportation problems are solved.
Generation of Electricity
A less-direct area of ecological impact which must 
be considered is the environmentalist's successful attempts 
to halt construction of new facilities for hydroelectric and 
atomic generation of electricity. This deferred 
construction has a significant bearing on the petroleum 
industry. The sulfur emissions requirements outlawed the 
use of most coal as a power source causing the producers of 
electrical energy to convert from coal to residual fuel oil 
or gas which drastically increased demand for both refined 
products and natural gas. The timing of these problems was 
critical because it introduced uncertainty into the 
decision model at a time when return on investment was low, 
as noted in the following section.
EFFECT ON FINANCIAL INVESTMENT
Refinery capacity in the United States has grown 
from 9,916,165 barrels per calendar day in 1963 to 
13,382,955 barrels per calendar day in 1973 (see Appendix A 
beginning on page 161). During this same period of time the 
Oil and Gas Journal forecast demand for domestic consumption
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and exports increased from 10,656,000 barrels per day in
1963 to 17,460,000 barrels per day in 1973 (see Table 4.6). 
Forecast demand exceeded refinery capacity in 1963 by 
approximately 740,000 barrels. However in 1973, forecast 
demand exceeded capacity by more than 4,000,000 barrels. 
What produced the tremendous lag in refinery investment?
Governmental policy decisions are apparently 
responsible for most of this difference. In 1963 the 
forecast of United States import of refined products and 
unfinished feed stock totaled 940,000 barrels per day. By 
1973 the forecast indicated 2,901,000 barrels per day of 
finished-product imports (see Table 4.7 on page 123). What 
appears then to be a constantly increasing gap between 
forecast demand and domestic capacity is in reality a 
planned difference -- planned by persons in United States 
Government agencies. To appreciate the real situation 
facing refiners, it is necessary to remove the forecast 
imports from total forecast demand to obtain the "real 
demand" envisioned by the industry. Figure 4.5 and Table 
4.8 both depict this comparison of refinery capacity to the 
more realistic forecast of domestic production requirements.
There was a slight excess of capacity in 1963 and
1964 which apparently caused refiners to stabilize 
investment from 1964 to 1967 as there are only very slight 
increases during that time. Except for 1967 and 1968, the 
sizable increases in demand beginning in 1965 and 
continuing in 1973 prompted refiners to commence
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Table 4.6
Forecast of Demand for Domestic Consumption 
of Refined Products and Exports 
with a Constant One Year
Lead Time
(Thousands of Barrels Daily)
Source:
Year 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Domestic Demand
Gasoline 4,476 4,588 4,827 4,847 5,074 5,140 5,445 5,740 6,074 6,247 6,682
Naphtha . . . . . . 89 86 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kerosine 261 254 254 267 269 260 278 280 255 252 231
Distillate 2,024 2,061 2,107 2,159 2,233 2,330 2,355 2,560 2,677 2,822 3,051
Residual 1,485 1,514 1,526 1,633 1,754 1,800 1,878 2,050 2,447 2.360 2,781
Jet Fuel - Military 323 330 339 376 453 580 677 790 784 801 849
Jet Fuel - Commercial 201 233 253 284 283 315 371 300 209 236 247
Lubricants and Naphtha 121 121 127 . . . 140 . . . ... . . . . . . ... • • ♦
L P Gas 747 684 718 762 933 1,015 1,115 1,280 1,334 1,329 1,446
Asphalt and Road Oil 347 355 362 374 399 . . . . . . . . . • • • ♦ • •
Other 690 618 632 1,076 656 1,615 1,659 1,775 1,762 1,802 1,947
Refinery Loss -178 -208 . . . . • • . . . -315 -314 -325 -387 ... • • •
Chem. Feedstock • . . 259 303 • • • 223 ... . . . ... . . . . . ♦ • • •
Total Domestic 10,497 10,809 11,448 11,867 12,503 12,740 13,464 14,450 15,161 15,849 17,234
Exports 159 179 189 189 196 225 244 230 245 241 226
Total Demand 10,656 10,982 11,637 12,054 12,699 12,965 13,708 14,680 15,406 16,090 17,460
Oil and Gas Journal Annual Forecast Numbers from 1963 to 1973.
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Table 4.7
Forecast of Finished Product 
Imports 1963 - 1973
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construction activities on an intensive basis during 1967, 
but the increases for subsequent years appear to be at a 
declining rate. The three to four-year time lag (1964- 
1967) between the demand increase and the construction 
increases is indicative of the lead time necessary to 
construct refineries.
If normal market forces had been at work, prices 
should have increased in 1965, 1966, and 1967. They should 
have fallen off slightly in 1968 and then moved upward at a 
slower pace. A reference to Figure 4.1 (price chart), page 
79, will reveal that although prices were declining on a 
seasonal basis in 1963 and 1964 (the result of the temporary 
oversupply), they never regained their former status; 
rather, they were suppressed by the market-controlling 
influence of the import program from the end of 1964 until 
the early 1970's. There is therefore a lag of five years 
following the rapid demand increase which started in 1965.
This time lag was created because officials in the 
refinery industry were optimistic. During periods of 
depressed prices of the mid-1960's the prevailing attitude 
was "the price will get well," and, because of the lead 
time required for refinery construction, this attitude 
sustained refinery expansion through a prolonged period of 
depressed prices. By 1969 and 1970, the industry had 
received the message concerning prices and realistically 
viewed price expectations to be low. At the same time, 
forces behind the ecology movement had gained strength and
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were presenting the industry with uncertainties. If return 
on investment had been greater the industry may have 
proceeded with expansion despite the uncertainty. However, 
with return on refinery investment, particularly for a 
totally new refinery, at a sustained low level, the risk of 
uncertainty became the probability of loss because there 
was little margin for error.
Responsible corporate officials who were interviewed 
and questioned regarding investment decisions all indicated 
that the return on investment for totally new facilities 
was indeed marginal and those firms that proceeded to invest 
did so for other compelling reasons, not because the 
investment proposal sold itself on a financial return 
basis.12 The situation was so obvious to an astute observer 
of the industry that one informed writer stated, "Despite 
positive demand, there is indecision in the HPl{*} today. 
Decisions are being delayed because of many uncertainties, 
particularly pollution control."13 Fisher and Phipps in a 
subsequent article in the same series added,
The consequences of misjudgment are today being 
amplified by: (a) a loss of flexibility in fuels 
refining as lead restrictions are imposed, (b) the 
outside influences on raw materials cost, and 
(c) the assumption of control by legislative and 
regulative bodies. The chances that overbuilding
*Hydrocarbon Processing Industry.
12Names withheld by request.
13james N. Fisher, Jr., "Analyzing HPI Inter­
mediates," Hydrocarbon Processing, L (February, 1971), 95.
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capacity will result in severe profit losses, for 
example, are far higher today than in the past. 
Losses in potential profit from underbuilding of 
capacity are also higher today than in the past.-*-4
SUMMARY
The normal domestic competitive forces in the 
petroleum refining industry were not allowed to work alone. 
The dual pricing structure introduced in 1959 which 
purported to uphold a higher domestic price for crude oil 
set in motion numerous activities which ultimately 
suppressed product prices. Returns from the production of 
crude oil thus appeared more attractive than the book losses 
which frequently surfaced in the refining and marketing 
Sectors. Management eventually, after prolonged depressed 
prices, shifted substantial investment to the production 
phase when additional uncertainties caused by ecological 
considerations indicated a high risk of loss on proposed 
refinery investment. If the return had been greater, 
refineries could have been built and modified to meet 
changing environmental restrictions.
During this same period government policy 
pertaining to the importation and pricing of residual fuel 
oil caused a great difference between actual demand and 
envisioned demand. Actual demand reflected total potential
14James N. Fisher, Jr. and A. J. Phipps, "Quantifying 
HPI Uncertainties," Hydrocarbon Processing, L (March, 1971), 
70.
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consumption in the United States, and envisioned demand 
represented this total, less envisioned imports, under 
existing government policy. After foreign powers were 
allowed to indirectly control substantial quantities of 
domestic heating and power-generating fuel supplies, the 
policies adopted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries disrupted operational levels worldwide. The 
foreign countries supplying the United States with residual 
fuel oil judiciously met their own needs first. Government 
policy thus created a significant portion of our "energy 
crisis" in an attempt to prolong extreme "low-cost energy." 
Numerous other regulatory policies, as well as a 
misapplication of marginal costing principles by the 
industry, contributed to suppressed product prices either by 
a reduction of cost to selected refiners or by 
discriminatory, artificially low competitive price both 
outside and within the refining industry.
The rigidity with which policies were followed, 
despite changing circumstances, contributed significantly to 
the inflexibility of price. These rigid policies were 
especially significant when applied by government regulatory 
agencies, but were also noted within the industry. Careful 
examination of the empirical data presented in this chapter 
strongly supports the hypothesis that prices have been 
semirigid and that forces outside the petroleum industry 
have played a significant role in producing this upward 
rigidity. A partial result of the rigidity, although not
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the main thrust of this study, was the recent crisis within 
the industry. Empirical data indicated the presence of 
price-suppressive artificial activity in the price structure 
of the petroleum-refining industry. The effect of this 
price-suppressive activity on investment decisions is 
examined in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5
DECISION PROCESSES EXAMINED
Identification of causes of semirigid prices was not 
too difficult when the actions of various interest groups 
were overt and publicly defended. The more subtle causes 
were harder to detect and disclose. The effects of price 
rigidity on the refining industry were even more difficult 
to measure. Empirical data obtained during unstructured 
interviews with key industry personnel assisted greatly in 
obtaining the viewpoints of executives in the planning 
areas of the petroleum-refining industry. Some of the 
questions considered while gathering and analyzing this 
empirical data follow:
1. Which companies should be contacted?
2. How could a cross-section of the industry be
obtained?
3. What were the impacts of price rigidities on 
financial planning?
4. What light would a postcompletion evaluation
shed on investment decisions made during the time 
period under study?
5. To what extent is traditional joint-cost­
accounting allocation used in the investment 
model?
A review of the methodology used in this study will 
assist in the readers evaluation of the empirical data.
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The summarized results of each individual interview have 
been presented in Appendix E, beginning on page 216. As 
promised during the interviews no disclosure was made of 
either the names of the firms or the names of individuals 
representing the firms being interviewed. Without this 
guarantee much of the detailed information discussed during 
the interview would probably have been unavailable. Post­
completion audit evaluations, made available on a voluntary 
basis by several of the companies interviewed, were 
reviewed. Once again sources were not disclosed.
METHODOLOGY
A detailed list of total refinery capacity by ■ 
company for the last decade is presented in Appendix A, 
beginning on page 161. Since investment in new refinery 
construction is of primary concern, the figures reflect 
refinery capacity as controlled by the companies in 1973. 
The figures, therefore, include additions to capacity as 
though these additions were owned by the acquiring company 
even prior to their acquisition. This approach allows the 
reader to determine growth by construction directly from the 
tables in Appendix A. The companies were ranked by size in 
order of descending capacity. The growth (by new con­
struction) in refining capacity of the fifteen largest 
companies for the last eleven years (1962 through 1973), is 
presented in Figure 5.1. Every company in the industry was
Bbls. per calendar 
day in 000's
Figure 5.1
1973 Refinery Capacity Controlled by the Fifteen Largest 




graphed during preliminary investigation to determine each 
firm's relative growth pattern.
Preliminary investigation revealed the strong 
probability of both a difference in management attitude and 
a difference in return-on-investment for firms of different 
size. A random sample was rejected in favor of a judgment 
sample to ensure that firms representing each different 
stratum would be selected. A stratified random sample was 
also considered impractical because the confidential nature 
of the interview might preclude cooperation by randomly 
selected participants, thus defeating the random selection. 
The companies contacted were specifically chosen as 
representative of particular growth patterns or to represent 
a particular size firm or both.
Originally, twenty-four firms were contacted and 
together they represented over 5,000,000 barrels per day 
of refinery capacity. The firms ranged in size from those 
in excess of 1,000,000 barrels per day to those with less 
than 3,000 barrels per day. One very large firm and one 
small firm refused to cooperate in the project. Another 
small firm also declined but in revealing the reasons 
answered in detail a portion of the information sought. 
Another firm's president was cooperative but his firm had 
acquired refining capacity so recently as to negate the 
value of responses in an interview. One firm which could 
not be contacted in follow-up action was in the process of
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being acquired by another firm that had already cooperated.
Four other firms originally contacted to ensure an 
alternative if some did not cooperate were of such similar 
size and operating characteristics to those contacted that 
no follow-up was initiated when no replies to the initial 
inquiries were received. All the remaining companies 
allowed an interview. The degree of cooperation was left 
entirely to the discretion of the firm's representative and 
ranged from cordial and open responses (which sometimes 
included actual formal postaudit evaluation reviews) to 
guarded, nonrevealing interviews. Even in the latter 
instances, however, specific answers were obtained to 
carefully worded requests which revealed the trend or 
management intention of those firms.
Initial contact with each firm was made by letter, 
and thirty to sixty days later, follow-up was made by a 
telephone call to the presidents of those firms not 
responding. There were no rejections or lack of cooperation 
once personal voice contact was made with a responsible 
official.
The large firm that refused to cooperate was the 
first one of that size contacted. Although there were 
indications that the rejection was a standard policy, 
subsequent contacts with other firms suggested that 
approaching the firm on too low a management level was a 
poor policy. The preferred approach proved to be a 
written communication directed to the chief executive
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officer of the firm.
COST ALLOCATION METHODS IN USE
No uniform method for allocating costs among the 
existing product mix was observed in the firms contacted. 
Some firms strongly favored a volume-based allocation. 
Others preferred a price-relative allocation for limited 
purposes (inventories) but not for managerial product mix 
decisions. One firm was using a cost differential which was 
essentially the cost of upgrading the last unit which had 
been changed to a lighter fraction by the latest techniques 
available. This method ignores the "natural" yield of high- 
revenue products when allocating a barrel of oil and would 
substitute as a premium on the cost of gasoline the 
differential involved in upgrading the last unit of the 
distillates changed to gasoline. This differential was then 
applied to all the barrels of gasoline produced even though 
no such costs were incurred in their production. By the 
same token no premium was associated with the gasoline 
component of the crude-oil barrel other than this latest 
differential.
Representatives of each firm contacted were asked to 
identify the allocation method used for managerial 
decisions involving product mix. Without exception each 
individual responded quickly that no profit could be 
determined by product lines. Those firms with computer 
capacity suggested a total cost - total revenue approach to
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the problem. This method utilized computer models of the 
specific refinery to determine the impact of altering the 
product mix within the limits of refinery configuration. 
The pilot firm (see Company M in Appendix E, page 236) 
determined that costs of three different products were 
identical throughout the refinery's normal operating range 
using this method. Closer inspection disclosed a very heavy 
bias in the computer model favoring a volume allocation of 
the input crude-oil barrel. This bias existed in all but 
one of the intermediate and large-size firms contacted. The 
smaller firms' managers indicated the same bias; however, 
without computer models the bias was not defended by them as 
strongly as by representatives of the larger firms.
Under Phase IV Price Controls refiners were required 
to identify profit by product lines. Despite strong protest 
that complying with this request was impossible, the firms 
had to respond. The technique which evolved reflected the 
bias in favor of volume, and this method was later required. 
Several small refiners seemed to find the government 
reporting requirements and the controls on various products 
such a problem that they sold out to intermediate-size 
companies to avoid the headaches. The firms that were 
acquiring did so to reduce some of the product-mix balance 
problems that government regulations had imposed on them.
Numerous additional items of individual interest are 
located in the interview results reported in Appendix E on 
page 216. However, one of the specific reasons the firms
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were contacted was to conduct or examine the results of 
postcompletion audits.
POSTAUDIT EVALUATIONS
The following analyses have been made by reviewing 
postaudit evaluations or implemented proposals. To ensure 
the anonymity of the companies involved, the postaudit 
evaluations will be referred to by omitting any identifying 
characteristics of either the company or the facilities 
unless those facilities are in common use in the industry 
and would not identify the firm.
Case I - A Totally New Petrochemical Plant
The first case is a decision to construct a new 
facility in an attempt to retain a declining relative market 
share. The initial proposal indicated the competitor's 
advantages to be:
1. market-oriented plant location.
2. more intense sales and service activity.
3. greater research and development efforts.
4. wider range of products.
This initial study indicated an average annual rate 
of return on investment of 18.46 percent with payout to 
occur in 4.8 years. The personnel presenting the proposal 
suggested that improved performance from existing locations 
would result from construction of the new plant. These 
improvements were included in the projected return. The 
postaudit evaluation by company personnel cut right to the 
heart of the problem. The new plant did not live up to
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expectations in sales, and incurred greater expenses than 
planned, causing the audit personnel to observe:
The premises that a plant in ,., would enhance 
market prices and volume in other areas (or that 
unfavorable consequences would result without such 
a plant) is, in our opinion, debatable and highly 
speculative for use in project justification.[*]
In the original proposal this speculative improvement 
amounted to 33 percent of the project income. The postaudit 
evaluation explained all significant deviations from 
projected performance and revealed a reduction in the 
average annual rate of return of 9.5 percent (more than 
half) and an increase in the years to pay out from 4.81 to 
8.5. This was an expensive lesson in totally new 
petrochemical-plant construction.
Case II - Refinery Modernization and Expansion
A dual proposal was made to upgrade the "bottom of 
the barrel" (see Figure 2.1 on page 36) and to expand total 
processing capabilities for an existing refinery. Antici­
pated new specifications for asphalt were expected to be 
more restrictive. Existing refinery configurations would 
not permit production of the new asphalt and would require 
the residual to be sold as fuel oil. A modernization of 
plant would prevent a loss of revenue. In addition, a 
planned 2,500-barrel-per-day increase in capacity (as first 
considered) coupled with the revenue from asphalt retention,
*Audit group identity withheld by request.
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produced an average annual rate of return on investment in 
the initial study of 17 percent with payout to occur in 5.2 
years. In the first six years differences in product prices 
and increases in crude-oil prices and manufacturing expenses 
reduced the average annual rate of return to 7.7 percent and 
lengthened the payout period to 9.4 years.
Case III - Expansion To Meet Emission Requirements
An investment proposal was examined which was used 
to implement an upgrading and expansion of refinery plant to 
meet the new 1975 Federal emissions standards. Built into 
the calculations were figures reflecting opportunity costs 
of not having product available for sale. In addition, it 
was assumed that no-lead gasoline would command a premium 
price. There was also an assumption that number six fuel 
oil would have a sustained high price. With these 
assumptions, the project showed a return on investment in 
excess of 25 percent and represented a proposal that would 
carry its own weight on a financial-return basis.
The premium price on no-lead gasoline did not 
materialize and return on investment dropped appreciably. 
This expansion was recent and improvements in the number six 
fuel-oil price coupled with general increases in other 
product prices salvaged the investment, The new equipment 
added catalytic cracking and Platforming capabilities which 
provided an enviable flexibility and increased the company's 
overall capacity.
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Case IV - Major Expansion
The results of an expansion decision and a review of 
the postcompletion effectiveness of that expansion were 
discussed with the person responsible for the planning and 
postaudit of the expansion. The data given are considered 
valid, but no written evidence was observed. As a 
consequence the results were reported in Appendix E under 
Company R (beginning on page 229).
Case V - Construction of a Totally New Refinery
The review of a totally new refinery-construction 
decision was made during an interview with the official 
responsible for planning and monitoring the expansion. The 
specific facility was identified and some confidential 
information pertaining to its unique features was presented. 
The firm's representative was open and candid, had extensive 
knowledge of the entire operation, and spoke rather freely. 
He understood that the confidential portion of the material 
would not be published nor the firm identified. Since no 
written matterial was examined, the results of this 
interview were presented in Appendix E under company T 
(beginning on page 224).
Case VI - Small Upgrading of Facilities
The results of a brief verbal exploration of a post­
completion evaluation is presented under Company H in 
Appendix E (beginning on page 239).
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SUMMARY
The results of contacts with the firms in the 
petroleum industry proved to be invaluable to the author. 
In addition to a good response (sixteen out of nineteen 
companies on which follow-up was initiated) the firms 
contacted were for the most part very cooperative.
None of the firms could refute the logic of 
government involvement and effective price ceilings for the 
latter part of the decade 1962 through 1972 (the basic 
content of Chapter 4). Neither did they take issue with the 
logic presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The development of the 
economic thrust of Chapter 3 was discussed with the members 
of the economics departments of several large firms and with 
the chief executive officers or planning officer of some 
small and intermediate firms.
Seven actual investment cases were discussed or 
studied. Six of the seven cases were presented. The 
seventh case was a detailed written proposal which had not 
been implemented. This case was received as the result of a 
direct request for a negative decision on an investment 
proposal. Together the proposals reviewed represent a fair 
cross section of industry activity ranging from the 
construction of a large, totally new refinery through major 
refinery modification, and included small additions and 
technological upgrading to meet emissions requirements. A 
facility other than a refinery was included to indicate the
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coverage of very limited petrochemical analysis (limited to 
a postaudit evaluation). Of the firms contacted, those 
which responded represent approximately 30 percent of the 
total refinery capacity in the United States at the 
beginning of 1973.
The interviews disclosed a basic trend. Return on 
investment for totally new refineries was so poor during the 
latter portion of the decade (1967 through 1972) that the 
few facilities actually built were constructed primarily 
because they could not be avoided or because the 
construction meshed with other critical decisions, and not 
because projections indicated a favorable return on 
investment. Expansion in the intermediate-size firms was 
more inclined to take the form of expanding sophisticated 
equipment and balancing existing facilities to take 
advantage of previously overdeveloped components. This 
attitude also spilled over into the large refineries when 
expansion studies indicated that the return on totally new 
refineries was inadequate. The intermediate companies had 
primarily adopted these policies because of capital
limitations.
Smaller companies continued the established trend of 
making small improvements from time to time with heavy 
utilization of used equipment obtained from larger firms' 
discarded facilities. A few small firms were planning for 
eventual upgrading to no-lead gasoline which involves heavy 
capital expenditures for new equipment. This upgrading of
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facilities is not mandatory for smaller firms until 1977. 
There was, therefore, no general rush to costly upgrading and 
the return on investment indicated by the small firms was 
quite high.
No use was made in the investment model of 
traditional joint cost-accounting allocation. Instead, 
there is a creeping movement toward a volume-oriented cost 
allocator. This attitude was most vocally represented by 
the large firms with extensive computer models, but was 
prevalent throughout the industry without regard to refinery 
size. Government regulation required the use of a volume­
based cost allocator under Phase IV price controls. 
Accounting systems have been modified extensively to meet 
that requirement. The academic world had little if any 
knowledge of this forced change and less opportunity for 




Petroleum refining has changed steadily since about 
1906 from a processing to a manufacturing activity. Among 
other gradual changes, capital requirements for expansion 
have increased dramatically as the optimum size of the 
refinery has become larger. The pace of the general 
business environment has also increased markedly. 
Government involvement in areas affecting the petroleum­
refining industry has become more and more pronounced.
EFFECTS OF POLICIES
A combination of forces produced a period of semi­
rigid prices in the industry. An unyielding adherence to 
policies when subtle changes in the business environment 
produced a need for policy modification or abandonment 
appears to be a primary cause of price rigidities.
Government Policy
Government officials vigorously pursued a low-cost- 
energy policy which had a threefold effect. First, the 
price of natural gas was held extremely low by a regulatory 
agency (the Federal Power Commission). The commission was 
not negligent in its duties nor did it intend to create a
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crisis. The problem in retrospect seems to be in part one 
of accounting.1 With whatever justification, the price of 
natural gas was held artificially low. This produced 
additional demand for the product both from areas pre­
viously serviced by gas and also from electric-power- 
generating facilities previously fueled by some ecologically 
restricted source. With no incentive for capital expansion 
to meet the huge demands now being placed on the resource, 
the natural gas industry simply could not keep pace.
The second phase of rigidity in governmental 
policy administration occurred in fuel-oil handling. 
Residual fuel oil was cleaned up through technology to meet 
the standards imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Consequently, there was an increased demand for this fuel 
to substitute for the less-expensive gas since the gas was 
available in short supply. Shortages were felt due to this
1The price of natural gas could be held low and 
justified only by a rigid insistence on review of past cost 
(the extremely low costs associated with the discovery of 
yesterday's natural gas). The theoretical reasons for 
historic costs versus replacement costs have been discussed 
by many persons with impressive credentials. However, the 
depreciable assets normally discussed during these 
theoretical inquiries have risen only modestly when compared 
to the tremendous increases involved in drilling in today's 
deep-pool, high-cost drilling ventures.
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expanded use as much as three or four years ago and 
newspaper headlines proclaimed a shortage of fuel oil.
These headlines caught the writer's attention and motivated 
this study.
Careful inquiry revealed no absolute shortage of 
residual fuel oil at that time but rather a shortage at the 
existing price. The price of heavier residual fuel oil has 
been so low that most major refineries have processed the 
residual into asphalt or coke. Relatively cheap foreign 
crude combined with lower foreign labor costs induced the 
construction of refineries outside the United States as the 
primary source of supply for United States residual-fuel-oil 
requirements. Government forces went to work when the 
shortage was publicized. Following rather rigid adherence 
to their previous policies in an attempt to keep the price 
low, import restrictions were reduced and eventually 
removed. This action allowed foreign sources to meet 
domestic requirements in an ever-increasing pattern. Total 
petroleum consumption was skyrocketing but the form of the 
demand was in a relatively unprofitable product as far as 
the existing policies of United States refineries were 
concerned. The policy of protective governmental agencies 
would not allow the product to become more profitable.
The third major effect of rigid administrative 
policy assumed a more subtle form. At its inception the oil­
import program was intended to ''protect” the industry from a 
glut of foreign crude oil readily available at a low cost.
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This action seemed to be a major reversal of policy in that 
low costs were being pursued in other areas. The primary 
intent appeared to be the preservation of employment in the 
United States petroleum industry. Government, however, is 
large and the low-cost-energy pursuit continued.
No sooner had the import program become mandatory 
than the program itself began to be used to suppress the 
price of refined products, particularly gasoline, which had 
no natural competitive substitute. At the same time crude­
oil prices were held high, the price at the pump was being 
attacked from two sources. Marginal producers were armed 
with a relatively low-cost product due to a reduced cost of 
crude under discriminatory import quotas. Smaller 
refineries were allowed a greater percentage of import 
quota compared to their total refinery capacity than were 
larger refineries. There is evidence that some marginal 
refineries were acquired from major oil companies and the 
resultant improvement in import allowables in effect 
provided an inexpensive acquisition. The resultant savings 
reduced the investment cost in these discounted, used 
facilities even further and shortened payout. This action 
allowed a low-cost gasoline to meet the low return on 
investment requirements. Government policy which was 
designed to keep the marginal producer competitive also 
presented problems with respect to new construction.
The extreme discontinuities being required in 
totally new refinery construction created, for any single
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firm, a problem in locating sufficient demand to satisfy the 
output requirements of the large refineries. Historically, 
the gradual replacement of older facilities produced some of 
that demand. Since the older marginal facilities were being 
operated with a subsidy, the investment decision on the 
larger new facilities became even more risky than they had 
previously been. Thus the indirect effect produced by the 
government through the marginal refiner has all the outward 
characteristics of natural competition from smaller 
(purportedly less-efficient) operations.
The direct effect was even more devastating. The 
price of gasoline was driven down by complex combinations of 
government policy interacting with a marginal-cost pricing 
scheme which produced an unstable price-depressing effect in 
the industry. Once prices were depressed sufficiently, the 
direct action of governmental low-cost energy policy went 
into effect. The government applied direct pressure on the 
industry and on any natural leader of the oligopoly market 
by threatening to roll back the price of crude oil through 
complete removal of the import controls. This action would 
have produced the flood of inexpensive foreign oil that the 
import controls were originally installed to safeguard 
against. This direct external pressure forced several 
industry leaders to roll back announced price increases 
during a period when cost to the industry (in all phases of 
operation) were rising in keeping with the overall price 
level. In the author's opinion, it appeared almost as if
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petroleum products and other energy sources were singled out 
as exceptions to the inflationary spiral of this time period, 
primarily because of the low-cost energy policy.
Other Policy Problems
In addition to the major effects of government 
policy, a relatively minor but still significant effect was 
felt in the competitive pressures brought by the electric 
utilities against home furnace fuel through artificially 
low, discriminatory, "off season" pricing schemes which were 
coupled with total-electric advertising. The net effect of 
this combination was to perpetuate justification for 
artificially low heating rates. The resultant increases in 
the use of electric heating placed even further demands on 
the petroleum industry, but shifted the demand from the 
distillate range which was produced domestically, to the 
residual range which was imported.
The United States Government was not alone in policy 
making. Sources of crude oil and residual fuel oil were 
suddenly removed when OPEC countries announced a reduction 
in oil production and a ban on deliveries to certain 
countries including the United States and some close allies 
in an attempt to gain desired political results. This 
action not only produced restrictions on crude-oil imports, 
but more significantly threatened to completely curtail 
substantial quantities of required residual fuel oil.
The firms involved within the industry also
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persisted in rigid policies. A misapplication of marginal­
cost concepts induced the adoption of product-dumping 
policies which added to the price-suppressing activities of 
the previously mentioned government policies. Numerous 
other policies complicated the picture. Measures adopted by 
the automotive industry increased petroleum-refining 
requirements, and new, hastily conceived policies of the 
Environmental Protection Agency presented rigid requirements 
which further heightened the capital intensity of the 
industry. All these interacting policies produced the 
pricing pattern indicated in Chapter 4. The effect of this 
price-suppressing activity and the government's assumption 
of price leadership in the oligopoly structure follow.
INTERVIEW RESULTS
The interview results and the postaudit evaluation 
of the industry's activity following the adoption of the 
mandatory import program as presented in Chapter 5 strongly 
suggest:
1. Return on investment during this period, 
particularly from 1967 through 1972, was sufficiently 
depressed to discourage construction of any totally new 
refinery facilities for investment reasons. While some 
facilities were constructed, reasons other than return on 
investment were responsible.
2. Uncertainty introduced by ecological considerations 
(i.e., plant location, and lack of knowledge regarding final
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fuel-emissions requirements) combined with low return on 
investment temporarily halted construction.
3. A general pattern developed. Large companies 
definitely slowed totally new refinery construction and 
substituted a policy of balancing refinery facilities.
Certain refinery units, which were overbuilt 
initially, provided the opportunity to expand total capacity
by raising the capacity of the rest of the refinery to the
level of these units. Smaller firms continued to rely 
heavily on construction with used equipment to hold down
investment costs. This action enabled them to show a
consistently higher return on investment during this period 
than projects using totally new equipment. Some of the 
firms struggled with competitive pricing to the extent that 
they relied exclusively on the value of the import quota for 
their entire profit. Ironically there was a suggestion, 
after this price-suppressive time period ended, that the 
activities of the industry for the period 1967 through 1972 
were normal conditions reflecting normal returns on 
investment. Several studies by the Chase Manhattan Bank 
have indicated a need for expanded capital requirements in 
petroleum refining. In addition, these studies also reported 
that return on investment for petroleum companies during 
this most seriously affected period of suppressed prices 
fell below the national average for manufacturing. Since 
the petroleum industry has, or is supposed to have, certain 
tax benefits, the return on investment should have been
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higher than the national average. In essence the effect of 
the price-suppressive rigidity, in all its complexity, 
surfaced as the energy crisis.
IMPLICATIONS
Several implications seem to present themselves 
from these observations.
Accounting Implications
The rigidities which surfaced as the result of the 
many policy interactions succeeded in holding prices fairly 
constant at a low level for about five years. Any 
stickiness of price directly affects the price-relative cost 
allocator; however, it was determined that the cost 
allocator had no bearing on the decisions of this time 
period since that cost allocator was not used in the 
planning departments of the industry. The effect of price 
rigidities coupled with the use of the price-relative cost 
allocator was presented in Chapter 2. The discussion of 
that chapter is still considered significant since planning 
personnel indicated a strong bias in favor of volume 
allocat ions.
Perhaps the real reason for the lack of a practical 
solution to the complex problem of joint cost allocation is 
the attempt by most persons to solve the problem in a single 
step or with as little additional effort as possible. Since 
Phase IV price controls require a cost justification for
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price increases, perhaps the time has come to try to agree 
on a uniform method of allocating cost to refined products. 
In a multifaceted problem, a multifaceted solution does not 
seem unreasonable. Volume appears to be a good allocator 
for processing costs. The volumes are predictable and the 
processing costs associated with basic refinery components 
can be closely approximated if they are not already known. 
The basic stumbling block has been and still is the 
allocation of the cost of the crude input. History has 
exposed the danger of attempting to propose a solution to 
this problem since any attempt invokes crossfire from 
several sectors of the academic community. All solutions 
previously proposed have been accepted with cynicism at one 
time or another by operating personnel. Despite these 
warnings the time has come to look more closely for a 
solution which can be generally accepted because the 
alternative has been a groping search by operating personnel 
and planners for a better way to determine cost differences 
for profit maximization.
The need becomes more urgent if, as has been 
suggested, petroleum as an energy source for the United 
States is, and will be, in short supply when demand and 
demand potential are considered. If the total quantity of 
petroleum requested significantly exceeds the quantity 
available, some indicator is required to direct available 
resources into the right ultimate product. In the author's 
opinion government has demonstrated a lack of ability to
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remain flexible in administering the needs and interests of 
the public. Policy rigidities have in large measure 
contributed to the initial problem. There is no current 
indication of any greater ability to handle these problems 
than the abilities demonstrated in the past when dealing 
with much simpler problems. In the author's opinion, free 
market forces could be capable of directing the resources 
better than regulatory policies. Industry accountants and 
engineers should acquaint the academic community with the 
specifics of the allocation problem in the refining industry. 
The three groups should then try to discover a more accept­
able and longer-lived solution to the problem than has been 
presented historically.
Both the engineer and the accountant have 
traditional viewpoints which contain logical observations 
that can not be refuted. There should exist an allocation 
system which considers the different values of products 
inherent in the barrel of crude oil, the fact that 
technology can and has changed this slate of products, and 
that time is the variable. Time appears to be the critical 
variable either with a free-market system or a government- 
regulated one since it has been clearly demonstrated that 
government policies can cause a doubling of price within a 
relatively short time.
The industry was recently requested to provide the 
government with figures representing the loss associated 
with a change in production from gasoline to home-heating
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fuel. The industry ostensibly complied with this request 
despite repeated assurances by everyone that the cost of any 
single product within the refinery product mix cannot be 
separately determined. Quite obviously it had to be 
determined. An adjustment in prices of furnace fuels 
resulted from the figures presented to the government.
As mentioned previously in this chapter, there is 
also another accounting problem which should be given 
greater consideration. When replacement costs drastically 
exceed historic costs and large inventories of refined pro­
ducts or raw materials in place in the ground are involved, 
profit measurement is difficult. If prices are based on 
historic costs and no provision is made for the necessary 
inventories which must be held to assure future production, 
defense needs and delivery, insufficient funds will be gen­
erated to replace the inventory. LIFO is clearly an attempt 
to consider this problem. However, there has never before 
been a domestic problem of the magnitude which currently 
exists in the production and refining of petroleum products.
Economic Implications
The economic models presented in the literature need 
modification or they fail to explain the activities of an 
industry with all the outward appearance of an oligopoly. 
Because of government interference in the marketing 
mechanism, the oligopoly appears to be unable to set price, 
to limit entry into the area, to rid itself of nuisance
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factors, to prevent price competition over sustained periods 
of time, and generally to function as an oligopoly. One 
reason which suggests itself as a cause of this peculiar 
situation is the extensive knowledge that economists have 
concerning characteristics of an oligopoly and the fact that 
so many economists are employed by the government. Such an 
observation may be pure conjecture. It is not conjecture, 
however, that the interference has taken place. A model was 
presented in Chapter 3 (page 57) which attempted to explain 
in an ex post fashion the activity of the industry during 
the period under observation, using government intervention 
as a new factor in the model. Another model which was 
presented attempted to show the possible effects of 
government intervention in a more conventional approach. 
The activity of the industry during the period of study 
definitely indicates strong outside interference. In the 
author's opinion, the result of this interference has 
unarguably been to place upward rigidities on price and 
therefore seriously to diminish return on investment. The 
average return on investment for the industry has declined 
and was, at the end of this period, well below the national 
average for all manufacturers.
There are logical explanations for the firm's 
behavior prior to 1960, but the introduction of the import 
program signaled the beginning of a change in trend. The 
nation has already reaped part of the harvest of this 
arbitrary interference in a seemingly well-managed industry.
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Suggestions have been made that refineries should be 
divorced from production and marketing facilities or that 
the government should take over all refining operations. 
Both of these suggestions appear unwarranted. The 
communication problems involved in the planning and control 
of balanced production, refining, and marketing are so 
complex that to further compound these problems seems at 
the least an unnecessary addition to the burden of the 
industry and at worst a potentially catastrophic event with 
severely damaging consequences. The assumption that the 
government could do as well with the refineries as had been 
done by the industry seems unwarranted from the facts. The 
nation can ill afford for the government to do worse.
The previously mentioned government interference in 
the marketing mechanism (see pages 145-150), attempted 
application of poorly understood marginal-cost concepts, and 
overt actions by foreign powers combined to produce an 
energy crisis. The actions of the United States Government 
regarding import policy and the government's assumption of 
the leadership role in industry pricing prior to the 
emergency by rather thinly veiled threats both 
combined to weaken the ability of the industry to solve its 
own problems. Had prices of critical products been higher 
and ecological restrictions and requirements been 
reasonably applied and clearly understood by all parties, 
there is every indication that the problem could have been 
met with less undesirable impact on the public. The
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industry now faces challenging problems of a planning 
control nature. In the future it will be faced with more 
pressing problems regarding product mix and will require 
better information for management decision-making purposes. 
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Petroleum Companies Controlling at Least 200,000 Barrels 
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
Exxon Co. 1,156,000 1,180,000 1,087,000 1,078,000 1,021,000 985,000 861,000 846,000 861,900 885,700 887,500
Texaco Inc. 1,109,500 1,109,500 1,029,500 960,00 925,000 925,000 805,000 790,000 785,000 785,000 750,000
Shell Oil Co. 1,082,600 1,059,600 1,058,500 942,900 875,800 810,500 786,500 727,000 726,000 682,300 652,600
Amoco Oil Co 1,022,000 958,000 996,400 896,100 885,300 835,300 737,800 684,200 680,200 678,500 661,700
Union Oil Co. of Calif. 969,900 941,200 937,900 799,900 762,900 716,900 620,600 620,600 698,300 726,800 630,300
Mobil Oil Corp. 930,100 797,400 833,800* 856,400* 852,600* 736,200 680,700 693,000 669,300 674,900 665,300
Gulf Oil Co. 818,000 799,000 659,300 646,600 627,900 606,300 563,700 593,700 593,700 575,700 569,200
Atlantic Richfield Co. 772,800 768,000 670,000 703,000* 724,000 724,000 703,000 692,500 692,500 663,500 663,500
Sun Oil Co. 410,500 404,500 408,000 405,000 405,000 394,000 381,500 174,500 376,000* 385,000* 385,000*
Phillips Petroleum Co. 403,700 398,500 398,000 389,500 389,500 409,500 409,500 405,000 405,000 405,000 405,000
Ashland Oil, Inc. 350,300 344,300 316,500 289,500 261,500 260,500 245,500 219,500 204,000 197,000 192,200
Continental Oil Co. 285,000 283,000 272,500 276,300 273,300 276,300 240,800 253,500 249,000 245,900 216,950
Standard Oil Co. of Ohio 264,400 255,100 254,000 171,600 180,600 172,500 168,000 165,000 165,000 165,000 158,000
Cities Service Co. 240,000 281,000 281,000 261,000 241,000 241,000 241,000 255,300 255,300 255,300 255,300
Marathon Oil Co. 223,000 205,000 187,150 159,150 159,150 159,150 149,300 168,650 168,650 153,850 153,850
+Figures represent refinery capacity as controlled on January 1, 1973, irrespective of transfers of ownership. For 
this reason the increases indicated are true increases in total refinery capacity. Growth by individual firms through a 
policy of acquisition rather than constrcution will not appear to be growth but a constant refinery capacity.
This total is a combination of barrels per calendar day and barrels per stream day since figures for just one 
category were not available.
*Barrels per stream day rather than barrels per calendar day.
Source:
Annual refinery numbers of the Oil and Gas Journal for the years presented.
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Table A.2
Petroleum Companies Controlling Between 






1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
British Petroleum Co. 141,250 181,400 185,000 185,000 104,000 104,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000
Getty Oil Co. 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000 140,000
Champlin Petroleum Co. 138,750 133,767 129,200* 90,000 87,000 87,000 87,000 84,180 81,680 81,680 80,180
Coastal States Petro Chem 130,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 85,500 80,000* 44,000 29,500 29,500* 27,500 29,000
Murphy Oil Co. 118,000 67,000 68,000 56,000 53,500 50,000 47,000 44,000 43,000 43,000 40,000
Clark Oil & Refining Co. 104,000 102,500 100,000 100,000 100,000 92,000 83,500 83,500 70,500 65,000 64,500
Amerada—Hess Corp. 98,500 98,500 98,500 98,500 95,700 93,800 90,900 90,900 88,600 89,850 89,850
Koch Refining Co. 96,500 87,700 87,000 77,300 77,300 62,300 62,300 62,300 62,300 62,300 43,200
Crown Central Petro Corp. 93,000 85,000 85,000 84,000 37,500 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Tenneco Oil Co. 88,200 87,000 84,000 81,000 76,000 76,000 57,000 54,000 51,000 47,000 44,000
Skelly Oil Co. 67,000 67,000 67,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 48,000 47,000 45,500 60,500
Charter Oil Co. 62,055 62,055 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000
CRA Inc. - Kansas 60,000 55,000 55,000 54,000 50,000 49,000 45,500 43,300 40,800 40,300 40,300
Texas City Ref., Inc. 60,000 60,000 60,000 50,000 50,000 52,500 50,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 34,000
Cosden Oil & Chem., Inc. 58,000 58,000 58,000 68,500 45,000 43,000 42,100 42,100 42,100 42,100 42,100
Suntide Oil Co., Tex. 51,000 51,000 50,000 49,000 49,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 53,000 53,000
Southwest Oil & Ref. Tex. 50,000 50,000 52,000* 52,000* 46,000 46,000 46,000 50,000* 50,000* 47,000 47,000
National Cooperative 
Refining Assoc. - Kan. 49,000 46,200 46,150 44,000 42,000 38,000 38,000 31.000 31,000 31,000 31,000
American Petrofina - Kan. 48,500 48,500 48,500 48,500 48,500 43,400 40,400 40,400 40,400 40,400 40,400
Chevron Asphalt Co. 46,900 39,200 35,900 35,900 35,900 33,600 33,600 32,300 30,800 30,800 30,800
Diamond Shamrock Co. 45,000 45,000 38,000 38,000 35,000 34,500 30,000 29,500 28,000 27,500 27,000
Douglas Oil Co. of Calif. 43,200 43,200 31,600 31,600 30,600 28,600 25,000 36,000 36,000 29,500 27,170
Tesoro Petro. Corp. 
(incl. Alaska) 41,500 35,600 27,910 28,650* 10,500 10,000 9,700 9,700 10,000 10,000 10,000
Husky Oil Co. 40,350 40,350 40,350 39,750 36,350 37,750 36,750 34,100 34,100 37,100 37,090
Lion Oil Co. 37,000 37,000 37,000 37,000 37,000 36,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000
Apco Oil Corp. 37,000 37,000 37,000 37,000 29,000 29,000 29,500 29,500 37,000 37,000 37,000
Leonard Inc. 36,950 NR 29,000 29,000 27,750 27,750 27,750 27,750 27,750 27,750 27,750
Pasco Oil Co. 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,800 26,000 26,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000
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Table A.2 (continued)
Petroleum Companies Controlling Between 30,000 and 200,000 Barrels 
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
Farmer’s Union 30,000 30,000 26,000 26,000 26,000 26,000 26,000 26,000 26,000 26,000 26,000
Hawaiian Independent Ref. 30,000 —
+Figures represent refinery capacity as controlled on January 1, 1973, irrespective of tranfers of ownership.
*Barrels per stream day rather than per calendar day.
Source:
Annual refinery numbers of the Oil and Gas Journal for the years presented.
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Table A.3
Petroleum Companies Controlling Less Than 30,000 Barrels 
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
Vickers Petroleum Corp. 29,500* 29,500* 29,000* 27,000* 27,000* 27,000* 25,000* 25,000* 25,000* 25,000* 25,000*
Delta Refining Co. 29,000 29,000 28,500 28,500 28,500 25,000 22,000 22,000 20,000 21,185 19,885
United Refining Co. 29,000 25,000 25,000 19,000 19,700 16,500 16,500 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000
Powerine Oil Co. 28,500 28,500 28,500 28,500 27,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 19,000 14,000 14,000
Kerr McGee Corp. 28,500 28,500 42,000 41,000 40,000 38,000 38,500 33,500 31,500 31,000 31,000
Rock Island Refining Co. 27,329 27,000* 22,600 22,600 22,600 22,600 22,600 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000
Sequoia Refining Co. 27,000 26,000 26,000 25,000* 25,000* 25,000* 25,000* 25,000* 1,300* 1,235 1,300
Toscopeto Corp. 26,500 25,500 25,500 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 20,000 20,000 16,000
Derby Refining Co. 25,500 25,500 25,300 24,800 23,800 23,400 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500 21,500
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. 24,370 14,670 12,140 12,140 12,110 11,470 10,050 9,850 9,350 9,190 8,720
LaGloria Oil & Gas Co. 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000
Atlas Processing Co. 23,250 18,500 18,500 18,500 18,500 18,500 18,500 18,500 18,500 17,500 17,500
Navajo Refining Co. 18,200 16,500 16,500 16,500 16,500 16,500 16,000 16,000 15,500 15,500 15,500
OKC Refining, Inc. 18,200 17,300 17,300 17,300 19,000 19,000 18,600 19,000 19,000 19,000 19,000
Midland Cooperatives 17,740 17,740 16,301 16,165 16,167 16,165 15,560 15,475 14,100 13.640 12,195
The Refinery Corp. 17,500 16,000* 12,000 11,500 11,500 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Southland Oil Co . 17,400 15,100 13,200 8,000 8,000 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,500 8,300 8,300
Bay Refining Co. 17,000 17,000 17,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 22,000 22,000 23,000 22,000
Mohawk Petroleum Corp., Inc. 17,000 17,000 20,500 20,500 20,500 21,000 20,500 20,500 20,500 17,155 12,500
San Joaquin Refining Co. 17,000 10,000 —
Witco Chemical Co., Inc. 16,350 25,350 24,950 26,750 19550 19,550 26,450 26,450 26,450 26,450 23,300
U.S. Oil & Refining Co. 16,000 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,500
Fletcher Oil & Refining Co. 15,200 14,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 9,615 9,615 9,615
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Table A.3 (continued)
Petroleum Companies Controlling Less Than 30,000 Barrels 
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
Edgington Oil Co. 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 16,000 16,000 16,000* 16,000* 16,000* 8,425 8,200
Hunt Oil Co. 15,000 14,750 14,000 8,200 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 8,000
Indiana Farm Bureau 15,000* 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,500 12,800 12,500 12,500 12,200 12,200 12,200
Pennzoil Co. 15,000 15,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000
Little America Refining Co. 14,500 14,500 13,500 13,500 13,500 —
Macmillan Ring-Free Oil Co. 14,500* 15,000* 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 13,400 13,700
West Coast Oil Co,. 12,700 13,000 11,750 10,000 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500
Alabama Refining Co. 12,600 12,500 13,000 13,000 12,500 10,000 —
Beacon Oil Co. 12,000 11,375 11,375 11,375 11,375 11,375 11,375 10,950 10,000 10,000 10,000
Fort Worth Refining Co. 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 10,500 10,500 —
Kern County Refining Co. 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 —
Oseceda Refining Co. 10,000* 8,000* 8,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000* 5,000* 5,000* 5,000 5,000
Good Hope Refining Co. 9,000 9,000 10,000* 8,600* 6,500 —
Pride Refining Inc. 9,000* 8,500 8,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,300 5,000 3,230 3,230 2,900
Union Texas Petroleum 9,000 9,000 8,150 8,150 8,150 8,150 8,150 8,150 8,150 7,600 7,600
Sunland Refining Corp. 8,500 8,500 8,350 5,350 5,350 5,350 5,350 5,350 5,350 4,500 4,500
Carson Oil Co. 6,900 6,900 7,000* —
Caribou’s Four Corners, Inc. 6,500 6,500 4,970 5,020 4,490 5,000 4,500* 3,200 3,000* —
Newhall Refining Co., Inc. 6,500* 6,500* 6,500 6,500* 6,500* 6,500* 6,200 4,500 4,000 3,400 3,400
Cotton Valley Solvents 6,442 7,600 6,201 8,000* 8,000* 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600 4,750 4,750
Crystal Refining Co. 6,200 6,200 6,200 6,200 3,300 6,200 6,200 6,200 6,200 6,200 6,200
Lajet, Inc. 6,000 6,000* 6,000 —
Tonkawa Refining Co. 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 7,500 —
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Table A.3 (coitinued)
Petroleum Companies Controlling less Than 30,000 Barrels 
of Daily Refining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
Laketon Asphalt Refining 5,500 6,000* 6,000* 6,000 6,000 5,500 5,000* 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500
American Gilsonite Co. 5,450 5,450 5,450 5,600 5,400 5,400 6,050* 6,050* 6,050* 5,050* —
Plateau Inc. 5,100 5,100 5,100 4,100 4,100 2,400 2,300 2,500 2,400 2,300 2,300
Adobe Refining Co. 5,000 5,500 5,500 5,500  5,000 5,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 3,000
Cross Oil & Refining Co. 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 3,350 3,830 3,600 3,500 3,600 3,800
Longview Refining Co. 5,000 5,000 5,000* 5,000* 5,500 4,500 —
Lunday-Thagard Oil Co. 5,000 5,000 3,600 2,600 4,000* —
North American Petro. Corp. 5,000 5,000* 5,000 4,300 4,300 3,800 3,600 3,600 5,700 5,700 5,700
Seminole Asphalt Refining Co. 5,000 3,000 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,950 2,850
Westland Oil Co. 5,000* 3,300 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 2,500 2,500 2,400 2,500
Big West Oil Co. 4,827 4,384 6,000 5,700 5,700 2,850 2,850 2,850 2,850 2,700 2,850
Lakeside Refining Co. 4,750 4,000 4,000 4,000* 4,000 4,000* 4,000* 4,000* 4,000 4,275 4,275
Farmariss Oil Corp. 4,500* 4,420 4,420 4.420 4,420 4,420 1,970 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675
Allied Materials Corp. 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000
Sound Refining Co. 4,300 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 2,850 —
Evangeline Refining Co. 4,000 4,000* 4,500 3,600 4,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,315 2,000
Westro Refining Co. 3,982 3,500 3,900 3,800 3,800 3,800 3,800 3,800 3,800 3,800 3,800
Gladieux Refining, Inc. 3,500 3,000 6,500 3,000 3,500* 3,000* 3,000* 3,000* 3,500* 2,850 2,470
Bayou State Oil Corp. 3,500 3,250* 1,500* 1,000 1,000 920 800 800 800 800 800
Howell Hydrocarbons 3,000 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,500* 4,500* 3,500* 3,000 3,325 3,325
Mid American Refining Co. 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,200 2,900 3,000 2,950 2,950 2,800 2,850 2,850
Petroleum Refining Co. 3,000* 3,000* 3,000* 3,000* 3,000* 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,500 2,500
Vulcan Asphalt Refining Co. 3,000 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,200 2,200 2,200
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Table A.3 (continued)
Petroleum Companies Controlling Less Than 30,000 Barrels 
of Daily Relining Capacity on January 1, 1973+
Source:
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
Canal Refining Co. 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,400 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700
Spruce Oil Corp. 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,200 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800
Calument Refining Co. 2,400 2,200 2,200 2,400* 2,400 2,000 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900
Young Refining Co. 2,300 2,000 2,000* 4,000* 3,000* 2,500* 2,000 2,000 1,500 2,000 1,500
Edington Oxnard Refinery 2,500* 2,250 2,500 2,500 2,550* 2,500* 2,500 2,500 2,500 700 2,375
Warrier Asphalt Co. 2,200 2,200 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,600
Wolfshead Oil Refining Co. 2,050 2,050 2,500 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,150 2,150
Eddy Refining Co. 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Texas Asphalt & Refining Co. 2,000 2,500 2,100 2,000 2,000 2,000* 4,750 4,750 4,750 4,750 4,750
Berry Petroleum Co. 1,530 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,300 2,830 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,325
Summerset Refinery, Inc. 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 2,925 2,850 2,850 2,850 2,850 2,850
Three Rivers Refining Co. 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Wireback Oil Co. 1,500 1,500* 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200* 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
Flint Chemical Co. 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,000 1,000 1,000 800 800 800 800 800
Thriftway Oil Co. 1,200 —
Jetfuel Refining Co. 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Yetter Oil Co. 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 950
Sage Creek Refining Co. 200* 500* 500 500 500 500 —
Mountaineer Refining Co. 50 300 200* 200* —
+Figures represent refinery capacity as controlled on January 1, 1973, irrespective of transfers of ownership.
*Barrels per stream day rather than barrels per calendar day.
Annual refinery numbers of the Oil and Gas Journal for the years presented.
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Table A.4
Relining Capacity No Longer Utilized 
by January 1, 1973+
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
American Oil Co. - Ark. — 30,000 43,600 43,600 43,600 43,600 39,400 38,700 38,700 38,700 38,700
Pennsylvania Refining Co. A 1,350 1,600 1,430 1,260 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,850 1,350 1,350
Diamond Asphalt Co. A 1,100 1,500* 1,500* 1,500* 1,500* 2,500* 2,500* 2,500 1,000 1,000
Morrison Refining Co. A 700 700 700 700 700 —
Utility Refining Co. — 8,000 8,000 8,000 8,100 8,200 7,125 7,125 7,125 5,000
Monarch Refining Co. — 3,500 3,500 3,300 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,900 4,000 4,000
Anderson Refining Corp. — 2,400 2,400 2,400 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,250 1,200
Newton Petroleum Enterprise — 500 800 —
American Oil Co. - Kan. — 30,800 30,800 30,800 30,800 30,600 30,600 30,600 30,600
Golden Eagle Refining Inc. — 9,500 9,500 9,500 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,500 8,000
Howell Refining Corp. — 8,100 8,100 10,000 6,500* 4,000* 4,000* 4,750 4,750
Bayou Refining Co., Inc. — 7,300 7,200 7,200 —
Southern Minerals Corp. — 5,000* 5,000* —
R. J. Oil & Refinery Co., Inc. — 4,800 4,500 4,900 4,700 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,800
Ida Gasoline Co. — 950 950 950 950 950 600 600 600
Empire State Oil Co. — 5,000* 5,000* 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 4,275
Naph Sol Refinery — 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 9,500 10,000
Nevada Refining, Inc. — 1,500* —
Pana Refining Co. — 6,500 6,500 5,500 5,500 5,000 5,000
Lubio Oil & Refining Co. — 5,000 5,000 3,500 — 1,500 1,500
Delta Terminal Co. — 4,000* omitted 4,000* —
Tydall Co. — 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,900 1,900
Rado Refining Co. — 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,425
Lamar Refining — 1,050 1,000 1,000 —
Petroleum Industries — 2,000 2,000* 2,000 2,000 1,900
Refinery Sales — 2,000 —
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Table A.4 (continued)
Refining Capacity No Longer Utilized 
by January 1, 1973+
1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963
Vickers Refinery — 15,000 15,000 15,000
Premier Oil Co. — 13,900 15,300 19,000
Berry Refining Co. — 13,000 13,800 13,300
Petroleum Specialties — 5,000 6,000 6,000
Oriental Refining — 4,215 4,215 4,215
American Bitumals - Wash. — 3,200 3,200 3,200
Danaho Refining Co. — 9,500 9,500
Socal Oil & Refining Co:. — 4,750 5,000
Wyandott Chemical — 2,380 2,380
Bryson Pipeline — 2,000 2,000
Waskom Natural Gas — 2,000 2,000
North Star Refining Co. — 700 —
C. & H. Refining Co. — 200 200
Pontiac Eastern — 16,500
Kent Distribution — 3,500
Advance Refining Co. — 3,000
Great Western — 2,500
Trumball Asphalt Co. — 2,000
+Figures represent refinery capacity as controlled on January 1, 1973, irrespective of transfers of ownership.
öRefinery shut down but operable.
*Barrels per stream day rather than barrels per calendar day.
Source:
Annual refinery numbers of the Oil and Gas Journal for the years presented.
APPENDIX B
APPLICATION OF A t TEST FOR SLOPES 




Part I of this appendix presents the formulas to be 
utilized in the t tests, and will develop modifications 
which allow utilization of the regression table. Part II is 
devoted to testing the appropriateness of price-level 
adjustments and Part III tests the original price data 
before and after the introduction of the oil-import changes 
in March, 1959.
Part I . The following equations are used.1
s2s2yxp -
(n-2)s2y1x + ( n2- 2 ) s 2 y2 X
n1 + n2 - 4
B.2a s2y1X =
n1- 1
n 2 - 2 (sy12 _ b12sX12)
B.2b s2s2 y2x
n2-1
n 2 -2 (sy22 - b22Sx22)







Equation B.3 is designed to test the null hypothesis 
H: B1 - B2 = 0. This hypothesis should be rejected if t is 
significantly different from zero (df = n1+ n2- 4).
The following table is utilized to provide 
simplification of the computation when computer-generated 
least-squares regression output is the input to the t test.2
1Wilfred J. Dixon and Frank J. Massey, Jr., 
Introduction to Statistical Analysis (3rd ed.; New York: 
McGraw Hill, Inc., 1969), pp. 208-09.
2James E. Wert, Charles D. Neidt, and J. Stanley 
Ahmann, Statistical Methods in Educational and Psychological 
















Residuals n-2 Σy2- (Σxy)2Σx2
Σy2 - (Exy)2Σx2
n-2
Totals n-1 Σy2 Σy2n-1
Given b1 = ΣxyΣx2




= S. S. regression from table
b1 Σxy = S. S. regression by substitution
Σxy = S. S. regression
b1
(Σxy)2 = (S. S. regression)2
b12
and:(Σx12) S. S. regression = (Σxy)2
(Ex.2) S. S. regression = (S. S. regr)2b12
by
substitution










Given: the previous formulas and the Mean Square Residual







(mean square residual), by definition
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Given formula B.l:
Simplify if s2y1x = mean square residual
The following formulas are simplified versions of
previous formulas needed for the t test:
B.4 sx12 -
B.5 s2ysp =
Part II. Two separate t tests must be applied to test 
the appropriateness of price-level adjustments prior to the 
analysis of price data when there is an indication of price 
suppression. Two tests are required since it is suspected 
that a significant change has taken place between the two 
sets of data. The pre-1965 data sets (Tables B.2 and B.3 
will be tested in section IIa and the post-1964 data sets 
will be tested in section IIb.
IIa. The tabulated results of the least-squares 
regression for the pre-1965 data follows:
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Table B.2
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices for Regular Grade Gasoline 
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Price
Pre-1965 +




% of Base Month’s Price
—
— —







































































































































































































































































































Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices for Regular-Grade Gasoline 
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Price
Pre-1965 + (continued)
















































































+From September 1955 through November 1964
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Table B.3
Wholesale Price Index (All Commodities) as Prepared by the United States Department 
of Labor, as Adjusted to the 1947-49 Base Period, and Presented 
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Index Value.
Pre-1965 +




Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 



























Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 



















































Wholesale Price index (All Commodities) as Prepared by the United States Department 
of Labor, as Adjusted to the 1947-49 Base Period, and Presented 
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Index Value.
Pre—1965 + (continued)




Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 















































+From September 1955 through November 1964
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Table B.4
Regression Table for Wholesale Price Index 
as a Percentage of the Base Month Index 









Regression 207.945 1 207.945
Residual 324.055 109 2.97928
Totals 532 110 4.83636
F = 69.9449
Coefficient of Determination = .390874
Coefficient of Correlation = .625199
Standard Error of Estimate = 1.72423
n1= 111
When the volume of x is 33 then y is 103.661






Regression Table for Wholesale Gasoline Prices 
as a Percentage of the Base Month Price 









Regression 46.5005 1 46.5005
Residual 3744.5 109 34.3532
Totals 3741 110 34.4636
F = 1.3536
Coefficient of Determination = .012266
Coefficient of Correlation = .110752
Standard error of estimate 5.86116
n1= 111
When the value of x is 33 then y is 107.465




sx12 = 1036.0109 
sx22 = 1036.1073 
s2yxp = 18.663096 
Syxp = 4.32008 
t = 1.241
With 218 degress of freedom t is not significantly
different from zero and therefore the slopes of the
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regression curves must be accepted as similar.
II b. The tabulated results of the least-squares
regression for the post-1964 data (Tables B.8 and B.9) 
covering the relative comparison of Oklahoma wholesale 
gasoline prices with corresponding comparable percentages of 
the wholesale price index (all commodities) follow:
Table B.6
Regression Table for Wholesale-Price-Level Indexes 
as a Percentage of the Base Month Index 









Regression 6546.79 1 6546.79
Residual 285.215 95 3.00226
Totals 6832 96 71.16667
F = 2180.62
Coefficient of Determination = .958253
Coefficient of Correlation = .978904
Standard Error of Estimate = 1.7327
n1 = 97
When the value of x is 144 then y is 105.463






Regression Table for Oklahoma Wholesale Gasoline 
Prices as a Percentage of the Base Month Price 










Regression 406.647 1 406.647
Residual 734.353 95 7.73003
Totals 1141 96 11.88542
Coefficient of Determination = .356396
Coefficient of Correlation = .596989
n2 = 97
When the value of x is 144 then y is 106.903









With 190 degrees of freedom t is definitely different
from zero at the 99 percent confidence level and therefore
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Table B.8
Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices for Regular-Grade Gasoline 
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Price
Post-1964 +







































































































































































































































































































Average Oklahoma Refinery Prices for Regular-Grade Gasoline 
as a Percentage of the Base Month’s* Prices 
Post-1964 + (continued)










































+From December 1964 through December 1972
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Table B.9
Wholesale Price Index (All Commodities) as Prepared by the United States Department 
of Labor, as Adjusted to the 1947-49 Base Period, and Presented 
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Index Value
Post-1964 +




Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 














Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-40 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-40 Base



















































Wholesale Price Index All Commodities) as Prepared by the United States Department 
of Labor, as Adjusted to the 1947-49 Base Period and presented
as a Percentage of the Base Month's* Index Value
Post-1964 (continued)




Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base 




















































Value as Adjusted to 47-49 Base


















































+From December 1964 through December 1972
188 
the slopes of the regression curves are not similar. The 
conclusion must be accepted that the wholesale price index 
is inappropriate for this period.
Part III. The tabulated results of the t test applied 
to the comparison of the slopes of regression lines for 
wholesale gasoline prices before and after the change in the 
oil import program follow:
Table B.10
Regression Table for Oklahoma Wholesale Gasoline 
Prices as a Percentage of the Base Month Price 









Regression 7,13256 1 7,13256
Residual 4,28932 46 .093246
Totals 11,4219 47 .243019
F = 76.4918
Coefficient of Determination = .624465
Coefficient of Correlation = .790231
Standard Error of Estimate = .305362







Regression Table for Oklahoma Wholesale Gasoline 
Prices as a Percentage of the Base Month Price 









Regression 11.7411 1 11.7411
Residual 14.8019 46 .32178
Total 26.543 47 .5547446
F = 36.4879
Coefficient of Determination = .442342
Coefficient of Correlation = .665088
Standard Error of Estimate = .567257
When the value of x is 93 then y is 13.2642










With 92 degrees of freedom, t is definitely from
zero at the 99 percent confidence level, This fact implies 
that the data are not from the same population even though
190
it is known that the firms in the market place have not 
changed appreciably and demand has increased over this time 
interval.
APPENDIX C





Winter has historically been a slack season for the 
electric utilities. As a consequence, their marketing 
personnel have developed a successful promotional campaign 
designed to induce homeowners to heat with electricity. 
Coupled with this campaign was a materially reduced cost 
based upon the marginal cost to the electric company. In 
addition to the rate reduction during the winter months, 
those who heat with electricity have also received a 
reduction in rate throughout the rest of the year. The 
author assumed that this reduction was justified on the 
grounds of increased consumption at a single facility, i.e., 
on the grounds of lower distribution costs. Such an 
assumption does not seem to hold true for commercial 
deliveries of electrical power. Although the average 
commercial user consumes more electrical energy than the 
average residential consumer, the national average cost per 
kilowatt-hour is more for the commercial user than for the 
residential user.
Until a careful study is made of the current 
situation, these reasons for price discrimination all appear 
logical applications of sound economic theory. To study 
the matter further it becomes necessary to examine both 
sales to ultimate consumers and average revenue by type of 
consumer. In December, 1972, the average revenue per 
kilowatt-hour for the three natural divisions of ultimate
193
consumers was as follows:1
1. Residential users 1.73₡ per kwh.
2. Commercial users 1.95¢ per kwh.
3. Industrial users . 96¢ per kwh.
The reason for the favorable rate to industry is 
made more clear when considered in the light of the 
regulations imposed on electric utilities. Since return on 
investment is carefully controlled by regulatory agencies, 
there are three ways to increase profit, considering only 
revenue:
1. Keep high-revenue projects out of the rate base.
2. Maintain low-revenue products in the rate base.
3. Increase the size of the rate base.
The telephone company has been rather successful in the 
manipulation of methods 1 and 2 above, i.e., setting up 
subsidiaries and selling "special services" outside the 
rate base. Subsidiaries of American Telephone and Telegraph 
control patents on touchtone phones, princess phones and 
other special options available to subscribers outside the 
rate base.
The electric utilities have not been successful in 
this area of discriminatory pricing and as a consequence 
have looked to an expanding rate base for their increases in 
profit. This constant attempt to expand the rate base has 
produced repeated regular blackouts and brownouts in certain 
areas of the country where total electric-generating
1Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics, 
December, 1972.
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facilities have been overtaxed due to oversubscription of 
customers. In this context the action of the electric 
utilities in reducing off-season rate, rather than 
penalizing peak-load users, is logical (to the industry) 
because it will allow an expansion of the revenue base 
rather than force a fight for higher returns on an existing 
base. Figure C.1 and Tables C.1 - C.4 present sales of 
electrical energy to ultimate consumers during the last 
seven years of the period under observation by months. For 
several consecutive years each winter's peak for 
residential users exceeded the previous summer's high.
To get a clearer picture of what actually causes the 
extreme summer consumption, Figure C.2 and Tables C.5 - 
C.6 show total sales, total sales less residential sales, 
and total sales less commercial sales. This graph clearly 
demonstrates that it is commercial sales that cause our high 
summer consumption while the total sales less commercial 
sales shows that the winter brownouts are due to residential 
users' demands for heating. The energy crisis as it 
pertains to the generation of electrical energy is real and 
has been caused in part by this frantic rush to sign up more 
subscribers. The current advertising (in effect for the 
last several years) coupled with the discriminating rate for 
home-heating purposes has added to the problem.
Logically, advertising for total-electric homes 
should not be allowed if it is the utilization of the slack 




Residential, Commercial, and Industrial Sales 
of Electrical Energy 1966-1972
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics.
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Table C.1
Electrical Consumption of Residential Users 
1966 to 1972, in 000's of kwh
Source:
Month 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
January 28,333,064 31,245,157 34,640,452 39,034,709 42,543,533 . 44,554,043 46,250,689
February 28,481,154 29,326,152 33,024,336 36,281,014 40,035,784 43,166,376 45,592,560
March 26,709,969 28,892,683 32,119,489 35,152,272 37,303.178 40,654,399 43,537,422
April 24,390,597 26,400,500 28,428,208 31,856,319 34,920,695 37,476,533 40,427,733
May 22,979,361 25,363,327 26,690,874 28,916,852 32,896,086 34,671,705 38,057,805
June 24,013,471 26,608,040 29,065,310 31,737,003 35,165,414 34,493,566 • • • •
July 28,300,319 29,845,426 33,242,276 39,653,187 41,993,068 46,999,722 47,762,635
August 29,760,336 30,608,987 36,250,866 41,862,885 44,852,093 46,413,295 51,068,318
September 27,840,214 28,867,483 34,919,271 39,492,681 44,786,776 46,245,415 51,068,318
October 24,690,912 26,287,099 29,481,353 33,367,337 38,610,580 40,972,422 • . • •
November 24,511,883 26,669,604 29,154,495 32,275,506 34,730,517 38,017,401 41,667,137
December 27,602,394 30,217,486 33,443,250 36,629,282 39,160,586 41,950,273 47,049,438
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics, 1966 to 1972.
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Table C.2
Electrical Consumption of Commerical Users 
1966 to 1972, in 000,s of kwh
Source:
Month 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
January 16,733,145 18,371,584 20,220,517 22,091,419 24,128,646 25,881,162 27,888,043
February 16,721,017 17,941,450 19,906,518 21,579,076 23,753,326 25,683,107 27,929,036
March 16,736,551 18,187,108 19,828,646 21,394,201 23,419,890 25,276,675 27,846,161
April 16,633,207 17,934,138 19,338,266 21,060,966 23,237,928 24,888,597 27,750,530
May 16,966,155 17,976,926 19,955,537 21,540,677 24,110,730 24,915,553 27,981,038
June 18,648,654 19,777,118 21,675,517 23,781,204 26,125,928 27,561,982 • • • •
July 20,822,197 21,396,778 23,617,598 26,046,352 28,085,755 30,727,002 32,099,712
August 21,266,123 22,246,611 24,879,619 26,928,046 29,051,264 30,422,309 33,516,438
September 20,510,651 21,421,950 23,994,077 26,505,780 28,929,424 30,710,095 33,446,565
October 18,363,100 19,955,001 22,073,617 23,952,703 26,702,944 28,734,949 • • • •
November 17,490,169 18,953,507 20,835,718 22,619,679 24,338,757 27,099,684 29,365,704
December 17,912,834 19,307,562 21,079,286 23,040,283 24,776,338 27,005,474 29,668,956
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics, 1966 to 1972.
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Table C.3
Electrical Consumption of Industrial Users
1966 to 1972 in 000's of kwh
Source:
Month 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
January 36,998,928 39,692,110 42,088,360 44,648,534 46,440,222 47,500,985 50,162,990
February 36,074,581 38,315,613 41,500,540 43,948,452 45,749,257 47,420,641 50,150,584
March 37,421,308 39,633,517 42,014,317 45,103,510 47,313,220 48,844,114 51,474,043
April 37,506,296 39,307,017 42,396,050 45,494,362 47,002,851 48,792,613 51,405,564
May 38,562,280 40,339,437 43,609,996 46,544,901 48,153,436 49,333,816 52,955,700
June 38,933,543 40,862,265 43,336,785 47,319,968 49,226,033 50,201,951 ....
July 38,854,799 40,434,934 43,123,673 47,062,212 48,432,928 49,310,460 52,495,100
August 40,130,093 42,024,352 44,175,294 48,223,324 49,077,462 49,261,610 54,610,524
September 40,121,578 41,584,017 44,234,667 48,417,587 49,176,215 50,214,451 55,218,337
October 39,774,275 41,703,720 44,603,808 48,537,852 48,505,796 50,130,185 ....
November 39,420,903 41,290,069 44,030,828 47,140,837 46,952,092 49,637,676 54,937,992
December 39,212,577 41,088,638 44,030,680 47,266,028 47,275,000 49,062,172 53,428,350
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics, 1966 to 1972.
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Table C.4
Electrical Consumption of Total Ultimate Users
1966 to 1972, in 000's of kwh
Source:
Month 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
January 85,012,597 92,556,023 100,556,289 109,657,803 117,190,102 122,223,769 128,765,777
February 84,192,415 88,759,465 97,928,371 105,501,135 113,487,517 120,439,052 128,210,323
March 83,861,060 89,969,331 97,402,912 105,457,004 111,930,210 118,956,243 127,366,172
April 81,359,769 86,742,394 93,435,047 102,044,741 109,022,580 115,212,262 123,946,619
May 81,411,260 86,845,565 95,591,462 100,663,436 109,073,700 112,985,153 123,388,545
June 84,489,453 90,397,635 97,445,983 106,551,866 114,474,146 120,446,565 • • * •
July 90,975,986 94,831,711 103,460,504 116,604,550 122,583,939 131,365,887 136,851,456
August 94,192,287 98,179,987 108,929,546 120,927,486 127,133,870 130,423,574 144,504,249
September 91,469,018 95,128,870 106,687,747 118,326,489 127,067,428 131,569,336 144,452,003
October 85,840,748 91,277,083 99,775,574 109,765,641 117,945,906 124,180,032 ....
November 84,479,225 90,234,184 97,613,702 105,920,489 110,124,366 119,053,597 130,690,021
December 87,870,368 94,124,259 102,316,190 110,980,206 115,434,029 122,450,264 135,012,831
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics, 1966 to 1972.
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Figure C.2
Selected Combinations of Electrical Consumption 
1966 to 1972, in Billions of kwh
Source:
Tables C.1, C.2, and C.4.
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Table C.5
Total Electrical Consumption Less Commerical Use 
1966 to 1972, in 000’s of kwh
Source:
Month 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
January 68,279,452 74,184,439 80,335,772 87,566,284 93,061,366 96,342,607 100,877,734
February 67,471,398 70,818,015 78,021,853 83,922,059 89,734,191 94,755,945 100,281,287
March 67,124,509 71,782,223 77,576,266 84,002,803 88,560,320 93,679,588 99,520,011
April 64,326,562 68,808,256 74,096,781 80,983,775 85,784,642 90,323,665 96,196,089
May 64,445,105 68,868,639 75,635,925 79,122,809 84,962,970 88,069,600 95,407,507
June 65,840,799 70,620,517 75,770,466 82,770,662 88,348,218 92,884,583 ....
July 70,153,789 73,434,923 79,842,906 90,558,198 94,498,184 100,638,885 104,751,744
August 72,926,164 75,933,306 84,049,927 93,999,440 98,082,606 100,001,265 110,957,744
September 70,958,367 73,706,920 79,693,670 91,820,709 98,138,004 100,859,241 111,005,438
October 67,477,648 71,322,082 77,701,957 86,812,938 91,239,962 95,445,083 ....
November 66,989,056 71,370,677 76,777,984 83,300,810 85,785,616 91,953,913 101,324,317
December 69,957,534 74,816,697 81,236,904 87,939,923 90,657,691 95,444,790 105,343,875
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics, 1966 to 1972.
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Table C.6
Total Electrical Consumption Less Residential Use 
1966 to 1972, in 000's of kwh
Source :
Month 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
January 56,679,533 61,310,866 65,915,837 70,622,994 74,646,569 77,669,726 82,515,088
February 55,711,261 59,433,313 64,904,035 69,220,121 73,451,733 77,322,676 82,617,783
March 57,151,091 61,076,948 65,283,423 70,304,732 74,677,032 78,301,844 83,828,750
April 56,969,172 60,341,894 65,006,847 70,188,422 74,101,885 77,735,729 83,518,886
May 58,431,899 61,482,238 68,900,588 71,751,628 76,177,614 78,313,448 85,330,740
June 60,475,982 63,789,595 68,380,673 74,814,863 79,308,732 81,952,999 ....
July 62,675,667 64,986,285 70,218,328 76,951,363 80,590,871 91,563,834 89,088,821
August 64,431,951 67,571,000 72,678,680 79,064,601 82,281,777 84,010,276 92,752,006
September 63,628,804 66,261,387 71,768,476 78,833,808 82,280,652 85,323,921 93,383,685
Octob er 61,149,836 64,989,984 70,294,221 76,398,304 79,335,326 83,207,610 • • • •
November 59,967,342 63,654,580 68,459,207 73,644,983 75,393,849 81,036,196 89,022,884
December 60,267,974 63,906,773 68,872,940 74,350,924 81,273,443 80,499,991 87,963,393
Federal Power Commission Electric Power Statistics, 1966 to 1972.
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the subscription of the same customer in the new home to 
total electric consumption to further increase the summer 
peak load clearly sets up a self-perpetuating slack period. 
The illustrations demonstrate that in 1971 and 1972 the 
residential sales considered alone reversed a previously 
existing trend to balance the summer and winter peaks which 
had almost been achieved (compare the summer of 1971 and 
the winter of 1971).
APPENDIX D
BASIC PHASE IV PRICING FORMULA AND
COMPUTATION INSTRUCTION SHEETS
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COMPUTATION INSTRUCTION SHEET - APPLICATION OF FORMULA PER § 150.356













COST/BBL - PD OF 
MEASUREMENT
2
Ck° COST/BBL - 
BASE PERIOD
3 Qtk BBLS - PERIOD OF MEASUREMENT
4 Q°k BBLS - BASE 
PERIOD
5 ctk Qtk IN S - PERIOD 
OF MEASUREMENT
1 X 3










8 Qkt-Q°k IN BBLS PURCHASED 3-4
9 x° AVERAGE COST/ BBL BASE PERIOD 6 / 4
10 x°(Ok t-o k °)
VOLUME ADJUSTMENT 
BASE PERIOD 9X8
11 A NET CRUDE COST 
PASS THROUGH
7-10
12 sn TOTAL S SALESPRIOR YR QTR.
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Table D.1 (continued)











1 = 2 
GASOLINE
i = 3
No. 2 0 
DIESEL
FUEL
i = 4 
OTHER
13 sin S SALES BYPRODUCT CLASS













17 qiit UNIT PERIOD
OF MEASUREMENT
18 p ii t
S PERIOD OF 




20 qii° UNIT BASE 
PERIOD
21 Piio qiio $ BASE PERIOD 19 X 20
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Table D.1 (continued)











1 = 2 
GASOLINE
1 = 3 
No. 2 D 
DIESEL 
FUEL








23 qi2t UNITS PERIOD OF 
MEASUREMENT
24 Pi2t qi2t
S PERIOD OF 





qi2° UNITS BASE 
PERIOD
27 pi2o qi2opi2o qi2o S BASE PERIOD 25 X 26
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) JU
28 p il t  q12t - 
pil° q il°
IN S PURCHASED 




IN S PURCHASED 
IMPORTED 24 - 27
30 pit-pioqio) IN S PURCHASED TOTAL
28 + 29
31 qiit-q° IN QTY PURCHASED DOMESTIC 17-20
32 qi2t-qi2o IN QTY PURCHASED 
IMPORTED
23 - 26
33 qit - qio
IN QTY PURCHASED 














i = 2 
GASOLINE
i - 3 
No. 2 D 
DIESEL
• FUEL
i - 4 
OTHER
BASE PD. PROD. SALES:
34 pij° J=1 PRICE/UNIT- 
CONSUMERS
35 UNITS SOLD- CONSUMERS
36 pijoqij° j=1 S SOLD - 
CONSUMERS
34 X 35
37 pijo j=2 PRICE/UNIT - RETAILERS
38 j=2 UNITS SOLO-RETAILERS
39 p°ij qij° j =2 S SOLO-RETAILERS 37 X 38
40 P° j =3 PRICE/UNIT— 
WHOLESALERS
41 q° j =3 UNIT SOLD—WHOLESALERS
42 S SOLO-WHOLESALERS 40 X 41
43 Σ(Pijoqijo) 
j























i - 2 
GASOLINE
i - 3 
No. 2 D 
DIESEL 
FUEL
i - 4 
OTHER■ PRICE DIFFERENTAILS (A):
46 A CONSUMERS;
WHOLESALERS 34 - 40
47 WEIGHTED /\ 36 X 46
48
A RETAILERS 
WHOLESALERS 37 - 40
49 WEIGHTED 39 X 48
50 TOTAL WEIGHTED A 47 + 49
51 TOTAL SALES— 
CONSUMER + RETAIL
36 + 39

































i = 1 
No. 2 
HEATING OIL
i = 2 
GASOLINE
i = 3 
No. 2 D 
DIESEL 
FUEL























































i = 2 
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i = 2 
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t = 3 
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CONSUMER 80 / 92
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The results of interviews reported were purposely 
divided into three size groupings. The groupings do not 
conform to any normal division of size but were selected for 
the primary purpose of revealing an indication of size while 
concealing specific identity. The groupings will be 
reported as follows:
1. A large company - 200,000 barrels per day.
2. An intermediate company - between 30,000 and
200,000 barrels per day.
3. A small company - less than 30,000 barrels per day
Company Z
The interview with Company Z, a larger company, was 
conducted with the manager of planning and economics.
Refinery investment decisions were under 
consideration by Company Z at various intervals throughout 
the period 1963 to 1973. Return on investment for totally 
new construction was considered submarginal. Primary 
expansion during the period was limited to existing 
facilities. Capacity was added in bottlenecked areas by 
rounding out capacity to the maximum output of existing, 
previously overbuilt, operations. This approach has 
produced an acceptable but not extremely gratifying return 
on investment. A more progressive approach was abandoned 
because the return forecast did not meet minimum acceptable 
requirements.
A representative of Company Z answered all questions
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but was very reluctant to volunteer any additional 
information on his own company. He did not have the same 
reluctance in commenting about other companies' operations 
and labeled one of the other firms contacted by this writer 
as a maverick. The reason expansion was possible for 
existing refineries was stated to be overcapacity of 
catalysts when they were first introduced in refineries. 
When considering the construction of totally new refineries 
this firm normally planned to close small, older, existing 
facilities and to contract a portion of the new refineries 
temporary excess production to other firms. Any plans for 
totally new construction are subject to availability of 
crude oil and therefore are not current. During the period 
under study Company Z reported investment costs on specific 
proposed projects which were more than 50 percent higher 
than when projects were first considered.
The interview disclosed a very strong need for 
greater flexibility in accounting to allow this company to 
conform more rapidly to the requirements of government 
regulations, specifically Phase IV controls. There was no 
opportunity to examine the results of postaudit evaluations 
of this firm. In fact, there was a specific firm statement 
to the contrary in the invitation to conduct the interview. 




The interview with Company Y, a small company, was 
conducted with the president. Company Y had been content to 
remain about the same size for most of the period 
considered. It is the subsidiary of another small company 
as far as refinery capacity is concerned. However, the 
parent has production facilities which assist both itself 
and the subsidiary of an intermediate-size refinery for a 
portion of its product distribution. The firm is somewhat 
unusual in its operation but those unusual features can not 
be mentioned without revealing identity.
The firm made several expansions in recent years 
and has realized a good return on its investments. The 
expansions were not construction of totally new facilities, 
but additions to existing plants, sometimes utilizing used 
equipment. Payout has been as brief as three years on 
pipeline investment and the company is assured a relatively 
steady availability of crude oil from that source. The firm 
has remained small even after expanding its processing of 
crude several times. The president was most cooperative and 
provided additional published information concerning general 
conditions in the industry. There was a review of specific 




The interview with Company X, a small company, was 
conducted with two different individuals. Company X had 
been acquired by another firm shortly prior to the 
interview. The initial contact was with the vice-president 
of marketing who explained the current operating 
characteristics of the new firm. The intense problems of 
the acquisition prevented a discussion with the current 
president, but the former president of Company X was located 
and was most cooperative in advising concerning operations 
of that company during the period under consideration. 
Company X was under severe competition in a limited 
geographical area with declining crude-oil availability and 
had to ship crude oil in by tank car. This firm was the 
subsidiary of another firm for most of the period under 
consideration. It had relatively heavy production of 
asphalt and suffered when in the words of its former 
president, "a competitor broke the asphalt price in 1968."
Company X's operation was a declining operation in a 
dying field. The new firm was rapidly expanding by 
acquiring small producing and refining companies in a rather 
intense pattern, having acquired at least five in less than 
two years. The strengths of some subsidiaries would offset 
the weaknesses of others and produced a rather sound 
structure. Had Company X not been acquired it probably 
would have ceased to exist.
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Company W
No interview was conducted with Company W, a small 
company. The specific reason given by the president was:
The title of your dissertation does sound 
interesting, and we appreciate your thinking of 
us to work with you in preparing your needed 
information. Due to the tremendous amount of 
paper work that is being generated through the 
various governmental control programs it would 
not be possible for us to devote the time to 
contribute to your efforts, and it would be wise 
for us to decline at this time.1
Company V
The interview with Company V, an intermediate-size 
company, was conducted with the vice-president of planning. 
The firm experienced two refinery expansions during the 
period of this study and obtained a minimal return on 
investment for both. Reasons other than return on invest­
ment prompted management to expand. In one instance the 
expansion involved a pipeline decision and in another 
instance the expansion involved upgrading to meet the new 
emissions requirements. The firm has a growing market for 
its product, a definite crude-oil deficiency, and follows a 
basic independent pricing approach to marketing. In a few 
areas the company marketed at major oil-company prices but 
in most areas it acted as an independent, pricing one or two 
cents below the major, with a firm policy of meeting the 
lowest price in the area.
1Name withheld by request.
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Although the normal tendency was for intermediate 
firms to experience modest returns on investment, this 
firm's minimal return is probably related to the type of 
expansion. Upgrading of the product usually requires new 
equipment but most firms of this size would normally 
consider used equipment for their other expansions.
Company U
The interview with Company U, a large company, was 
arranged by the public affairs department and conducted with 
a member of the controller's staff who was in charge of a 
special group monitoring Phase IV operations. The firm's 
representative had previous experience in refinery 
management and also in the corporate planning department.
In addition, there was also a discussion with the 
head of the economics department relative to the views 
expressed in Chapter 3. Company U was extremely cooperative. 
After disclosing requested information, the company 
permitted perusal of the correspondence files between its 
firm and the cost-of-living council and also Mr. Simon's 
energy group. The firm followed the general pattern for 
large companies and disclosed minimal returns on investment 
on totally new refinery facilities. The return on 
investment was better for expansion of existing facilities 
and the company indicated that reasons other than return on 
investment were primarily responsible for the final
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refinery-investment decisions. The merger of two large 
companies (for which no antitrust action was initiated) 
forced a shutdown of one of this firm's refineries.
The qualifications of the firm's representatives 
prompted some questions involving his personal opinion 
regarding economies of scale and a comparison of a large 
firm with a small firm. He listed the following advantages 
for a small firm:
1. An independent can move faster.
2. Can give better service.
3. Can tailor size to specific location and 
circumstances.
4. Has transportation economies.
5. Can build to merely meet state codes.
6. Is not troubled with hardening of the arteries
(rigid policies restricting freedom of movement) 
and may consider unique solutions to short-run 
problems.
7. Government favoritism existed.
8. The company can be an individualist.
9. The small firm will not encounter severe competitive 
pressures unless it is engaged in overgrowth 
(expands to some other firm's envisioned market).
In response to a direct question this representative stated 
that if he wished to he could start and successfully operate 
a small refinery in competition with the major company that 
is his present employer.
A study was prepared by this firm which compared the 
domestic integration balance with cumulative dealer tank­
wagon increases in cents per gallon. The results of this 
study provide data showing the extreme difference in 
competitive prices available to firms with very high 
domestic production and those with extremely low domestic 
production, particularly old production which is severely
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limited in crude-oil price compared to new produced oil and 
imported oil.
This firm did not engage in any product dumping 
during the period under observation and seemed to be rather 
unique in that regard. A specific cost method used for 
internal product-mix evaluation assigned a cost differential 
to the components of the product mix based on the latest 
cost to upgrade products by the latest techniques available. 
Company U favored a volume-oriented cost allocation under 
Phase IV controls and appeared to be instrumental in 
assisting in the adoption of this policy by the government.
Although cooperating fully with the questions 
asked and volunteering additional information of both a 
current and a historical development nature, the company did 
not allow a direct postaudit evaluation.
Company T
The interview with Company T, a large company, was 
conducted with the former head of forward planning (the 
operating head of forward planning at the time the 
decisions discussed were made) and a current member of the 
planning department. Brief contact was also made with the 
current vice-president in charge of forward planning.
Company T has established a pattern of marketing 
expansion which deliberately caused sales to exceed refinery 
capacity until a critical point was reached. At this time 
a refinery would be constructed which would somewhat exceed
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this company's total market demand so that for a short 
time excess refinery capacity would exist for the firm. The 
company found itself needing expansion in refinery capacity 
in the late 1960's and began a study which resulted in a 
refinery-investment decision. The study of return on 
investment was conducted merely as a precaution against a 
losing operation since the decision was largely based upon 
the firm's market demand. Was it more economical to buy 
product with which to meet this demand or to manufacture it?
The price of products during this period was 
depressed and the resultant financial analysis indicated 
that the refinery-investment decision would generate no 
large return on investment but rather would barely exceed 
the minimum requirement. The firm concluded that the 
alternative, purchasing their products from outsiders, was 
potentially the more expensive approach with even less 
potential return. An overriding consideration which seemed 
to be the deciding factor was the cost of construction 
itself. Company management decided that the time had come 
to construct a refinery because other companies were not 
constructing and favorable construction contracts were 
available.
Throughout the interview company representatives 
emphasized the important role of competition for both price 
and product-mix determination. They could not refute the 
argument that government regulatory agencies had exerted 
considerable influence in the price area, but they were
226
reluctant to emphasize this approach.
The company is using the equivalent of incremental 
costing techniques to determine refinery product mixes and 
production runs. Manufacturing or processing costs are 
fairly well established on different products, but no 
attempt is made to allocate the cost of raw material input 
by product for decision purposes. The company has been 
analyzing marketing costs in a similar fashion with the in­
tention of "backing up realized prices to the refinery gate."
Company T is just beginning to use Monte Carlo 
techniques for probability determination and is adopting 
extensive use of discounted cash flow. The firm has been 
developing incremental cost techniques assisted by the 
computer and appears to have manufacturing costs isolated 
with practical accuracy. Forward-planning personnel have 
little regard for any attempt to allocate the cost of crude 
oil among the various products and are reluctant to concede 
its desirability under any circumstance. Company personnel 
indicated the decision to build the refinery was indeed 
fortunate since present circumstances caused the project to 
exceed all expectations. Prices had recovered and the 
excess capacity planned prior to construction was 
immediately utilized upon completion of the refinery. This 
accelerated utilization of planned expansion capacity caused 
all projections at the time of the decisions to be surpassed 
by considerable margins. For these reasons and also due to 
a lack of operating performance time, management decided
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against an outsider conducting a postaudit evaluation. The 
cooperation of Company T greatly exceeded expections in 
two areas:
1. The decision reviewed was extremely current.
2. The company made available the person actually 
involved in the original decision, and he was 
quite open and candid in his comments.
Company S
This intermediate-size company, Company S, was 
represented in the interview by its president. At the time 
of the interview the firm's refining capacity exceeded daily 
production by 10,000 barrels and was only slightly over half 
of the firm's market for products. The firm acquired two 
refineries at relatively close intervals. One acquisition 
was in substance a financial transaction; however, it 
became unexpectedly profitable to operate both refineries 
for a while. Later, the refinery investment was developed 
at one location and the other location was abandoned.
The president of this firm was quite cooperative 
and spent much time on background information. In the 
1930's the Interstate Oil Compact established allowable 
production for many producing states. The allowables were 
at a high of 100 percent during World War II and ranged down 
to as low as 20 percent at one time. These allowables 
provided a strong inducement for United States companies to 
go to foreign countries for exploration. The allowables 
were primarily a price-protecting device which kept marginal
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producing wells in existence.
The president discussed Truman's standby reserve 
capacity requested following the Korean conflict, the impact 
of the Suez Canal blockage, and the threat of cheap foreign 
oil which ushered in the import program. The oil-import 
program was first introduced as a voluntary measure. 
However, several firms immediately took steps to defeat its 
intent. Commonwealth and Phillips were successful in 
installing refineries in Puerto Rico with almost 100 percent 
imported crude oil. Hess succeeded in the Virgin Islands 
with a similar program and it was not until an attempt was 
made to install a refinery in Maine utilizing imports 
exclusively that the pattern was broken. Occidental's 
efforts to thwart the oil import program were defeated. 
Following this defeat, the import program became mandatory 
in 1959. This import program with its import quotas kept 
marginal refineries in existence as explained in Chapter 3. 
Firms were mentioned that existed solely on the value of the 
import tickets.
Additional insights into marketing problems were 
revealed to be due to loosely worded long-term contracts, 
originally negotiated between friendly firms. Personnel 
changes and time caused one firm to seek to take 
advantage of the poorly worded contract. These contracts 
took the form of guaranteed margin and provided an advantage 
to the purchaser whenever the prices were depressed, since 
the seller bore all the loss.
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This firm provided some very factual information 
concerning the increase in both the size and cost of a 
totally new refinery. Each of the following proposals was 
considered and rejected due to inadequate return on invest 








1. 66-67 90,000 80 to 90
2. 69-70 100,000 100 plus
3. 71 130,000 175 plus
4. 72 150,000 to
200,000
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Company S was one of the few intermediate-size firms 
considering totally new refinery investments. Management 
could not be convinced on the financial data. The firm even 
considered partnership with a major oil company but without 
success.
In addition to the information presented, this firm's 
representative reviewed the basic material in Chapters 2 and 
3, making appropriate comments but not refuting the logic. 
This firm later acquired Company K.
Company R
A large firm, Company R was represented in the 
interview by its planning coordinator. The firm decided 
to expand capacity 35,000 barrels per day by retiring some 
units and making a major addition to an existing refinery. 
This company followed a regular pattern of expansion at a
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rapid pace, buying product to fulfill growing demand and 
building refineries only when there was assured demand for 
company product. During the late 1960's while normal 
market expansion for most companies was between 7 and 7 1/2 
percent, this firm experienced almost a 9 percent growth 
rate in gasoline market demand. At the time of the 
investment decision, refinery capacity was clearly behind 
market expansion; yet, the acquisition of market share was 
so favorable that the marketing department received approval 
for additional expansion. The study took a discounted 
cash-flow projection form and the return on investment, 
stated in the interview but not reported here for obvious 
reasons, was very disappointing to the firm's management. 
Historically the company did not allow capacity to exceed 
sales. Even after this decision, refinery capacity was 
15,000 barrels per day less than sales and production was 
considerably less than that.
Other firms were not constructing refineries during 
this period. Company R was forced into a decision by a 
deadline for deciding its participation in a pipeline 
project. Dwindling productive capacity in the area coupled 
with a fear of insufficient crude supplies at a later date 
propelled the firm into an early study. The firm thus took 
positive action while ecological problems were causing 
others to defer action. The off-cycle timing for refinery 
expansion created a considerable saving in refinery 
construction costs.
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This firm was interviewed twice. When the first 
contact was made the large expansion appeared to be a 
mistake due to the tremendous downward pressure on product 
prices. However, patience proved the investment decision 
to be wise. The planning coordinator, somewhat reluctant 
to disclose internal errors to outside personnel, changed 
his thought and cooperated fully when the decision proved to 
be favorable (as his initial study had indicated it should). 
In this particular instance the planning coordinator had 
reviewed (in the form of a postaudit evaluation) the 
original investment decision for management at the time of 
the first contact. He took the time to reacquaint himself 
with the decision and the evaluation and discussed both 
quite freely, even mentioning in confidence figures that 
were not for publication. More than a year elasped between 
the first and the second visits to this firm.
Company Q
Company Q was represented by both the vice-president 
of planning and a member of his department. It is a fully 
integrated oil company with two major refineries. The 
accounting department of this intermediate-size company has 
gone through several accounting methods, including an 
adjusted Group Three price less discount, a commission-base 
operation, and a transfer price system. Currently, all 
refinery operations are handled as one profit center with no 
attempt to define profit for any segment. The company
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uses a standard cost system with variance analysis. The 
firm is basically a cut-rate marketer of petroleum products.
At one point in the existence of Company Q the firm 
tried to move up to a major marketing style. Discriminatory 
prices were inadvertently attempted with no discrimination 
in product name. Large, modern, multibay stations were 
built in areas where the company's discount stations were 
still located. The new stations had major pricing and the 
old stations discount pricing. As might be expected, the 
customers viewed the new stations as peddlers of cut-rate 
gasoline at high prices. The company returned to cut-rate 
marketing policy exclusively. This firm has a flexible 
pricing policy, evaluating each situation and establishing 
price based on appearance. Poor stations with poor 
appearance could cut price by two cents without causing 
concern but one that appeared competitive would be allowed 
no price differential. This company did not favor either 
import quotas or the entire import program.
A specific refinery-investment decision was examined 
and was reported in Chapter 5 on page 140. The firm is a 
net purchaser of crude oil and experienced extreme 
difficulty in obtaining crude-oil requirements. The 
pressure of current shortages forces a closing of many 
stations including most of the new stations recently built. 
The firm is in a fairly competitive position after these 
closings. The planning department emphasized its opposition 
to any breakdown of costs in its product mix.
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Company P
Company P, a small company, was represented in the 
interview by both the refining manager and vice president of 
marketing. There were no expansion plans considered during 
the period under study. The stated objectives of this 
refinery was "to survive," and the pricing policy was "the 
price required to move the product."
Other sources, outside this firm, add somewhat to 
the picture of Company P’s operations. Originally held by a 
major oil company, this refinery was sold to a firm outside 
the industry. The increase in import allowables resulting 
from the refinery size reduction (see Table 4.7, page 123) 
facilitated payout and improved the economics of this 
acquisition. The operation of the refinery was controlled 
by the same manager, i.e., he was acquired from the major 
with the refinery.
Company O
The views of Company 0, a large company, were 
presented during the interview by a director of operations 
analysis in the planning division. Repeated studies 
convinced the planning personnel that the return on 
investment from totally new refinery construction did not 
come close to meeting their lowest acceptable return on 
investment. The appropriate expansion pattern therefore 
appeared to be expansion of existing facilities and 
acquisition of any major facilities that could be purchased.
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The firm carefully pursued this course of action and 
represents an exception to the rule for large firms. All 
large firms have indicated poor returns on investment from 
totally new refinery facilities. However, Company 0 has not 
constructed totally new refineries for any reason, including 
nonfinancial.
The Company 0 representative explained several 
pricing schemes which appeared to be generally used by the 
industry. These included the crude-replacement-value method 
and particularly the incremental barrel which he maintained 
has been sold over the last ten years. A detailed 
discussion of the inherent flaw in this approach is 
presented in Chapter 3, beginning on page 63.
The basic conflict between the engineering and the 
accounting viewpoints on cost allocation first appeared 
during this interview. An inadequacy in reporting for 
planning purposes was resolved by methods not involving 
the accounting department. The firm is currently using 
computer output for cost allocation and makes only the final 
year-end adjustment with a price-relative cost allocator. 
Hostility existed at one time between the accounting and 
planning departments and there is evidence that this 
relationship has not fully returned to a spirit of 
cooperative mutual assistance.
In addition to the director of operations analysis, 
brief discussions were held with the manager of the planning 
division and the vice president of refining.
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Company N
The interview with Company N, a small company, was 
conducted with its president. Two expansions were completed 
during the period under study. Specific discussions 
centered on the second expansion. The president indicated 
that the depressed prices for petroleum products hit such a 
low that refinery construction had to end before the project 
was fully completed. The refinery was completed to a stage 
which allowed it to go on stream but many of the auxiliary 
facilities planned had to be postponed.
The return on investment during this period was 
characterized as "bad." Additional facts are required to 
fully understand the implications of this response. Company 
N has constructed its entire refinery from used equipment. 
Most of this equipment was purchased at very favorable 
prices but is in excellent condition. Some was acquired for 
as little as 10 percent of new-equipment cost. The firm is 
not content with its present size and has expansions planned 
for the future. During the depressed price periods this 
firm made less than the value of the import allowables to 
which it was entitled; without the allowables it would have 
lost money.
Although the firm is very conscious of ecological 
problems and has instituted many improvements in its 
refinery operation, there was no intention of constructing 
facilities to meet no-lead-gasoline-production capability. 
The president indicated a loss of approximately one dollar
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a barrel before administrative costs on a rather substantial 
volume of residual fuel. He also stated that any time 
government decision makers sit down and control the market 
there is going to be trouble. To support his statement he 
referred to a cargo of diesel fuel in a market close to his 
refinery which sold for sixty-two cents a gallon before tax. 
At the same time the same product at this terminal was about 
half that price. Quite simply, if his product could have 
been transported to the market mentioned and sold at the 
price of the other shipment, a twenty-five-cent-per-gallon 
profit would have resulted. He further stated that similar 
things have happened to gasoline prices.
Company M
Company M, of intermediate size, was the first firm 
contacted and as such represented a pilot project. The 
senior representative of the economics department provided 
the basic contact. Company M had engaged in an unusual 
study of cost over normal operating ranges using the 
incremental approach. Computer output revealed a similarity 
of costs for each of three products in the distillate 
range. Although operating personnel seemed pleased with 
this study and management implemented changes based on it, 
reservations are held concerning its validity.
The initial product mix of a refinery is determined 
only after a series of multiple comparisons involving types 
of crude oils available, product demands in the geographical
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area, and the effect of competitive forces upon the firm's 
products. These interacting forces are so complex that 
computer models and professional consultants are often 
needed to arrive at some semblance of an optimum mix. The 
particular study in question proposed the introduction of an 
additional volume of crude oil to be made entirely into each 
of three separate products in the distillate range under 
three hypothetical cases, each case dealing with a separate 
product. To accomplish this it was necessary to modify the 
normal refinery output slightly for each barrel of crude 
input, moving away from a previously determined optimum mix 
to an inefficient position. The amount of this change was 
controlled by flexibility available.
The distillates involved seemed to affect the same 
blending stocks. Although the writer was not familiar with 
the stocks involved, they had the same variable names on the 
computer run. Therefore under normal circumstances each 
computer output was determining the result of a move away 
from optimum under which all competitive forces and 
available supplies had been considered and was instead 
substituting the consideration of the result of only one 
product change. Under normal conditions such a move would 
not be advantageous. A request to look at the price side of 
this study was denied. Repeated assurances were given that 
company personnel had examined these prices and that they 
were not depressed by the additional output. These sustained 
prices despite increased output could only mean that the
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firm had either discovered a hole in the market or a flaw in 
its original estimation of product demand.
The logical result of a discovery that costs were 
constant throughout an operating range was a move to the 
highest-revenue product since the products had different 
revenue potential. Accordingly, a major plant modification 
was made which maximized the output of that product. A 
postaudit evaluation of this management decision was 
prepared and indicated a good return on the investment. 
This printed evaluation and the computer runs evaluating 
cost were made available to the author during the interview.
Company L
Company L was a small company and declined the 
interview for the following reasons:
I regret to advise that the only project we 
have that would require new investment has been 
deferred due to the fact that cost factors in 
our business are practically changing daily and 
in fact fluctuating to such an extent that there 
is no way to develop economic studies at this 
time.1
This firm doubled capacity during later years of 
the period under study.
Company K
Numerous attempts were made to interview the 
president of company K, an intermediate-size firm, until it 
was learned that the reason he was so occupied was that
1-Name withheld by request.
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company K was being acquired by company S. Since the 
management of company S's opinions had already been obtained, 
neither company was approached further.
Company J
Company J was one of the first large companies to be 
contacted by correspondence. An indirect route through 
local management was attempted and this approach proved to 
be poor. The firm declined for the following reason:
As I am sure you will understand, ... receives 
a great number of requests both from governmental 
and nongovernmental sources. The burden of 
responding to these becomes such that in the 
interests of stockholders and from the standpoint 
of good business practice it has been necessary to 
restrict our participation in activities such as 
yours principally to those legally required.
Company I
The president of company I was most cooperative,
but he had controlled this small company for such a short 
time that he had neither studied nor instituted any 
increases in size. He was relatively new to the business 
and had nothing to contribute to the material already 
acquired.
Company H
Company H, a small company, is a subsidiary of a firm 
that is not in the petroleum industry. The interview was 
conducted with the manager of the planning and economics
2Name withheld by request.
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department. The basic facilities have existed for some time 
and have been improved at regular intervals. A recent 
investment decision involving a Platformer (equipment which 
combines lighter fractions into gasoline) increased 
production of gasoline from 35 to 55 percent. The decision 
had to be "sold" to a tough-minded management on a return- 
on-investment basis. A postcompletion review of the 
operation disclosed it had met or exceeded expectations.
The firm has attempted to keep labor and operating 
costs below the industry average and to excel in station 
location and efficient station format. The basic marketing 
policy during the period under study has been to emphasize 
volume with a basic two-cent differential in price. One 
objective of this firm is to maximize the profit of the 
refining department. To accomplish this goal required a 
flexible computer-assisted evaluation of possible input and 
output combinations. This firm indicated a strong tendency 
toward short-short run product-mix flexibility.
Company G
The interview with Company G, a small company, was 
conducted with its president. The firm was formerly owned 
by another oil company and moved from a branded to an 
unbranded marketing position. It relied quite heavily on 
the small-business set-aside program to allow it to exist 
under the extreme pressure of recent years. Its pricing 
policy has been one cent under tank-wagon price and is
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exclusively wholesale except for the jet-fuel operation. 
The only expansion considered by this firm increased its 
capacity by 25 percent. Idle equipment was used to rework 
the units, and therefore an excellent return on investment 
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The premise of this study is that certain policies 
within and without the petroleum industry have interacted 
to produce semirigid industry prices. One effect of this 
price rigidity is the inflexibility that is passed on to 
costs whenever the traditional joint-cost-accounting 
allocation (based on relative market value) is used in 
conjunction with these prices.
In studying the problem, activities and policies 
which combined to cause artificial price restraints in the 
petroleum-refining industry from 1963 to 1972 were 
reviewed. The accounting and economic implications and the 
effect on refinery investment of the resulting semirigid 
prices were investigated.
Published wholesale gasoline prices were compared 
with the wholesale price indexes from 1963 to 1972. The 
gasoline price trend was significantly different from the 
intense inflationary trend which began in 1964. A test of 
regression line slopes covering the inflationary period 
resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis of slope 
similarity. Therefore, no adjustment for price-level 
changes was necessary.
A major reversal in the wholesale gasoline price 
trend was found to be centered on 1959, and appears to be 
caused by the Oil Import Program. Marginal cost pricing 
1
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when discontinuities existed, coupled with industry policy 
rigidities, added to the undesirable effect of government 
involvement in the refined-products marketing picture. 
This involvement was further complicated by rigid policies 
and biases of other nonindustry groups.
Unyielding adherence by each group to policies that 
needed modification appeared to cause the price rigidities. 
Government officials pursued a low-cost-energy policy with 
a threefold effect: (1) A low-price natural-gas policy 
encouraged consumption and held competing product prices 
low. (2) Import restrictions on residual fuel oil were 
frequently reduced to maintain low prices, increasing 
import dependency. (3) The wholesale gasoline price was 
attacked from the two following sources when a dispro­
portionate percentage of crude oil was allowed to marginal 
producers: (A) Government policies interacted with a
marginal-cost pricing scheme to produce an unstable price­
depressing effect in the industry. (B) The government 
then forced a rollback in price advances of refined pro­
ducts by threatening complete removal of import controls. 
These external interferences placed upward rigidities on 
price and drove the average return on investment for the 
industry below the national average for all manufacturers.
Uncertainties introduced by ecological consid­
erations, along with the low return on investment, 
temporarily halted most new construction. Large companies 
changed from a policy favoring totally new refinery
3 
construction to one which balanced refinery facilities. 
Smaller firms continued to rely heavily on construction 
with used equipment to hold down investment costs.
Without modification, the economic models presented 
in the literature failed to explain the activities of an 
industry with all the outward appearance of an oligopoly. 
The refining industry appeared (for a limited time) to be 
unable to function as an oligopoly. The writer attempted 
to show the possible effects of government intervention by 
presenting two modified economic models. Both the 
conventional kinked-demand-curve approach and one designed 
to provide for external as well as internal constraints 
were considered.
A review of the price-relative joint-cost allocator 
disclosed a time interval during which this accounting 
allocator proved invalid. Inquiry revealed an industry 
trend toward the managerial use of a volume allocator 
rather than the price-relative cost allocator. The 
industry, now faced with extensive planning and control 
problems, will face even more pressing requirements for 
detailed accounting information. Thus it seems essential 
for the industrialist and the academicians to work 
together in striving for a more realistic solution to the 
cost-allocation problem, a solution which may be multi­
staged .
